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... 
26th CoNGREss, 
1st Session. 
[SENATE.] 
MESSAGE 
FROM 
-451] 
THE PRESIDENT OF 'rHE UNITED STATES, 
TRANSMITTING 
A report from the Secretary of War, in compliance 'l()ith a resolution of the 
enate, in relation to the military and naval defences of the country. 
APRIL 27, 1840. 
Read: and referred to the Committee on Military Atfairs. 
MAY 8, 1840. 
Ordered to be printed, and the committee dischargecl. 
To the Senate of the United States : 
I transmit, herewith, a report and accompanying documents from the 
Secretary of War, which furnish the information, in relation to that por-
tion of the defences of the country intrusted to the charge and direction 
of the Department of War, called for by the resolution of the Senate of 
the 2d of March, 1839. 
M. VAN BUREN. 
W .ASHINGTON CITY, April24, 1840. 
W kR DEPAR'rMENT, April24, 1840. 
Sm: On the 2d of March, 1839, the Senate" Resolved, That the Pres-
ident of the United States be requested to cause to be laid before the 
Senate, at the commencement of the next session of Congress, reports 
upon the military and naval defences of the country ; showing-
" 1st. The fortifications, or other permanent defences, commenced, 
completed, projected, or deemed necessary: 1. For the northern frontier, 
from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay. 2. For the maritime frontier, 
from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape Florida. 3. The Gulf frontier, from 
Cape Florida to the Sabine bay. 4. The western frontier, from the Sabine 
bay to Lake Superior; with a conjectural' estimate of the probable expense 
of constructing or completing such works ~s may not yet have been ·com-
pleted or commenced. ··· · 
"2d. The state of the armament of the fortifications, so far as the same 
may be completed or commenced, with a conjectural estimate of the ..ex-
pense of completing the armament of all the forts which may be com-
menced, or deemed necessary to be constructed. 
Blair & Rives1 prioters, 
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"3d. The armories, arsenals, magazines, and foundries, either con 
structed or deemed necessary ; with a conjectural estimate of the expense 
of constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed 
or commenced, but which may be deemed necessary. 
"4th. The floating or steam batteries, or vessels which have been con-
structed in aid of fortifications, or may be deemed necessary to be con-
structed in aid of such works, with a conjectural estimate of the expense 
which the same may require. 
" 5th. The ships of war built, or under construction, or deemed neces-
smy to be built, with a conjectural estimate of the expense of building 
and arming the vessels not yet completed or commenced, or which may 
be deemed necessary within a reasonable time. 
"6th. The navy yards, docks, and naval establishments of every kind, 
either constructed or commenced, or deemed necessary, with the probable 
expense of completing the same. 
" ·with any other information or suggestions which the President may 
deem necessary to be communicated to Congress, in order to exhibit a 
full view of what is necessary to be done, and the probable cost thereof, 
to place the United States in a proper state of defence by land and water, 
and on each of the four great lines of defence which her frontiers present." 
This resolution having been referred by you to this department, with 
instructions to furnish the information required in relation to the matters 
under its jurisdiction and control, a board of able and experienced officers 
was appointed to take the whole subject into consideration, and to make 
a full and detailed report on the various points of inquiry involved. The 
report of that board I have now the honor to submit. The great incon-
venience to the service which would have resulted from assembling, at an 
earlier period, the officers who composed the board, and the important in-
terests embraced in the subjects submitted to them, have occasioned the 
delay which has occurred in furnishing the information called for by 
the resolution. 
In presenting this report, I beg leave to state that I fully concur with 
the board, both as to the manner it is proposed to defend our maritime and 
inland fr0ntiers, and in the selection of sites for the works of defence. 
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
J. R. POINSETT. 
To the PRESIDENT of the United States. 
wASHINGTON, Ap1·il 23, 1840. 
SIR: The board of officers, to whom so much of the resolution of the 
Senate of the United States of the 2d of March, 1839, as relates to the mih-
tary defences of the country, was committed, have the honor to subn1it the 
following reports, namely: 
1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passama-
quoddy to the Sabine. ·( 
This is divided into two .distipct portions, viz: the coast from Passama-
quo~dy., tg Cape Florida. ; and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sauine 
bay.·· .' , .. 
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2d. Rtport on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior 
o Passamuq11oddy bay. 
3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake 'Su-
perior. · 
Connected with these reports are tabular statements showing the "per-
manent defences commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" 
"w1th conjectural estimates of the probable expense of constructing or com-
pleting such works as may not yet have been completed or commenced." 
4th. Report on " the armories, arsenals, magazines, and foundries, 
eithe" constructed or deemed necessary, with a conjectural estimate of the 
expense of r-onstructing' such of said establishments as may not yet be 
completed or commenced, but which may be deemed necessary." 
Hon. J. R. PoiNS~<~TT, 
Secretar'!J of JiJT ar. 
:. ;~ •' 
\ . 
. ~-
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REI10RT 
ON 
THE DEFENCE OF THE ATLANTIC FRONTIER, FROM P ASSAMAQUODDY '1'0 
THE SABINE. 
So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several oc-
casions, within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and 
military otficer:s, by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individ-
ual officers, who have at various times been called on to treat the same sub-
ject, that, in quoting their opinions, we should, for the greater part, express 
our own. But though these reports are, some of them, comprehensive and 
elaborate, we suppose that an explicit statement of our views, at least as to 
the great principles on which the system of defence should be erected, is 
expected from us ; especially as the system now in progress has been the 
subject of a criticism which, considering the high official source whence it 
emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed the confidence of the public 
therein. 
The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamen-
tal principles1 and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly 
dangerous, will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove 
tedious; this, however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the sub-
ject for eJX~use, if not for justification. 
The principal errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to, are-
1. That, for the defence of the coast, the chief reliance should be on the 
navy. 
2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be intro-
duced wherever they can be used. 
3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions; and, consequently, 
4. The.t the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are 
unnecessarily large for the purposes they have to fulfil. 
On these topics, together with other errors of the same nature, we shall 
feel constrained to enlarge. 
The first question that presents itself is this : What, in general terms, 
shall be the means of defence ? 
We have a seacoast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, 
along which lie scattered all the great cities; all the depots of commerce; 
alJ the establishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair; and towns, 
villages, and establishments of private enterprise, without number. From 
this line of seacoast, navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of 
which are similarly occupied, penetrate deep into the heart of the country. 
How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from 
hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the 
prosperity of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from 
the ocean, is, as regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness1 
Shall t~e defence be by a navy exclusively ? 
*See Sen11.te document No. 2~3, p. I, 24th Congress l$t se::;sion-vol. 4. 
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The opinion that the navy is the true defence of the country is so ac-
ceptable and popular, and is sustained by snch high authority, that it de-
mands a careful examination. 
Before going into this examination, we will premise, that by the term 
"navy" is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle ships, frigates, smaller 
sailing vessels, and armed steam-ships; omitting vessels constructed for local 
uses merely, such as floating batteries. 
For the purpose of first considflring this proposition in its simplest terms, 
we will begin by supposing the nntion to possess but a single seaport, and 
that this is to be defended by a fleet alone. 
By remaining constantly within this port, our fleet would be certain of 
meeting the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there 
would be no reason to look for a snccessful defencB; and as there could be 
no escape for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of avert-
ing the issue, would only render it the more calamitous. 
Should onr fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, 
and it probably would be so. Still, hazard-some of the many mishaps 
liable to attend colltests of this nature-might decide against us; and, in 
that event, the consequences would be even more disastrous than on the 
preceding supposition. In this case, the chances of victory to the two 
parties would be equal, but the consequences very unequal. It might be 
the enemy's fate to lose his whole fleet, but he could lose nothing more; 
while we, in a similar event, would lose, not only the whole fleet, but also 
the object that the fleet was designed to protect. 
If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would, in all respects, 
be complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy \Vould, in such 
case, employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean ; and noth-
ing could be done to protect this commerce, without leaving the port in a 
condition to he successfully assailed. 
In either of the above cases, the fleet might await the enemy in front of 
the harbor, instead of lying within it. But no advantage is apparent from 
such an arrangement; and there would be superadded the risk of being 
injured by tempests, and thereby disqualified for the duty of defence, or of 
bemg driven off the coast by gales of wind; thus, for a time, removing all 
opposition. 
In the same cases, also, especially when eqnal or superior to the enemy, 
our fleet, depending on having correct and timely notice as to the position 
and state of preparation of the enemy's forces, might think proper to meet 
him at the outlet of his own port, or intercept him on the way, instead of 
awaiting him within or off our own harbor. Here it must be noticed that 
the enemy, like ourselves, is supposed to possess a single harbor only; but, 
having protected it by other means, that his navy is disposable for offensive 
operations. If it were attempted thus to shut him within his own port, he, 
in any case but that of decided inferiority, would not hesitate to come out 
and risk a battle ; because, if defeated, he could retire, under shelter of his 
defences, to refit; and, if suc«essful, he could proceed with a small portion 
of his force-even a single vessel would sutfice--to the capture of <?Ur port, 
now defenceles5; while, with the remainder,'he would follow up his advan-
tage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue them into th~ili harbor, 
should they return thither. '··· : . . · · 
Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy from volunteering 
a battle; but it would be indispensable that the superiority be steadily main· 
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tained, and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by 
tempests, or absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, 
when it would be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defence of its 
own port. Experience abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to 
attempt to shut a hostile squadron in port, for any length of time. It seems, 
then, that whether we defend by remaining at home, or by shutting the 
enemy's fleet within his own harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indis-
pensable to the security of our port. 
With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet 
remain within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon 
the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react 
offensively upon the foe: unless we can control the chances of finding the 
enemy's fleet within his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping 
him there ; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the Joss 
of our harbor. 
Let us next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition 
of numerous important ports on either side, instead of a single one; rely-
ing, on our part, still, exclusively on a navy. 
In order to examine this question, we will suppose our Pdversary to b 
fortified in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means equal to 
our own. 'rhis is certainly a fair supposition; because, what is assumed 
as regards his harbors, is true of all maritime nations, except the United 
States; and as regards naval means, it is elevating our own strength con-
siderably above its present measure, and above that it is likely to attain for 
years. 
Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us, is, that 
the enemy, believing all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his 
vessels, sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of opera-
tions, while we are left without choice in the matter; for, 1f he think 
proper to come, and we are not present, he attains his object without re-
sistance. 
The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition 
of Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points, 
he may have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his partic-
ular choice, and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence on one 
point rather than another ; so that the chances of not being present and 
ready on his arrival are directly in proportion to the number of our ports: 
that is to say, the greater the number of ports, the greater the chances that 
he will meet no opposition whatever. 
Another difference is, that the enemy can choose ~the mode of warfare, as 
well as the plan of operations1 leaving as little option to us in the one case 
as in the other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on 
the supposition that an assault will be made with his entire fleet; because, 
should we act otherwise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet 
and coast in inevitable defeat and ruin. Beir-~g in this state of concentra-
tion, then, should the enemy have any apprehensions as to the resnlt of a 
general engagement; should he be unwilling to put any thing at hazard; 
or should he, for any other reason, prefer acting by detachments, lw can, 
on approaching the coast, disperse his force into small squadrons, < ud sin-
gle ships, and make simultaneous attacks on numerous points. These en-
·terprises would be speedily consummated; because, as the single poi11t o~­
cupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments would be unop~ 
r 
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posed; and, after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or public es.tab-
hshments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave the coast 
for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet 
or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge. 
Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to 
meet these enterprises '! 
As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out 
of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the 
spot 1 And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that 
shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe ·? Suppose we 
attt>rnpt to cover the coast, by cruising in front of it; shall we sweep its 
whole length ?-a distance scarcely less th:tn that which the enemy must 
traverse in passing from his coast to ours. Must the Gnlf of Mexico be 
swept, as well as the Atlantic? or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy 1 
Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also? We must, un-
qnestionahiy, do one of two things: either relinquish a great extent of 
coast, confining our crnisers to a small portion ouly, or include so much, 
that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the 
question. 
On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising 
in front of it-or, in other words, the possibility of auticipating an eNemy's 
operatious; discovering- the objRct of movements of which we get no 
glimpse~, and hear no tiuings; and seeing the impress of his footsteps on 
the surf.1ce of the ocean-it may be well to consult experience. 
The Toulon fleet, iu 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-
battle ships and frif!'atcs, about twenty smatler vessels of war, and nearly 
two hundred transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port 
:tnd surprised Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly 
that they were bonnd for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. 
The l<'rench, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage, 
so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them; and, uot finding them 
thl!re, retumed, by the way of Carumania and Candia, to Sicily, missing 
his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he fonnd 
the Freuch fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay; and, attacking them, achieved 
the rllernorable victory of the Nile. 
When we consider tbe narrowness of this sea; the very numerous ves-
sels iu the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain 
night; and that Nelsnn, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy 
himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of 
the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic. 
rrhe escape ot another Toulon fleet in 1805 ; the long search for them in 
the Mediterranean by the same able offi.eer; the pursuit in the West Indies; 
their evasion of him amongst the islands; the return to Europe; his vain 
effill'ts, subsequently, a tong the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and 
off !he English channel; and the meeting at last at 'rrutalgar--bronght about 
only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the acces-
sion of srveral reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of 
battle: these are instances, of many that might be cited, to show how small 
is the probability of enconnteriug, on the ocean, an enemy whq, desires to 
avoid a meeting; and how little the most untiriFig zeal, the most r(lstless 
activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen 
the adverse chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched 
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his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he ·was fully 
prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading 
squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Ville-
neuve had ta {en, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered 
by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again 
put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. 
On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to 
belong, in a pre eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this 
system of d0fence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects 
of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is ad-
missible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that 
which to do at all seems impossible. 'rhe navy is required to know the 
secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance and the broken intercourse 
of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who 
is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an 
element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in 
wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and 
seasons; to see him, in spite of fogs and ·darkness. Finally, after all the 
devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all 
difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, 
the fate of the war; having no resource or hope beyond. 
It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of 
the country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have ennmerated; 
that it means, also, gun-boats, floating batteries, and steam batteries; and 
that the true system of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our 
harbors with some or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances; 
leaving to the sea-going vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's com-
merce, carrying the war into the enemy's seas, and contending for the mas-
tery of the ocean. 
But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been con-
sidering. This is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly sound; as con-
taining, though not true throughout, the great principle on which the 
present glory of the navy proper has been built, and its future glory will 
depend. 
We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our 
harbors, but we are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by 
that service has been gained in these blockaded ships. 
On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and con-
tenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch 
over them than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's com-
merce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without 
countenance or aid-they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the 
ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most 
brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, more-
over, that in the amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American 
property protected or recovered, and in the 1-::umber of hostile ships kept in 
pursuiL of our scattered vessels-ships, evaded if superior, and beaten if 
equal.~they rendered benefits a thousand fold greater, to say nothing of the 
glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, 
than tiny that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the 
harl>o.rs. ·. · 
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Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the 
r1avy proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has 
been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, 
will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. 
ln order, however, thnt the navy may alwttys assume and maintain that 
active and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same 
time so consistent with its functions and so consonant with its spirit, we 
have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence. 
But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty, some other reliance 
must be substituted; the navy itself requiring, for its own establishments, 
not less than the towns and harbors, that the defence be complete. And 
this brings us to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, 
namely, gun-boats, floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best 
reliance. 
After considering these defensive means, we will examine the properties 
of forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort; and, 
that n. comparison may• be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases 
where the latter are properly applicable. 
There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to pre-
sent a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone 
would be impracticable; aml it is not, therefore, prejudging the question 
we are about to examine: it is neither underrating fortifications, nor over-
rating these floating defences, to say that these lust are, some or all of them, 
indispensable in such positions. 
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a dis-
tance from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where no 
insular spot, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of 
ships, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great 
bays as examples. 
Broad sonnds, and wide roadsteads, aff~Hding secure anchorage beyond 
good gun-range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and 
harbors with very wide entrances, and large surface, exhibit examples of 
still another kiud. 
As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, never-
theless, recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidahle, it has not 
failed to be a recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the 
coast, since 1818, that there should be a suitable and timely provision of 
appropriate floating defences. And until the invention of man shall have 
caused an entire revolution in the nature of maritime attack and defence, 
these or kindred means must be resorted to; not, however, because they are 
means intrinsically good, or suitable under other circumstances, but because 
they are the only means applicable. 
In the circumstances just referred to, there is no alternative, and there-
fore no point to be discussed. 'rhe remaining question is, whether these 
floating defences are to be relied on in cases tl1.at admit of defence by forti-
fications. 
And, first, as to gun-boats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar cir-
cumstances, it will hardly contended that gun-boats afford a safe reliance 
in harbors that can be entered by vessel~ of magnitude. Ship~ becalmed, 
or a~ronnd, might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack 
from this fcn·ce ; and there are other situations wherein it would be very 
effective. But harbors defended by gun-boats will not be attacked in calms, 
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nor with adverse winds ; and it is not easy to helieve that any probable 
array of tht~se craft would impede or binder for a moment the advauce of 
a hostile fleet. Nelson, at Trafalg:u, bore down in two divisions upon the 
combined fleet, each division being exposed to a raking fire; aud, although 
suffcrin~ considerably from that fire, he was able, not withstandiug, to brrak 
the hostile line and defeat his sn perior adversary. V\'hat, cotnpararively 
with the raking fire of the combined flHet, would be the fire of a fl r,et of gun-
boats? Opposing no effectual obstarle to approarh or entrance, these slnall 
vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, wnuld be kept, by the broad-
sides of a few active vessels, at too grPctt a distance to produce any serious 
effect upon the main attack, by their desultory fire. 
Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a pro-
tracted occn pat ion by the enemy of harbors that contained extensivP. shoal 
grounds and shallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in 
resisting the first assault, and in preventing the brief operation of levying 
contributions, or burning or spoiling- national rstablishrnents. 
The trne reason of this f~eble deftmce m11st not~ howf-'ver, be misunder-
stood. It is not that the boats do not carry guns enough, or men enough, 
for the object; but it is because, from tlte comparative weakness of the 
vessels, the guns and the men cannot be kept in an effective position. 
There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence, in which there 
are no shoals whereon these boats could take refuge; and in such, their 
capture or destruction would be inevitable, should there be, at the same 
time, no river up which they might fly: or lateral issue through which they 
could escape, to a safe distance. 
Floating batteries, of which good use might be somrtimes made in 
peculiar situations, would, we suppose, differ from gun boat~, in being 
larger; containing many gnns; alH.l in being stronger--that is to sny, hav-
ing thicker sides or bulwarks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed 
to construct them with bull proof parapets, and with platforms open above; 
like, in these respects, batteries upon the shore. But, in whatever way 
formed, it is necessarily a part of the idea that they be stroug- nnd massive; 
and, consequently, that they be unwieldy, incapable of sudden change of 
place, and incapacitated nither to advance upon a defeated foe, or to evade a 
victorious one. We are not, of course, now speaking of batteries moved 
by steam. 
Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of ma-
nam vering in face of the enemy, we are to consider these battP-ries as 
moored in position, and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be 
large, requiring deep water to float them; or should they be placed across 
or near the channel, for the sake of proximity to the track of ships; the 
enemy would engage them nt close qnarters. All advantages of mobility-
of concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two pomts, to which, lltlder 
these circumstances, no relief can be sent-of g-reater elevation a11d rom· 
mand, would be on the side of the assailant; with no countP-rvalliug nd-
vantage to the batteries, b11t greater thickness of bulwarks. 'Vbetber this 
excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage, sir1ee the 
introduction of large bomb cannon into the armament of ships, is a doubt-
ful matter. 'The batteries, if anchored across the channel, wonld hn.ve the 
further. advantage of a rakiug fire; but we have seen that the raking firn of 
one $qnadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisivr. 
,.fhe power of throwiug the whole assailing force upon one or two points, 
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of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of 
boarders, would, of themselves, 5eem to len ve little room to doubt as to the 
issne 
It; now, we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having 
a hg hter draught, they might be placed near the shores, or upon the shoals, 
they might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would 
provt~ so fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would, at 
the same time, lose much of their efficiency, from their remoteness; and 
posttious. wherein they would be secure from being laid alongside, while 
they would be in a proper attitude to contribute materially to the defence 
of the harbor, are afforded but rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general 
rnle, these smaller floating batteries, notwithstanding their greater capability 
of endu ranee, would afford a better defence, gun f(H gun, than gun-boats; 
or, in other words, whether this capability of endurance in the one, would 
be more than a compensation tor the power of locomotion in the other. 
But, whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, 
this description of defence. owing to its fixedness, connected with the 
destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed 
to attacks analogous to those made by gun-boats on ships aground. The 
enemy, knowing of what the defensive arrangements consist, will come 
provided with the requisite number of sailing or steam vessels, armed with 
bomb cannon, aQ,ainst which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries 
wonld avt1il nothing. He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself 
with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea-mortars ; and, as there could be 
no gnarding against the effects of the long ranges of these, a few such 
vessels wonld, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries to quit 
their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concentrated 
array. Not to mention other modes of attack, which would seem to leave 
the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of 
def(·uce, whether by gun-boats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic 
fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has ; that is to say, the ~ 
euemy has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, 
and at least as efficacious, as that relied on for dl'fence : hence the neces-
sity uot of mere equality, hnt of supe1 iority, on the part of the defence, at 
every point liable to be attacked ; and hence, also, the necessity of having an 
aggregate force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy as 
we have important places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten 
such places, and the enemy threaten us with twenty sh1ps of the line, we 
must have, in all these places, an aggregate of gun-boats and floating 
batteries more than equivalent to two hundr<'d ships of the line; for, it will 
hardly be contended that these defencc:s can be transported from one place 
to ancther, as they may be respectively in danger. 
llnt what will be the relative state of the parties, if, instead of gun-boats 
or fluati11g battenes: WP- re ·ort to steam batteries? Although much has 
bee11 said, of late, of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this 
desrrilJtlon of force, we have not been able to discover the advantages; nor 
do :ve see that seacoast defence has been benefited, in any particular, by 
the re1·ent improvement in steam vessels, except that, in the case before 
adverted to, where, from the breadth of the waters, defence from the shore 
wonld be unavailing, a more active and f0rmidable floating defence 1 han 
by g un-boats and floating batteries is provided. It must be remeJ.nbered 
that by far the greatest improvement in steam-vessels consists in having 
adapted them to ocean navigation ; and one inevitable consequence of this 
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improvement will be, that, if the defence of harbors by steam batteries be 
regarded as securiRg them from the attacks of ships of the line and frigates, 
or, at least, of placing the defence quite above that kind of attac.k, they will 
no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels, similar, in all 
warlike properties, to those relied on for defence. 
Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels across· the 
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin 
a state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times; and, 
also, a complete independence of arrangement at each particular point--both 
the state of preparation, and the independence of arrangement, being much 
more important than when the enemy's motions were governed by the 
uncertain favor of winds and weather. 
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam 
batteries acting defensively, that the attacking steam-ve:ssels may not bring 
with them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon 
the coast; unless it should be thonght proper to give to the former a greater 
thickness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea going vessels. 
Bnt the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of 
moving with promptitude and rapidity; and any atten1pts to strengthen the 
harbor vessels, by thickening their bulwarks considerably, would unavoid-
ably lessen their mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage 
sought. At the same time, it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit 
would be derived from the thicker sides. 1t is probable that the best kind 
of bulwark for these vessels, and all others, is that which will be just proof 
against grape and canister shot fired from moderate distances; because: 
with such bulwarks, a shell fired from a bomb cannon within a reasonable 
distance would pierce both sides; that is to say, would go in on one side 
of the ship and out at the opposite, producing no greater effect than a solid 
shot of the same calibre ; while, with thickened sides, every shell would 
lodge in the timbers, and produce terrible ravages by bursting. 
In the practice with these missiles in this country, it has been found 
oifficult to lodge a shell in thin targets, even when the load of the gun was 
so reduced as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is prob-
able, therefore, that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bul-
warks would be more than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal 
shells would inflict by means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the 
harbor steam-battery will not differ, in this respect, mn.teriall y, from the attack-
ing steamships; and, if they do differ in having more soiid and impervious 
bulwarks, that no advantage over the enemy will result therefrom. We 
come, therefore, to the same result as when considering the application of the 
other kinds of floating force to the defence of harbors ; and this result is, that 
there is no way of placing the coast in a condition of reasonable security but 
by having, at any point the enemy may happen to select, a force in perfect 
readiness which shall be superior to that brought to the attack. 
The reason of this coincidence of result is: ·that no peculiarity in form or 
details can disguise the difficulties, or essentially modify the conditions, insep-
arabl~ from the nature of a floating force. 
BJ!vyancy is a condition ne<1;essnry to every variety of the force ; and, .to 
obs~rvtt t,h.is condition, a commQn material must be used in each-a matenal 
that is combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and 
penetr.~bility be, in vart, remedied by an increase of the quantity of the ma-
terial, it must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed-proper-
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ties of great value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be 
obtained at the expense of that concentration of power which is a great and 
almost characteristic quality of naval armament. 
It might not be s;trictly true to say that as much would be lost in one 
respect as would be gained in another; but, though modifications of this 
:floating force, made with a view to adapt it to peculiar services, will some-
what disturb the equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no 
great disparity when acting in their appropriate way; and a little super-
added force to the weaker party will restore the bt1lance. .None of these 
modifications, it should be observed, touch, on the one hand, the means 
whereby injury is inflicted; nor, on the other: the susceptibility to injury: 
all are still timber structures, carrying a common armament. 
The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attack-
ing force, will require large preparations, on any supposition. \Vith the 
navy proper, however, with gun-boats and floating batteries1 something has 
already been done: the existing navy will be an important contribution. 
Small vessels supplied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for 
gnu-boats; and from the class of merchant ships many vessels might be 
drawn for service as floating batteries : still there will remain great efforts 
to be made, and great amounts to be expended, to complete the defensive 
array. But a reliance on steam batteries would lead to expenditure Yastly 
greater, because, with them, all has yet to be pr0vided. Having at present 
no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,) the preparation by the 
enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the construction of two 
hundred, of equal force, on our part, supposing that we design to cover but 
ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy. 
Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore de-
fences, we will here add that they will, on the other hand, in certain cases, 
necessarily increase the number of these defences, and, in other cases, aug-
ment their force. Channels which admitted only small vessels of war, 
would, in peculiar positions, need no defence; in other positions, their de-
fence might be safely trusted to works of moderate force. 'The introduction 
of these vessels of small draught and great power requires, however, that 
these passages should be defended, and defended adequately. 
We should not have gone so much at length into a branch of our sub-
ject, wherein the general conclusions appear to be so obvious and incontro-
vertible, but for the prevalence of opinions which we consider, not errone-
ous merely, but highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way 
before a full exhibitiOn of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable 
objections to the positions assumed, nor to the illustrations ; but, even should 
all these, in thl'l form we have presented them, be objected to, we may still 
challeng~ opposition to the following broad propositions, namely: 
1st. If the seacoast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the de-
fensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be: at leastJ 
equal in power to the attacking force. 
2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting 
an attack on one of these points rather that:t on another, and no time- for 
transferring our state of preparation from on ~ to another, after an attack has 
been declared, each of them must have assig ·ed to it the requisite mearts; 
and, 
3d. Consequently, this system demands a power in the defence a.s many 
times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered. 
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Believing that a well·digested system of fortifications will save the coun· 
try from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and 
the intolerable expeuse of a full provision of those means~ we will now en-
deavor to show that such a system is worthy of all reliance. 
There has been but one practice among nations, as to the defence of ports 
and harbors; and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experi-
ence that history exhibits is on one side only: it is the opposition of forts, 
or other works comprehended hy the termjorti.ficotion, to attacks by ves-
sels; and, although history affords some instances wher~in this defence has 
not availed, we see that the resort is still the same. No nation omits cover-
ing the exposPd points upon her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates 
in confiding in them. 
Iu opposition to tltis mode of defence, much stress is ]aid on certain suc-
cessful attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed stroug. We 
have no doubt that all such results might he accounted for by circumstances 
independent of the naked qnestien of relative strength; but, at any rate, 
when carefully considered, bow little do these results prove, in comparison 
with numerous other instances, in which there was an immense di~parity 
of force in favor of vessels that have been signally defeated. 'l,hese l,tttPr 
instances are those that Rbou ld be received as a test of the aetna) relation 
between the two kinds of force; not, certainly, because they were sncce~stul, 
but because the smaller the work, its armament; its garrison, the less thP proba-
bility that any extraneous influence has been in operation. A single gun 
behind a parapet, provided Its position be a fair one, and the parapet be 
proo~ need, as regards its contest with ships, owe nothing else to the art of 
fortification ; and its effect will be the same whether the bn.ttery were fresh 
from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, or were erected at the dawn 
of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect ; the men are 
as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will allow ; they 
are brave and skilful, and there is nothing- to prevent their doing their duty 
to the utmost. These are all conditions eusily fnltilled, and, therefore, likely 
to be so. The state of things is not less just aud fair toward the vessel : she 
chooses her time and opportunity; the Lattery goes not to the ship, bnt the 
ship to the battery; taki11g the wind, the tide, the sea-all, as she wonld 
have them; her condition and disctpline are perfect, and her crew courage-
ous and adroit. .1\otbing, under such circumstances, can prevent the jnst 
issue of battle, but some extraordinary accident-po~sible, indeed, to either 
· party, but easily recognised when occurring. 
The contest betwt>eu larger works and heavy squadrons may be much 
more complicated affairs; the cause of disaster to the former being otten 
traceable to potent, though not always obvious, influences. 'J'he fortdica~ 
tions may have been absurdly planned originally, or badly executed; fnr 
there has at all times been in this professiou, as in others, much scope gtven 
to quackery-they may have been erected at a time when the ships of 
war, against which they were provided, were very different things from the 
lofty line~of-battle ships of modern times-a Joug peace, or long impunity, 
may have left them iu a state who ly unprepared for the sudden use of thPir 
str~ng~h-the command may havP. been iutru1:1tt'd to persons ignomnt alike 
oftne amount of power in thetr hands, and of the mode of exerdsing it-
the •garri~on may have been undisctpliued or mutmous--the populace dis-
contented or disloyal-the clamor of frightened citizens may have caused 
a premature surreuder: all these, or any of them, may have produced the 
issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched, 
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While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences 
may have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortificatious, and that 
these were Jikf'ly to be more numerous and more cotJtrollitJg us the works 
were more extensive, it is certain that there can be uo influence acting in 
a reverse dtrection upon them; that is to say, none muking them stronger 
and more effideut than they ought to be. There can be no favorable in-
fluence of such a nature, for example, as to make the simple one-gun bat-
tery before mentioneJ equivalent to a battery (say) ten times as large. 
It mnst not be supposPd, from what we have satd in relation to larger 
fortifications, that their magnitude necessarily iuvolves imperfection or 
weakness; nor, because we hnve cousidered small aud simple works as af-
fording the be:st solmion to the question ot relative force, must it be inferred 
that small works are suited to all ctrcumstances. We speak here in refer-
ence merely to the judg-r11ent we are entitled to form of the relative power 
of these autag-omst forces, from their Ct>ntests, as exhibited in history. In 
in ranees of the latter sort, tlu~re cannot, from the uature of the case, be any 
important influence operating, of which we are ignorant, or for which we 
cannot make due allowances; whtle, in examples of the former kind, we 
mar ue Ill the rl'ark as to mauy vital matters. 
rhesP ohsel'VHtiOlJS have been deemed necessary, because, in jndging Of 
tnis Ullttter, it tnig-ht not be ~So obvious that certain brilliant and striking 
re ults 1wuld not be adopted as aff.,rdiug the true test of relative power. 
It would he more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers, as indicating 
where the power liPs, than to Charleston and Stonington; and yet these 
latter, ns tndtces, won ld be trne, and the former false. 
We will now turu to certam examples: 
"1'he name of Martello tower was adopted in consequenc~ of the good 
defence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in 
the year 17~J4, which, although armed with o11e heavy g-un only, beat off 
Obe or two British ships <'f war, without sustaining any material injury trom 
their fire. Bnt this circnmstauce ought merely to have proved the snperi-
onty wluch ~Ut1S 011 s~ore umst always, in certain sittwtions, possess over 
those of shipping, no matter wiJether rhe former are mon111ed on a tower or 
not. 'l'hat this )s a jn~r dt•cisioll, will pAr haps be readily allowed by all who 
are acquainted with the followi11g eqnally reUJarkable, but less generally 
known fact, which occurred about twelve years afterwards, in the same 
part of the world."* 
''Sir Sidney Smith, in the Pompee, an eighty gun ship, the Hydra, of 
thirty-eight guus, Captain Manhy, and ar,other frigate, anchored about 
eight buudred yards from a battery of two gnus, situated on the extremity 
of _;a, e Ltcosa, and protected from assault hy a tower in which were five. 
and tweuty l<"re11ch ~olJif'rs, commanded by n ltf'tltP.naut. 
"'rhv ImP. of battle ship and the frig tl<'.!S fired successive broadsides till 
their ammumiion was mmrly expend8d; the battery coutinually replying 
wHh a slow bnt de ·tructive effect. The Pomr,e ·, at which ship alone it 
d1rect~·d its fin~, had forty shot in her hnll; her mtzen topmast carried away; 
a ltcntt~uant, midshipman, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. 
At length, forcn provtug inetfectnal, nt~gotiatjon was resortf'd to, and, af r 
some h ur.;; .parley, the offict>r, a Corsican, an6 relative of Napoleon, capi u-
lated. ll theu appeared that the carriage of oue of the two guns had failed 
"Pasley's Course, vol. iii. 
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on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the 
sill of the embrasure: so that, in fact, the attack of an eighty-gun ship and 
two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance." (Journal of 
Sieges, by Col. John r-r. Jones.) 
c; The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, com-
pletely baffi.ed a naval cannonade, was very soon found to :surrender when 
attacked by land ; not, however, before a small battery had been made 
[erected] to reduce it." (Pas ley's Course, vo 1. iii.) 
Here are two examples : 
1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, l>eat off one or two British 
ships. 
2d. A bar bette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun 
ship, supported by two fi·igates. 
It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, 
as trials of relative power. 'rhere is no complication of circumstances on 
one side or the other; nothing to confuse or mislead; all is perfectly sim-
ple and plain. A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, 
is attacked by armed vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns; and 
the ships, unable to produce any effect of consequence, are beaten off with 
loss. 
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side 0f the batteries, 
either as regards position or quality; for both works were immediately re-
duced by a land attack ; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates 
were unable to effect, being immediately accomplished by landing two field. 
pieces, with a very small portion of the crew of one of the vessels. 
On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of the 
ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice. 
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels, in 
the manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military wri-
. ters (the ships being British) has been exactly quoted. (See Pasley's Course 
·of Elementary Fortifications, vol. iii; and Journal of Sieges, by Co lone] John 
T. Jones.) 
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious 
party, the result would hu.ve appeared still more to the disadvantag~ of the 
ships. 
The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in 
April, 1801, seem to have been the following: 
On the northeast side of the city, (the only side exposed to attack from 
heavy ships,) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-
quarters of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, 
in a northeast-and-by north direction, a narrow channel, connecting the 
basin, in the heart of the city~ with deep water. Were it not for this shoal) 
vessels might approach even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one 
and a half mile ; as it is, they can get no nearer, in any place, than about three-
quarters of a mile, without following the channel just mentioned. As the 
edge of the shoal lies nearly north and south, and the channel passes through 
it in a northeast-by-north direction, the great mass of the shoal is to the 
southward, or on the right-hand side of the channel. We will call this 
the southern shoal. The "rrhree-crown battery" is situated upon this 
southern shoal, and near the channel. 
The Danish defences consisted-
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1st. Of the fortifications on this side of the city, including the Three-
crown battery, Nelson estimated the batteries supporting the Danish ves-
sels at about ninety guns. 
2d. Of four sail of the line, mounting 282 guns, and one frigate and two--
sloops, mounting 76 guns; making 358 guns. All these vessels lying in. 
the channel before mentioned, and some of them near its month ; they con-
stituted the left of the Danish floating defences, and were thus posted to 
defend the entrance to the inner harbor or basin. 
3d. Of a liue of floating defences, of various kinds, moored near the edge 
of the southern shoal. They \Vere eighteen in nn mber, as follows, count-
ing from the right or southern extremity: lst, a block ship of 56 guus ; 2d 1 
a block-ship of 48 guns; 3d, a prnarn of 2U guns; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 
5th, a block-ship of 48 guns; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 
guns; 8th, a raft of 20 guns; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns; lOth, a small 
vessel of 6 guns; 11th, a raft of 24 guns ; 12th, a praam of 20 guns; 13th, 
a ship of the line of 74 guns; 14th: a block-ship of 26 gnus; 15th, a raft·~ 
of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60 guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 
guns; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns: total in this liue 62t3 guns. These: 
vessels were moored in a line extending south from a point outside and a. 
little to the southward of the Three·crown battery; and the part of th~ 
line nearest the walls was not Jess than three quarters of a mile distant. 
Lord Nelson carried to the attack the ~;lepbant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74;:~ 
Monarch, 74; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 74; Russell, 74; Ganges, 74; Glutton,., 
54; Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 7 4; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38 ;; 
Desiree, 38; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Crniserllf 
18; Hurpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10;; 
Hecla, 10; Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, B: making ~ 
total of 1107 4 guns, besides a few in gnn-boats. ']'he Agamemnon did not 
get into action ; which reduces the force employed to 1,010 g-uns. Th~ 
Bellona and Russell gronnded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not ill. 
the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of good set-: 
Yice." 
\Vith this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that 
was moored near the edgo of the southern shoal. He approached from the. 
south: with a fair wind; and as his leading vessel got aln·east of tile most 
southern of the Danish line, she anchored by the stern. 'rhe second En-
glish vessel passed on until she had reached the next position, when she 
.anchored, also, in the same way; and thus, inverting his line as he ex-
tended it, he brought his whole force against the outer aud southern part 
of the Danish forc:e. His line did not reach as far northward as the 'rhree-
crown battery, and mouth of the channel ; for he says, in speaking of the 
grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon: "These accidents 
prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before mentioned, 
who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, (Three-crown 
'battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy-
loss in the Defiance and Monarch." 
Concentrating, as he did, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the. 
Danish array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be · 
beyond the scope of succor, and without a chance of escape,,.Lord Nelson 
had no reason to doubt that signal success would crown his able auange-
ment. Every vessel in this outer Danish line wa~ taken or destroyed 
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except one or two smaller vessels, which cut and ran in under shelter of the· 
fortifications. 
The vessels lying in the narrow chnnnel could participate in no mate-
rial degree, in the action, because the British line did not reach abreast of 
them; and because, not being advanced beyond the general direction of 
the Danish line, but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act 
upon any of the British vessels-except: perhaps, obliquely upon two or three 
of the most northern ships. But, had all the Danish vessels that were lying 
in the narrow channel been mingled, from the first, with the line that was 
destroyed, the result would probably have been still more to the advantage 
of the assailants: that is to say, these vessels, also, would have IJeen cap-
tured or de::.troyed ; because, not only would the aggregate Dnnish force of 
986 gnns have been inferior to the 1,010 guns of the British, but it would, 
also, have been without the ability to counteract the power of concentration 
possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force would have acted on parts 
of the Danish line in succession. 
For the same rflason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel 
could not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating 
defences anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the 'l'hree-crown, 
battery, and the guns on the shore, mnst have been greatly restricted. 
Situated upon the shoal, the 1.,hree crown battery was behind tile Danish 
line, which consequently masked it, and also the shore batteries: from a 
view of the English line. Under such circumstances, it is not conceivable 
that the batteries r.ould be used with effect; and the commander of the 
Danish forces says, expressly, that the Three-crown battery "did not come 
at all into action/' and a chronicler of the times states that the fortifica-
tions of the town "were of no service while the action lasted). they began 
to fire when tlte enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, bnt it was· 
at the sa'l1te time that the parley appeaTed." In proportion as the Danish 
vessels passed into the hands of the English, as some were burnt, and. 
others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlnrge, and their power 
be felt; but, just as nil impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord' 
Nelson himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. 
It might be profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continu-
ance of the action; to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had 
conquered two-thirds of the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pur-
sue his advantage, and concentrate his 1,010 gnus upon thP- 358 guns, which· 
were all that remained of the floating defences of the Danes, especially as 
the wind was in favor of such a maureuvre. But having already devoted 
too much space to this particular contest, we will suppose some dictate of 
policy, perhaps of humanity, indnced him to close the contest, relying on 
the severe blow he had already inflicted, and the commanding tone it ena-
bled him to assume, for such a termination of the pending negotiation as. 
-the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded. 
It is important, however, yet to notice, that, as soon as the negotiation 
opened, Lord Nelsgn's vessels passed out of the reach of the ,.-rhree-crown 
battery, as fast as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states~ 
that this battery was not silenced. .r 
A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says: "It must not, however, be 
. concealed _that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, 
was placed in rather awkward and difficult circumst:mces: the principal 
batteries, as well as the ships which were stationed at the month of the har-
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bor: were still unconquered ; two of his own vessels were aground, and ex-
posed to a heavy fire ; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to 
a similar fate; while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off 
the prizes nnder the fire of the batteries. These considerations, undoubt-
edly, influenced him in resolving to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in 
addition to the instructions lre had to spare the Danes, and the respect he 
might have felt for their brave defence.;' (Campbell's Naval History, vol. 
vii, p. 203.) 
The circumstances above detailed show, clearly-
1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought bet'X'een an English fleet, 
mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of floating defences, mounting 628 
guns; and that alt the latter were conquered. 
2d. 'rhat the Danish line was attacked in sueh a manner, that none of 
the fixed batteries in the system of defence could participate in the contest, 
which was carried on up to the surrer.1der of the Danish line, almost exclu. 
sively between vessels. It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under 
Captain Riou, occupying the northern extremity of the English line, were 
under the fire of the 'rhree-cro'.vn bnttery. 'l'lw loss being very severe, he 
was obliged to retreat. 
3d. 'l'hat, as soon as the batteries were unmasked and began to act, the 
battle was closed, by Lord Nelson opening a parley. 
4th. That, consequently, it was in no sense a contest between ships and 
batteries, or a triumph of ships over batteries, and affords no ground for 
judging of their relative power. 
5th. 'I' hat it illustrates, strikingly, the advantage that a fleet possesses over 
a stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson \Vas superior to the 
whole of his adversary's floating force; but not being disposed to run any 
unnecessary hazard, he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, 
which was, of course, defeated; and had there been no other than a floating 
force present, so, of course, would hav~ been the remainder, had it been of 
twice the strength it was. 'l,his example fully confirms what we have be. 
fore urged on this top1c. 
in estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of 
both parties at their rate: that is to say, a ship called a seventy-four, we 
have reckoned at 74 guns. 
We now proceed to examine a great inst~nce of. nav~l success, in which 
there is no room to doubt the extent to which forttficatwns were engaged; 
this instance is the attack on Algiers in 1816. 
The attack was made by the c-ombined English and Dutch fleets, mount-
ing about one thousand gnns, under the command of Lord Exmouth. 
In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated 
in a plan supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of 
these could act upon the fleet as it lay. The ratio of the forces engaged, 
therefore, as expressed by the number of guns, (saying nothing ?f the cal.ibres, 
of which we know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. The actwn contmued 
from a quarter before three until nine, without intermission, and did not 
cease altocrether until hn.lf-past eleven. 
It is ve~y certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerinc sJ:lipping 
and town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was de-
. strayed, excepting some small vessels ; and we know, also, that Lord Ex. 
mouth dictated the terms of the treaty that followed. 
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Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was 
for the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances 
connected with it, that excite doubts as to how much of the final result 
was due to physical chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in 
the defences, and to ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they 
were. That the loss in killed and wounded in the city and works was 
great, is probable, because we are informed that a very great addition had 
been made to the garrison, in preparation for the attack, under some im-
pression: no doubt, that a landing wonld be attempted. For the service 
of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,000 men, at the utmost. An 
.accumulation beyond that number would add nothing to the vigor of 
.defence, while: by cansing an increase of the casualties, it would heighten 
the terrors of the combat. 'J'he depressing effect of this loss of life in the 
.batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town, and about the 
mole, was of course increased by the entire destruction of the Algerine 
fleet, anchored within the mole. 
We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works; 
nor of their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of 
modern times. · 
The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be 
commanded even by the largest of the assailing ships; and, provided these 
guns were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being 
well situated. 
But more than half of the guns engaged were in the Mole-head battery; 
and the mode of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 
guns) was calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which 
this work had been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" 
of the extremity of this battery, that she could either rake, or lake in 
reverse, every part of it. If she, at the same time, commanded the battery-
that is to say, if, from her spar-deck, she could look down upon its plat-
~fonn-then she must, at once, with her grnpe and canister, have driven the 
garrison from that platfnrm, leaving only the lower and covered tier of 
guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With our imperfect knowledge 
of the fortifications, all this must, however, be left to conjecture. 
But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries, which 
-are not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had 
.anchored. 
What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have 
been, if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 
guns in raking her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half 
until she hacl anchored within fifty yards? How different might ha.ve 
·been the condition of the fleet, generally, if they had been subjected, 
during the approach, and while assuming their stations, to the raking fire 
-<Jf all the 200 guns? 
Jj does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries. 
We mio-ht almost rest on this fact ; and assert that a defence which had 
failed to provide itself with this auxiliary means, must have been carried 
on in disregard, . if not in violati?n, of all rules, all_ kn?wledge, and all 
experience ; that 1t was pr~babl.Y without pla!l or combi?atwn, and, not less 
probable, without preparatiOn m other particulars of Importance scarcely. 
inferior. 
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Before leaving this example, it may be well to inquire what, after aU, 
was the effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect 
of ships upon ships. 
In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a 
loss in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded ; which is in the propor-
tion of ten French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. 
In the battle of 'Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, 
and they caused a loss to the English of 1,587 kilJed and wounded; which 
is in the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In 
this affair of Algiers, with a force not exceeding 200 guns, the batteries 
caused a loss of 883 killed and wounded, being in the proportion of 10 
guns t0 44 men ; and: if we take into account every gun that was pointed 
upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the proportion will be 10 guns to 25 men ; 
being an effect more than three times as great as that produced by the 
French ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than four times as great 
as that produced by the ships of the same nation at 'Trafalgar. 
vVhile reflecting on the circumstances of this battle, the mind is not 
satisfied with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of 
Lord Exmouth, the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the 
supposition of entire success on his part, it is net understood why he 
should feel the great anxiety he states himself to have been under, that 
this wind :-;hould spring up. "Providence at this interval," (between 10 
and 11 at night,} "gave to my anxions wishes the usual land wind, com-
mon in this bay ; and my expections were completed. We were all hands 
employed warping and towing off, and, by the help of the light air, the 
whole were under sail, and came to anchor out of the reach of shells, 
about two in the morning, after twelve hours of incessant labor." 
Now, if any thing had been decided by the action, it mnst have been 
one of two thiugs : either the ships were victorious, or the batteries 
were so. 1f the ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have 
been judicious for them to remain where they were, in order, if there was 
to be any more fighting, to be ready to press their advantage; and, especi-
nlly, in order to maintain the ascendency, by preventing the remounting of 
guns, repairing of batteries, and resupplying them with munitions, &c. 
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and 
had they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it 
might not have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his 
hips are acknowledged, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to 
enforce his demands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been 
so snccessfnl as to be certain that his end was attained, he should be so 
anxious to get out of gunshot, when, by so doing, he involved the issue 
iu more or less doubt and hazard. 
He relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannon-
ade, and the result proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the· 
vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still uncnnquered,. 
which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering popu-
lation of the city, than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his 
presence. vVhat was this power, but an unsubdued energy in the batteries? 
The true sblntion of the question is, then, not so much the amount of in-
jury done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, on the 
one side, a city to snffer, as well as the butteries-as the relati~e effi.ci~~cy 
of the parties when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. All pohttcal 
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agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had 
the fight been coetinued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next 
morning? 
These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the 
manner the battle ended certain! y leaves room for many doubts whether, 
had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in 
his power to enforce them by his ships: whether, indeed, if he had renew-
ed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. 
On the whole, we do not think tliat this battle, although it stands pre-
eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents any argu-
ments to shake the confidence whtch fortifications, well sitnated, well 
planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. 
Gibraltar. 
The attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the 
French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well-known instance of the power 
of guns on shore. 
These floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed: shot-proof 
and shell-proof; by several additional thicknesses of timber to the sides: and 
by covering the decks with a roof of sloping timbers. 
They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with 70 in reserve to re· 
place any that might be dismounted. 'l'hey were anchored at the distance 
of about 1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by about 85 guns. 
After a protracted cannonade, nine of the floating batteries were burnt 
by hot shot from the shore; and the tenth, having been taken possession of 
by the victors, was set on fire by them. 
No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and 
only eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from 
these vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment 
from the siege batteries. 
·, 
Rattle of Algesiras. 
On the 6th July, 1801, the Freuch Admiral Lenois was lying at anchor 
off the town of Algesiras with two ships of 80 guns, one of 7 4 guns, and 
one frigate. 'ro the south of him, on a sm~ll island, was a battery, called 
the Green-island battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and, to the 
north of him, on the main, another battery, called Sr. Jaques's battery, 
mounting five 18-pounders. There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gun-
boats anchored near : m:~.king a total of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in 
battery-altogether, 318 guns. 
Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced 
against him from Cadiz with two ships of 80 guns, four of 7 4 guns, one 
frigate, and a lugger: in all, 502 guns. On his approach, Lenois, who was 
anchored in a line nearly north and south, at some distance from the shore, 
cut his cables and ran into shoal water, to prevent being doubled upon by 
the British line: this manamvre, at the same time, entirely unmasked the 
fire of the batteries. 
The Hannibal, one of the British 74's, in attempting to close with the 
French admiral, touched the ground, and could not be floated off. She, lww-
ever, continued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time 
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.after she was deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the 
French line, an attempt was made to assault the Green-isle battery, which, 
being badly served by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing. But this at-
tempt was anticipated by the arrival at the island of a party se1..1t from the 
French frigate lying near; and the assault was defeated, with the loss to 
the English of one &oat sunk and another taken: the Frenchmen renewing 
with vigor the fire of the uattery. At tbe north end of the line, the Fren~h 
admiral wns aided by seven gun-boats, which took so active a part in the 
fight that five of them were sunk or rendered un~erviceable. The St. 
Jaques battery being, however, served sluggishly by the Spaniards, the 
French sent a party from the Dessaix to impart greater nctivity and effect. 
After the combat had continued abont six honrs, the British . squadron 
drew off, greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal74 alone and aground; and 
she, after suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that 
the Pompee, an English ship of SO guns, had struck her colors; but, as 
they could not take possession, sbe drifted off and was then towed away: 
it is believed she was entire! v dismasted. 
We do not know the loss in "the French squadron, bnt the killed, wounded, 
and missing, in the English fleet, arnonnted to 375 men ; being more than 
twelve men for every ten guns against them, and being twice as great, in 
proportion, as the English loss in tbe battle of Trafalgar. 
In this battle of Algesiras, there \vere 502 English gnns afloat, acting 
against 306 French gnns afloat. As the English chose their own time for 
the attack, and had the wind, it is only reasonable to suppose that 306 of 
the English guns were a match for the 306 guns in the French vessels. 
'rhis will leave 196 English gnns afloat, opposed to the 12 guns in the bat-
teries; or, reckoning one side only of each ship, it shows 98 guns in the 
British fleet to have been overmatched by the twelve guns in the batteries. 
'rhere never was a more signal and complete discomfiture ; and it w1ll 
admit of no other explanation than that just given, namely, that the two 
small batteries, one of 5 and the other of 7 guns, partly 18 and partly 
24-pounders, more than compensated for the difference in favor of the Brit-
ish fleet of 196 gnns. 
'rhe Hannibal got aground, it is true ; but she continued to use her guns: 
with the best effect, until she snrrendered; and, even on the supposition 
·that this ship was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess 
of 122 guns over the French fleet and batteries. 
These batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and con-
structed, but there was nothing cxtraordinarr about them; their condition 
before the fight was complained of by Admiral Lenois; and they were 
.badly fought in the early part of the action : still the 12 guns on shore 
were found to be more than equivalent for two seventy-fours and one 
frigate. 
Battle of Fuentcrabia. 
This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our notice. 
On the 11th July, 1836, six arrnrdsteamers, together with two British and 
several Spanish gun-boats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The 
place is surrounded only by an old wall ; and two guns of small calibre, to 
which, on the evening of the attnck, a third gnn of larger calibre was added, 
tormed the entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place. 
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during a whole day, and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and: 
demolishing a few poor and paltry houses, not worth, perhaps, the ammu-
nition wasted in the attack. What may have been the number of guns and· 
weight of metal which the assailants brought, is unknown; though the su-
periority, independent of the superior weight of metal, must have been at 
]east ten to one: but not the slightest military result was obtained. (See 
United Service Journal, August, 1836, page 531.) 
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast. 
In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships 
of 50 guns, four of 28 guns, two of 20 guns, and a bomb-ketch-in all (ac-
-cording to their rate) 252 guns-attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston har-
bor, South Carolina. 
It is stated that the fort mounted "about thirty pieces of heavy artillery." 
Three of the smaller vessels were nground for a time during the action; 
and one of them could not be floated off, and was in conseqnence burnt 
by the Enf!lish. Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, 
and supposing that the other two were engaged bnt half the time, the En-
glish force may be estimatPd at 200 guns; or, reckoning one broadside only, 
at 100 gnns against 30 guns. 
The English were defeated with great loss of life, and injury to the ves-
sels; while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but 30 men. 
The killed and wounded in the squadron were reported by the ~ommodore 
to be 205; being for every 10 guns employed against them more than 68 
men killed and wounded-a loss more than eleven times as great, in pro-
portion to the opposing force, as the loss nt the battle of Trafalgar. 
In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships 
and two brigs, mountiug about 9D guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth 
of Mobile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of 
marines, artiilery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, 
and could not have mounted more than 20 guns on all sides, nor more than 
15 guns on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three 
hours, when one of the ships, being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted 
ashore under the gnns, and was abandoned and burnt by the English; the 
other vessels retreated, after sufiering severely. 'rhere were ten men kiJl .. 
ed and wounded in the fort; the loss on the other part is not known. 
The affair of Stonington, dnring the last war, affords another instance· 
of successful defence by a battery. In this case ther8 were only two guns,. 
(18-pounders,) in a batt!~ry which was only three feet high, nnd without 
embrasures. rrhe battery; beiag manned exclusively hy citizen volunteers 
from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a sloop of war, causing 
serious loss and damage, but suticring none. 
The only other instance we will adduce is that of the late attack on the 
castle of St. Juan de Ulloa. Having before us a plan of this work, made on 
the spot, after the surrender, by a French engineer officer who was one of 
1he expedition; having, also, his official account of the affair, as well as 
narratives by ::;everal eye-witnesses, we can fully understand the circum-. 
stances attending the operations, and are liable to no material errors. 
On the 27th of November, 1838, Admiral Baudin anchored at the dis-
tance of about seven-eighths of a mile in a northeast direction from the 
.castle, with the frigates La Nereide, of 52 guns, La Gloire, of 52 guns, and 
I....'Iphigenie, of 60 guns; and, after being a short time in action, he was 
joined by La Creole, of 24 guns: in all 188 guns1 according to the rate of 
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the ships. In a. position nearly north from the castle, and at a distance of 
more than a mile, two bomb-ketches, carrying each two large mortar~, were 
anchored. The wind being adverse, all the vessels were towed into posi-
tion by two armed steamboats belonging to the squadron. "It was lucky 
for us," says the reporter, "that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, 
which lasted near two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the 
:fire." He further says: "We were exposed to the fire of one 24 pounder, 
five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one ~-pounder, and five 18-pounder 
carronades: in all, 19 pieces only." In order the better to judge of these 
bRtteries, we will convert them, in proportion to the weight of balls, into· 
24-pounders; and we find these 19 guns eqnivalent to Jess than 12 g-uns of 
that calibre. But we must remark, that, although this simplifies the ex-
pression of force, it presents it greatly exaggerated ; it represents, for exam-
ple, three 8-pounders as equivalent to one 24 pounder; whereas, at the dis-
tance the parties were engaged (an efficient distance for a 24-pounder) the 
S-pounders would be nearly harmless. It represents also the IS-pounder 
carronades as possessing each three-fourths the power of a long 24-pound-
er; whereas, at that di~tance, they would not be better than the 8-pounders, 
if so good. Although the above estimate of the force of the batteries is too 
great by full one-third, we will, nevertheless, let it stand as representing 
that force. 
There were, then: twelve 24-ponnders engaged against 94 guns (estima· 
ting for one broadside only of each ship) and 4 sea-mortars. During the 
action, a shell caused the magazine in the cavalier to explode, whereby 
three of the nineteen guns were destroyed, reducing the force to about ten 
24 pounders. · 
Considering the manner in which this work was defended, it wonld not 
have bee n sur-prising if the ships had prevailed by mere dint of their guns; 
but onr anthor states, expressly: that though the accident just mentioned 
completely extinguished the fire of the cavulier, still ''the greater part of 
the other pieces which could see the ships, to the number of sixteen, con-
tinned to fire till the end of the action." 'I'hey were not dismounted, tber · 
fore, aud the loss of life at them could not IIave been great. vVhat, then, was 
the cause of the surrender of the castle '! 
)luch has been said of the great use, made by the ships: of horizontal 
~hells, or shells fired at low angles, from large guns ; and it is n prevailing 
Jdea that the work \Vas torn to pieces, or greatly dilapidated, by these mis- . 
siles. This engineer otlicer states that, on visiting the castle after the can-
nonade, he fonnd "it had been more injured by the French balls and shells 
than he had expected; still the casemates in the curtains, serving liS bar-
racks for the troops, were intact." "Of 187 guns found in the fort, 102 were 
still serviceable; 29 only had been dismounted by the French fire. The 
heaviest injury was sustained by the cavalier" (where a magazine exploded) 
c.jn bastion No.2; in battery No.5," (where another magazine was blown up:) 
"and the officers' quarters." They found in the cas!le 25 men whose wounds 
were too severe to permit their removal with the rest of the garrison. 
Of the 29 guns dismounted, 5 were thrown down with the cavalier; 
the remaining 24 guns were no doubt situated in parts of the work opposite-
to the attack, being pointed in other directions; and were struck by shots 
or £hells that had passed over the walls facing the ships. 'rhere is reason to 
suppose that, of the remaining 16 guns pointed at the French, none were-
dismounted; and we know that most of them continued to fire till the end 
of the action. 
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The two explosions may: certainly, have been caused hy shells fired at 
low angles from Paixhan guns. But it is much more likely they were 
caused by shells from the sea-mortars, because these last were much larger,. 
and therefore more likely to break through the masoury; because, being fired 
at high angles, they would fall vertically upon the magazines, which"' were 
less protected on the top than on the sides; and because there were more of 
these large shells fired, than of the small ones, in the ratio of 302 to 117. 
But, considering that the cannonade and bombardment lasted ubont six 
hours, and that 8,250 shot and shells were fired by the French, it is extraor-
dinary that there were no more than two explosions of magazines, and that 
no greater injury was do11e the fort; since it is certain that there were no less 
than six other similar magazines situated on the rampart, in different parts 
of the work, not one of which was sheU-proof. The surrender, after these 
explosious, \Vas a very natural event, with a governor and garrison who 
:;eem to have known as little about the proper preparation for such contests 
as aLout the mode of conducting them. The second explosion mnst have 
satisfied them, if the first did not, that they had introduced within their own 
precincts much more formidable means of destruction than any it was in 
the power of the French to send from gun or mortar. 
'rhe important points to be nuticed in this contest are these: 
] st. The French took such a position that their 94. guns were opposed 
by the equivalent of 10 or 12 guns only. 
2d. In proof of tbe inefficiency of the Mexican guns generally, it may 
be stated, that: although the three French frigatrs were struck in their hulls 
about three hundred times, they lost but thirty three men in killed and 
wounded. 'rbe Iphigenie was hulled l60 times, and yet had but thirteen 
men hurt; very fe,v, therefore, of these 160 balls could have passed through 
her sides. 
3d. It appears that very few, if any, of thE' guns exposed to the direct 
action of the French broadsides were dismounted or silenced by their fire. 
4th. The narrativE's of the day contain exaggerated statements of injury 
inflicted on the walls by shells fired from guns; the professional report above 
quoted, of the chief engineer of the expedition, neither speaks of, nor alludes 
to, any such injury. After deducting from the parts of the work said to be 
most injnrr.d-the cavalier, and also battery No.5, in each of which a maga-
zine exploded~there remain, as having suffered most, the quarters of the 
officers and bastion No.2. As to the first, if it was elevated above the walls, 
(as is probable) it would of course suffer severely; because the walls of mere 
barracks, or quarters, are never made of a thickness to resist shot or shells of 
any kind; and if not elevated above the walls, hut covered by them, the 
injury re~ulted most probably from shells fired at high angles from the sea-
mortars: and not from shells fired nearly horizontally from the Paixhan 
guns. Whether the injury sustained by bastion No. 2 was the effect of 
shot and shells npon the face of the walls, or of shells falling vertically within 
the bastion, is not stated; it was probably due in part to both. If there hacl 
been any extraordinary dnmage done by the horizontal shells) we may rea-
sonably suppose special mention would have been made of it, because it was 
the first time that this missile had been tried, in a large way, in actnal war-
fare. That any thing like a breach could have been effected with solid shot, 
at that distance, and in thnt time, we know to be impossible ; but it is neither 
unreasonable to snpposr., nor unlikely, that many of the heavy vertical shells 
may have fallen in the bastion and cnused much injury. Whatever may 
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have been the cause of the damage: or its amonnt, it ditl not, we have 
reason to believe, extinguish tl1e fire of any of the five 16-pounders 
that were pointed from the bastion against the ships. 
5th. So far ns effects were prodnced by the direct action of the French 
mmament, whether guns, bomb-cannon, or sen mortars, it does not appear 
that there wns the slightest reason for the submission of the fort. 'rhere is 
little doubt that the 8,250 shot and shells fired at the cnstle must have 
greatly marred the surface of the walls; and it is not unlikely that three or 
four striking near each other may have made deep indentations-especially 
as the stone is soft, beyond any material applied to bnildillg in any part of 
the United States; but these are not injuries of material consequence, how-
€ver they may appear to the inexperienced eye; and we should risk little in 
asserting, that, abstracting the effects of the explosion, the castle \Yas as 
inaccessible to assault, after the cannonade, as before it ; that, so far as re-
gards the levelling of obstacles lying in the way of a sword in · band attack, 
the 8,250 shot aud shells might as well have been fired in the opposite 
direction. ~ 
6th. The explosion: hO\vever, of two deposites of powder in the castle, 
(one of which is reported to have buried sixty men in its ruin~,) showed 
the defenders that, although they might evade the vertical fire, and their 
works might cover them from ttJe horizontal fire, of the French, there was 
no protection against, no evasion of, the dreadful ravages of exploding mag-
azines. With tbis ruin around them, and a six-fold greater ruin likely, at 
every moment, to bnrst upon their heads, it is not surprising that a garri-
son, found in circumstnnces so unmilitary, doubted their po\ver of pro-
tracted resistance. 
7th. It must be borne in mind that these explosions have nothing to do 
either with the question of relative strength, or with the peculiarities of the 
French attack. No defences, with such management, can be effective; and 
no attack can fail. 'I'he French, not dreaming of such culpable, such in-: 
·conceivable negligence, on a point always receiving the most carefnl atten-
tion, entered upon the cannonade with no other purp-ose, as is avowed, than 
that of somewhat weakening the defences, and dispiriting and fatiguing 
the garrison, before proceeding to an assault which was to. have followed 
at night, and for which all preparations had been made. Had the Mexi-
cans thrown all the powder of these eight magazines into the sea, or had 
they transported it to their barracks, and every man, making a pillow of a 
keg, slept through the whole cannonade (as might have been done safely) 
in their quarters in the cnrtain casemates, the castle of St. J unn de Ulloa 
would, we doubt not, have been as competent to resist the proj~cted assault,. 
as it wns when the .French first arrived before it. 
8th. The number of killed and wounded in the French vessels, in pro-
portion to tbe guns acting against them, was, for ten guns, more than twen-
ty-seven men-being npwards of four times as great as the loss sustained 
by the English at the battle of Trafalgar. 
In concluding this reference to facts in military history, we will add, that 
we do not see how it is possible to avoid making the following deduction, 
namely: that fixed batteries upon the shore are copable of resisting the 
.attacks of ships, even when the armament of the latter is by far the most 
numerous and heavy. . 
There are severnl reasons for this capacity in batteries, of which the 
:principal may be thns stated; and these reasons apply to vessels of every 
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size and every sort-to small or large-to vessels moved by wind or steam :. 
'rhe ship is everywhere equally vulnerable; and, large as is her hull, the 
men and the guns are very much concentrated within her : on the other 
hand, in the properly constructed battery, it is only the gun itself, a small 
part of the carriage, and now and then a head or an arm raised above the 
parapet, that can oe hurt: the ratio of the exposed surfaces being not less than 
fifteen or twenty to one. Next, there is always more or less motion in the 
water, so that the ship gun, although it may have been pointed accurately at 
one moment: at the next will be thrown entirely away from the object, even 
when the motion in the vessel is too small to be otherwise noticed ; whereas, 
in the battery, the gun will be fired jnst as it is pointed, and the motion of 
the ship will merely vary to the extent of a few inches, or at most two or 
three feet, the spot in which the shot is to be received. In the ship, there 
are, besides, many points exposed, that may be called vital points. By los-
ing her rudder, or portions of her rigging or of her spars, she may become 
unmanageable: and nnable to use her strength; she may receive shots un-
der water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire; 
and these damages are in addition to thosG of having her guns dismounted, 
and her people killed, by the shot which pierce her sides and scatter splin-
ters from her timbers; while the risks of the battery are confined to those 
mentioned above, namely: the risk that the gun, the carriage; or the men, 
may be stmck. That tlte magazines should be exposed, as were those of 
the castle St. J unn de Ulloa, mnst never be anticipated as possible. 
\Vhile on this part of our subject, it is proper to advert to the use of hori-
zontal shells, or hollow shot, or Paixhan's shells, (as they are variously 
called;) it having been argned thRt thfl mtrodnction of these missiles is seri-
ously to impair the utility of fortifications as a defence of the seacoast. 
We fnlly believe that the free use of these shells will have an infltH'nce 
of some irnportauce on the relative force of ship and battery; but that in-
fiut:nce mnst be the very reverse of such predictions. How are the bat-
teries to be afl:'ected by them? It can be but in two wnys: first, the ship 
gun having been pointed so as to strike a vital point-that is to say, a gun or 
a carringe-the shell may explode at thl?. instant of contact. This explosion 
may possibly happen thus opportunely, but it would happen against all 
chances; aud if happening, would probably do no more than add a few men 
to the list of killed and wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to 
he doubted whether the probability of dismounting the gun would be so great 
as if the missile were a solid 32-pounder shot. Secondly, if it be not by 
dismounting the g-nns, or killi·ng the garrison, the effects anticipated from 
these missiles must result from the injury they do the battery itself. Now 
we are perfectly informed, by military experience, as to the effects of these 
shells upon forts and batteries; for the shells are not new, although the guns 
may be so-the 8-inch and the to inch shells having always been supplied 
in abundance to every siege-train, and beiog perfectly understood, both as 
to their effects and the mode of using them. 
"\V ere it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the parapets of a · 
work (a very desirable result to the attacking party) would be a common 
incident in the attacks of fortifications ; but tbe history 0f attacks by land 
or water affords no such instance. The only practicable way yet discov-
ered of demolishing a fortification, being by attaching a miner to the foot of 
t~Je wall; or by dint of solid shot and heavy charges, fired unremittingly, du-
rmg a long succession of hours upon the same part of the wall, ih.order not 
i. 
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only to break through it, bnt to break through it in such a manner that the 
weight and pressure of the incumbent mass may throw large portions of 
the wall prostrate. This, the shortest and best way of breaching a wall, 
requires, in the first place, perfect accuracy of direction ; becnnse the 
same number of shots, that, being distributed over the expanse of a wall, 
would merely peel off the face, would, if concentrated in a single deep cut, 
cause the wall to fall; and it requires, moreover, great power of penetration 
in the missile~the charge of a breaching gun being, for that reason, one-
third greater than the common service charges. Now, the requisite pre-
cision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels, whether the 
shot be solid or hollow; aud if it were attainable, hollow shot would be 
entirely use!Gss for the purpose, because every one of then1 would break to 
pieces against the wall, even when fired with a charge much less than the 
common service charge. 'rhis is no newly discovered fact; it is neither 
new nor doubtful. Every hollow shot thrown against the waH of fort or 
battery, if fired with a velocity affording any penetration, will unquestion-
ably be broken into fragments by the shock. 
After so much had been said about the effect of these shells upon the 
castle of St. Juan de Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of 
European experiments were perfectly wP-ll known, to repeat, in our own 
service, some trials touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, 
having one-third part of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, 
and the remaining third of free-stone. This was fired ut by a Paixhun 
gun, und by a 32-pounder, from the distance of half a mile ; and the 
antieipated results were obtained, namely: 
1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the free-stone, that was 
struck} the solid 32-pounder shot penetrated mnch deeper into the wall, 
and did much more damage, than the 8-inch hollow shot; and, 
2d. 'fhese last broke against the wall in every instance that the charge 
of the gun was sufficient to give them any penetration. 
The rupture of the shell may often c.ause the explosion of the powder it 
contains, because the shell: the burning fuse, and the pov.rder, are all cmsh-
ed up together; bnt the shell having no penetration, no greater injnry wilL 
be done to the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bnrsliug 
of a shell that had been placed against it. 
From all this, it appears, incontrovertibly: that: as regards the effects to 
be produced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to 
hollow shot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batte-
ries1 should change any of her long 24 or 32-ponnder guns tor Paix-
han guns, would certainly weaken her armament. Her be$t missiles, at 
ordinary distances, are solid shot; and, if she can get near, grape shot 
to fire into the embrasures and over the walls. The best sheils against 
batteries are the sea-mortar shells, fired a~ high elevations; whic!J 1 being of 
great weight, and falling from a great height, penetrate deeply: and, con. 
taining a considerable quantity of powder, cause material ravage by their 
explosion. Such shells, however, can only be fired by vessels appropriately 
fitted. 
'l'he use of these same hollow shot by batteries aO'ainst vessels, is, how· 
.ever, an affair of different character. The shells do~not break against tim. 
ber; but, penetrating the bul \\?arks, they: in the first place, would do greater 
da~age than hollow shot, by making a larger hole, and dispersino- more 
splu_lters ; . and having, as shot, e.ffected aU this injury, they woukL .then 
augment 1t, many fold, by explodmg. · 
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In all cases of close action between ship and battery, the shells will pass 
through the nearer side, and, if not arrested by some object on the deck1 
will probably lodge and explode in the farther side; causing, by the ex-
piosion, a much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the ves-
sel, than l:ly their mere transit across the ve~sel. As before suggested, the 
vessel would suffer less injnry, were her sides made so thin as not tore-
tain the shell, permitting it to pass through both sides, unless fired with a 
small velocity. It is not impossible that au extensive nse of these horizon-
tal shells may lead to a reduction in the thickness of ships' bulwarks. 
In the facts quoted above, there is no illustration of the effects of hot shott 
except in the case of Gibraltar. In that attack, the floatiug batteries were 
made proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the c:onstrnctor, proof 
against hot shot also : and so, indeed, for a time, it seerned. It was con-
ceived that the hot shot, when buried deep in the clo~cly jointed timbers, 
would scarcely communicate flame; and that it wonld not be difficult, by 
the use of tbe fire enl.!;ines provided, to subdue so stifled a comlmstion. 
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed 
they had been rendered equal, in perfectly smooth water, to land batteries, 
~un for gun; aud so they might then have been, nearly, had the incom. 
bustibility of the latter been imparted. to them. But~ now, resistance to fire 
would nat snffi.ce; these floating batteries must either repel these horizontal 
shells from their bu1 warks, or, if that be impossible, permit them to pass 
through both sides. Nothing can be better calculated to exhibit the tre-
mendous effects of these shells, than a vessel so thick-sided as to stop every 
shell, allowing it to burst when surrounded by several feet of timber; and 
there can be no greater mistake than supposing that, by thickening the 
bulwarks of vessels of war, or fitting up steam butteries with shot-proof 
sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled, or in any material de-
gree modified. 
We will sum up this branch of our subject, with the remark, that the facts 
of history, and the practice of all warlike nations, are in perfect accordance 
with the conclusions of theory. The results that reason anticipated have 
occurred again and again. And so long as, on the one side, batteries are 
formed of earth and stone; and, on the other, ships are liable to be sw.allow-
ed up by the element on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by 
which they move; so long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on 
fire or blown np by hot shot, or tom piecemeal by shells, the same results 
1nust, inevitably, be repeated at each succeeding trial. 
Bnt, after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended 
for~ namely, the superiority of batteries in a. contest with ships, might be 
admitted : and still it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind 
of dcfende best adapted to our peculiar wants. 'rhis is true ; and we will 
now proceed to consider, severally, the cases to which defence must be 
applied. 
It may be well, however, first, to recall the general scope of the preceding 
argument. It has been contended that. floating defences should not be re-
lied on-not because they are actually mcompetent to the duty, but because 
they cannot fulfil this duty unless provided in inordinate numb~rs, and u.t.a 
boundless expense; and we have endeavored to show that this remark IS 
g;enerally true, whether the defensive fl~et be made up of sea-going vess~ls, 
< tf floatino- batteries, or of steam battenes. We have next urged the pomt 
that pr()p~rly planned and constructed · batteries are an overmatch for· ves-:, 
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sels of war, even when greatly inferior to them in armament-snstammg 
our opinion by many striking examples, and explaining satisfactorily the 
only instances that have cast any doubt on snch contests. lf the facts and 
reasonings we have presented do not convey the samP. strong convictions 
that sway our own minds, it must be because we have obscured rather than 
illustrated them; for it would seem to be impossible that facts could be more 
unexceptionable, or reasons more beyond the reach of cavil. However that 
may be, we now leave them to candid and di~passionate revisal, and proceed 
to examine the mode of applying these defences to our own coast. 
1t may be well to divide these into several distinct classes : 
1. There will be all the smaller towns npon the coast, constituting a 
very numerous class. 
At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enter-
prise of mnguitnde, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the 
lesser nttacks. A small vessel might suffice to guard ngainst single vessels 
that would otherwise be tempted by facility to burn the shipping and exact 
a contribution; but something more than this is necessary, since the amount 
of temptation held out by a number of these towns would be apt to induce 
operations on a larger scale. It might often happen, moreover, that our 
own vessels of war would be constrained to take refuge in these harbors, 
and they should find cover from the pursuer. 
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of 
form and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts 
and batteries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship of 
war can lie in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. \Vhile the 
circumstances of no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the 
defences to be applied to them severally, all should fulfil certain common 
conditions, namely: the passage into the harbors should be strongly com-
manded; the enemy should find no place, after passing, wherein be would 
be safe from shot and shells; and the works should be inaccessible to sud-
den escalade-that is to say, a small garrison shonld be able to repel such 
an nssault. With works answering to these conditions, and of degrees of 
strength in accordance with the valne of their respective trusts, this class of 
harbors may be regarded as secure. We cannot, however, here avoid ask· 
ing what would be the mode of defence, if purely naval, of these harbors 1 
Suppose the circumstances are deemed to require the presence of a frigate, 
or a steam-frigate, or an equivalent in gnn-boats; would not two hostile 
frigates, or two steam-frigates, infallibly arrive in quest? Could th<'re be 
devised a system more certain to result in the capture of onr VP,Ssels, and 
the submission of on r towns? 
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as large cities, 
navnl depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to ndmit of 
O'OOd defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point; so that an ~nemy could find no spot within, in which he conld safely prepare for oper· 
ations ulterior to the mere forcing an entrance. 
In this class are to be found objects that are, in every sense, of the high-
est value. Ou the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material,. 
and structures for naval accommodation, that could not be replaced during 
a war, which are of indispensable necessity, and of great cost; and, on the 
other hand, the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be 
great in the eyes of the· enemy-great for him to gain, and for us to lose- · 
corr~sponding efforts on his part must be looked for, and guarded against. If 
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he come at all: it will be in power ; and the preparations on our part must 
be commensurate. 
'rhe entrance to the harbor, and all the narrow passes within it, must be 
occupied with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the posi-
tions deemed requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. 
Batteries should succeed each other along the channel, so that the enemy 
may nowhere find sh~lter from effective range of shot and shells while 
within the harbor, even should he succeed in passing the first batteriE's. 
Provided the shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied 
with an armament, numerous: heavy, and selected with reference to the 
e-ffects on shipping: the facts we have quoted from history show that these 
defences may be relied on. 
If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one, or f'ven 
two sets of uatteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of 
these, or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it; but 
our present supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proeeedin~s, and 
finally his return, are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences. 
3. 'rhis brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments 
of importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being inter-
mediate space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases 
the defence must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of 
·course, be apportioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. 
When the value is not very great, a stout array of batteries at the best posi-
tions would deter an enemy from an attempt to force the passage, since his 
advantage, in case of success: would not be commensurate with any irnmi· 
nent risk. But with the more valuable establishments it might be otherwise: 
the consequence of success might justify all the risk to be encountered in 
rapidly passing in·face of batteries, however powerful. This condition of 
things requires peculiar precautions, nnder any system of defence. If, after 
having occupied the shores, in the narrow places, in the best manner, with 
batteries, we are of opinion that the temptation may induce the enemy, not-
withstanding, to nm the gauntlet, the obstruction of the passage must be 
Tesorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruction of the passage; 
such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the rnin of the chan-
nel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy float-
ing masses. 
'rhere is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size, 
nnd anchored with strong chains, would make it impo~sible to pass \vithout 
first removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made im· 
possible to effec.t this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstruc-
tions need not be resorted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could 
then be ~peedily formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threat-
ening nature. 
'There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of 
part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line, 
ready to move into their places at an hour's notice. 
'I"' he greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would 
be from explosion vessels; and from these they might be protected by a. 
boom, or a line of smaller rafts in front. . 
From what has just been said, it will be perceived that, when .the induce-
ments are such as to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient 
batteries can be established only at certain po.ints, we are not · ttien · to·zely 
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on them exclusively. In snch a case~ the enemy should be stopped by some 
physical impedimeuts; and the batteries mnst be strong enongh to prevent his 
removing these impediments, and also to prevail in a cannonade, should the 
enemy undertake to silence the works. 
The eonditinns these obstrnctions have to fulfil are these: 
1st. 1'hey must be of a nature to be fixed readily~ and to be speedily 
removed when there is no longer occasion for them ; and, to this end, they 
must be afinat. 
2J. They must have adequate inertia to resist, or rather not to be de-
stroyed or displaced by, the shock of the heaviest ship; and, in order to this, 
they must be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors. 
3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels; and, if in 
danger from this source, must be covered as above mentioned. 
'Ve do not say what are the exact circumstances in which all these condi-
tions will be fulfilled, though we think the idea long ago presented by the 
board uf engineers will, with modifications, embrace them all. 
,..rhe idea is this: Suppose a line (extending across the channel) of rafts, 
separated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship of war, 
each raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 6 feet deep, formed of 
strong timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in 
the strongest manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of 
the four corners, two obliquelr up stream, and two obliquely dowH stream, 
to very heavy anchors; and there should also be a very strong chain cable 
passing from one raft to another. Suppose a ship, striking one of the rafts, 
to break the chains leading down the stream: in doing this, she must lose 
much of her momentum. She bas, then, "under her fore foot:" the raft 
connected by a strong chain with the rafts to the right and left; on being 
tightened, this chain will throw the strain upon the down stream cable of 
that adjoining raft towards which the ship happens to tend. If we suppose 
it poss~tlle for th~se chains also_ to be parted, by th_e power still remaining in 
the ship, or by Impulses receiVed from succeedmg vessels, there will be 
other chains still to break in the same way. After the down-stream chains 
are all parted, the rafts will " bring up" iti a new position, (higher up the 
channel,) by the anchors that, in the first instance1 were pointed up stream. 
Here a resistance, precisely like t~at first .overco~e, is to be eneo_nntereci by 
vessels that have lost most of their force m breakmg- the snccesstve chains, 
and in pushing these great masses of timber before them through the water. 
Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these remaining anchors 
and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave nothing uncertain, 
a second similar line may be placed a short distance above the first. 
The best pruportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be deter-
mined; but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given 
to the rafts themselves, and to. the means by which they are to be held to 
their positions and to each other, the success of a well-arranged obstruction 
of this sort can hardly be doubted. 
'rhe expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the mate-
rials would be available for other purposes, when no longM needed for this. 
It may be repeated here, that such expedients need not be resorted to, ex-
cept to cover objects of the highest importance and valne, such as would induce 
an enemy to nsk a large expedition. For objects of less importance, batteries 
would afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last po\ver 
is, ~vft~n once established in any position, a constant quantity; and, although 
.·. . 3 . 
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it should be incompetent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large 
fleet, may be an overmatch for any small force upon which it should be 
concentrated. At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to 
heavy attacks, there will be, in the batteries, the greater capacity of resist-
ance to others. 
It rrJust not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we 
are considering, they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long 
as these aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we have 
suggested, the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chnnce of suc-
cess being on the side of the defence; that is to say, if any confidence is to 
be placed in the lessons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same 
security be attained by naval means? Only, as before shown, by keeping 
within the harbor a fleet, or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shaH 
be at all times superior to the enemy. 
lu a naval defence, there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, 
for there can be no lessening of the array of guus, in consequence of such ob-
structions; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating 
defences, the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the ob-
structions at his leisure. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the 
obstructions will bave been unnecessary, and will serve only to shut up our 
own fleet, preventing the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe. 
4. There is a fourth class; consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estu-
aries, of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. 
'l'hese have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through, 
these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the 
shore. The reliance must, from the nn.ture of the case, be a floating de-
fence, of magnitude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The 
complete defence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great 
expense ; certainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. 
The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifi-
cations; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by 
the presence of a not inferior fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, 
it will be better to give np the bay to th~ enemy, confining our defences to 
the more important ha~bors and rivers that discharge into the bay. By this 
system, not only will these harbors be secure, but the defences will react 
upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, secure it from predatory incursions; 
because, while Hamrton roads and the navy-yard at Norfolk are well pro-
tected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than thut 
whieh could be sent out from the navy yard. 
In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might de-
sire to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tem-
pestuous weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach 
the whole anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery 
of sea mortars, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a 
good defence; because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells. 
In thus distributiug the various exposed points of the seacoast into gene-
ral classes. acc01ding to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not 
:find that any thing can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications 
are applicable ; and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last ; 
,and in the last we shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. "In this last 
cla. s, there are, no doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the 
,act1ve a.nd operative force; and it ~s proi.Jable that steam ba:tfer1esJ~I!Y,pf 
all fioatmg defences, be the most smtable. ~ . -
• 
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It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recom-
mend this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam-ves-
sels of the enemy; nor must it be forgotten that, whether steam-vessels, or 
sailiug vessels, or both , are relied on, unless there are well secured points on 
the shore, under which they can take refuge, they will themselves consti-
tute an object inviting the superior force of an enemy. 
If, for example, we were to deem oFie of the open harbors of such import-
anee as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should 
thereby place within reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of 
a squadron, or t\,·elve or fifieen vessels of the same description. Even, there .. 
fore, in the cases where naval mean~ must be resorted to for defence npon 
the water, there should be works upon the shore, behind which, if overpow-
ered, they can retire. 
It has been before remarked, that the steam batteries are in no way more 
formidable to shore batteries than sailing vessels are : armed with Paixhan 
guns, they would be less so. Aud they would be less formidable, also, on ac-
conut of their comparatively small number of guns; for there is no reason 
why the firing should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances 
of inflicting injury would be in proportion to the number of missiles. . 
The only material effect the introduction of this description of vessel can 
have upon a system of defence by fortifications, is, that, owing to their less 
draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not being navi-
gable by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left unguarded. 
Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an arti-
ficial ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam-vessels; and 
this may often be done at small expense, and without detriment to the 
harbors: others will need additional fortifications. But the instances are 
not numerous where any such shallow channels exist. 
In opposition to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements in 
steam-vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see 
that the tendency is rather to increase their number. 
Thronghout this whole discussion, the argument has turned on the rela-
tive efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great reJative economy of 
the former, we suppose, wiH be conceded. If not1 we would ask, as couclu-
sive, or at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the follow. 
ing information be obtained from authentic sources, namely : the first cost, 
when complete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Oonstit1:1tion, and 
Congress, and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; 
specifying, as to each, the year of the sevRral expenditures and the amounts 
thereof, under the heads, as far as practicable, of .first cost, 1·epairs or rebuild-
ing, and improvements and alterations; and distinguishing-1st. The ex .. 
pense bestowed upon the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, 
spars, sails, anchors, cables, and rigging. 3d. 'rhe sxpense bestowed upon 
the armament; and 4th. The expense bestowed upon all other matters, (as 
boats, ballast, tanks, paint, &c.) necessarily connected with the preservation, 
or the ordinary service of the vessel. 
Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast rrqniring 
fortifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though 
on another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to 
their magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be em-
braced by our remarks, is the more necessary, since views hostile to the 
sy;st((~ Qf 'Yo~ks now in progress have been urged from a high source • 
.... 
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The presPnt system is founded on this principle, to wit~ that the fortifica-
tions should be strong, in proportion to the value of the objects to be se-
cured. The principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the 
.mode of applying it. 
There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding 
the less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, 
works simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a 
moderate armament, bnt at the same time inaccessible to the dashmg euter-
prises that ships can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few 
hours with much vigor; will suffice. Circumstances must, however, mate-
rially modify the properties of these works, even when the points to be 
guarded are of equal value. In one, the disadvantage of position must be 
compensated by greater power; in another, natural strength may need little 
aid from art; in another, greater width in the guarded channel may demand 
a larger armament; and in a fourth, peculiar exposure to land attack may 
exact more than usual inaccessibility. But all these varieties lie within limit!t 
that will probably be conceded. 
As to the larger objects, it has been con tended that there hn.s been exag-
geration in devising works to cover these-the works having been calculat-
ed for more formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to 
utter \·agnP. criticisms of this nature; and it is not easy to rebut them, with-
out going into an exa-mination as minute as if the criticism were ever so 
precise and pertinent. 
But let ns look a little at the material facts. \Vhat is the object of an 
enemy? What are his means? What should be the nature of our defences'! 
The object may be to lay a great city nn.der contriLution, or to destroy 
one of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors7 
&c. It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the 
year 1835, the. property destroyed within a few hours was worth upwards 
of $17,000,000, although the tire was confined to a very small part of the 
city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss 
that would accrue fi·om the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon 
the circuit of that great city, when no friendly hand could be raised to ex· 
tinguish them? or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay 
for exemption from that calamity? Can we value too highly the pecuuiary 
losses that the destruction of one of the great navy-yards would involve? 
and the loss, beyond all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations in· 
dispensable in a state of war, and that a state of war can hardly replace? 
Bnt what are the enemy's means? They consist of his whole sea-going 
force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the 
language of the critic: "From the nature of maritime operations, such a 
fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, 
and, by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either antici-
pate the tardy movements of troops upon ]and, and effect the object before 
their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far 
superior to that of the enemy, but so djvided as to be inferior to it on any 
one point." 
W ~ have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude ; and the means of the 
enemy consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these 
objects. . · 
With the highest notion of the efficien~y of fortifications :against ship· 
ping, these are not cases where any stint in · the defensive means ;A~e ad-
..... 
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nissible. Having, therefore, under a .full sense of the imminent danger to 
which the great objects upon the coast are exposed , applied to the approaches 
by water an array of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully 
explore all the avenues by land, in order to guard Against . approache~ that 
might b~ made on that side, in order to evade or to ct~pture the works 
guarding the channels. Bnt, before deciding on the defences necessary to 
resist these land attacks, it will be proper to estimate, more particularly, the 
menns that an euemy may be expected to bring forward, with a view to 
such laud operations. 
History furnishes many examples; and the expedition to Flushing, com~ 
mouly called the ' iValcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly iustruc~ 
tive. 
From an early day, Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a 
maritime force in the Scheldt ; and, in 1809, he hfld provided extensive 
dock-yards and naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his in-
vasion of Austria this year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that 
had before kept jealous watch over these naval preparations; relying now 
on forts and batteries, and on the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp, 
for the protection of the naval establishments, and of a fleet containing 
several line-of-battle ships and frigates, and a numerous flotilla of smaller 
vessels. 
The great naval establishment at Flushing-, near the mouth of the Scheidt, 
and of Antwerp, S()me sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels 
nfloat on the river, or in progress in the yards, presented an object to Eng~ 
land worthy of one of her great efforts. 
The troops embarked on this expedition consisted of upwards of 33;000 
infantry, 3,000 cavalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and some hundreds of 
sappers and miners; constituting an army of about 40,000 men. The naval 
portion consisted of 35 sail of the line, 23 frigates, 33 sloops of war, 28 
gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 82 gun-boats: 
mnking a total of 155 ships and other armed vessels, and 82 gun boats. 
rrhe guns, mortars, &c., provided for snch bombardments and sieges as the 
troops might have to condnct, amounted to 1!58 pieces, with the suitable 
supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind. 
1,he idea of sailing right n p to their object, in spite of the forts and 
batteries, seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the 
fleet. The plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion 
of the army on rhe island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing; 
while another portion proceeded up the Scheidt as high as Fort Bartz, 
which was to be taken ; after which, the army would push on by land, 
about twenty miles farther, and lay siege to Antwerp: all which, it was 
thonght, might be accomplished in eighteen or twenty days from the first 
landing. 
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, wa 
reduced within fifteen days; and in less than a week from the deharcatinn, 
(which was on the 31st of Jnly,) Fort Bartz was in possession of the 
English, having been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty five 
days before the main body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were as-
sembled at this point, and ready to take np the line of march against Antwerp. 
Sine~ the first descent of the British, matters had, however, greatly changf'd. 
'rhP. Frencb were now in forcp,; they had put their remaining defences 
· in ~~d condition ; they"had sprend inundations over the face of the coun-
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try; and not only would there be little chance of further success, but the 
safety of the expedition: formidable as it was, might have been compro· 
mised by a farther advance: it was, therefore, decided in council to 
abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops ac.::ordingly returned 
to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave till the end of 
December. 
The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to 
the omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and 
capture the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was pre-
vented by the difficulty of landing enough troops, at any one debarcation, 
in the bad weather then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would 
have enabled the expedition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first 
week; and, in the then unprepared state of the French, the issue of a dash 
upon Antwerp can hardly be doubted. 
The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unGon-
nected with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military 
movement; unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying 
the island of Walcheren as a position during the war. 
Possession was held of the island for five months; and it was finally 
abandoned from no pressure upon it by the French; although, after the 
first six weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 
17:000 men; of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were 
sick-effectives being often reduced below 5,000 men. 
We see: therefore, that nn effective force of less than 10,000 men main-
tained possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the 
most formidable military power in Europe; for more than three months; and 
ilO reason can be perceived why it might not have remained an ind,~finite 
period, while possessP.d of naval superiority. 
The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the ex-
pedition ; but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argu-
ment. . 
· . 1Ve will allude to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the Er1g· 
lish to distant countrifls, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, 
sent in the year 1814 against this country: one by the way of Canada; the 
other to the Gulf of Mexico. United in a single force of 20,000 men a~ainst 
our seacoast, the expense would have been less, and the results more certain. 
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found 
opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802, 
Leclerc 13roceeded to St. Domingo with 34 line of-battle ships and large 
frigates, more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 
men. 
We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worthy 
of vast preparations ; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our owu 
coast, and rivers, and bays, pm~sess many establishments not less inviting 
to an enemy than Flushing and Antwerp. 
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other 
words, what is the amount of force we mnst prepare to meet; and, more 
than all, we are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable momeut, 
when the military arrangements of a country are incomplete-when the 
armies are absent, or imperfect in their organization or discipline-does not 
hesitate to land in the face of the most populous districts, and, avall.iug of 
the local peculiarities, and covered and supplied by a fleet, to uu4~tiW.e 
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operations which penetrate deep into the country, and consume considera-
ble time. 
It seems, therefore, that, whenever the object we are to cover possesses a 
value likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire 
to inflict a serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are 
guarded against his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards 
against attacks by land also. A force considerable enough for very vigor-
ons attacks against the land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon 
the shore; and, if these yield, a \\tay is opened for the ships: and the enemy 
carries his object. 
In certain positions, the local circumstances would favor the land opera-
tions of an enemy; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, 
to be aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force 
of the country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population 
in the neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, 
on their own strength. In all such cases, a much greater power of resist-
ance. would be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In 
all such circumstancr~, the works should be of a strength adequate to resist 
an attack, although persevered in vigorously for several days. But when 
these land operations lead away from the shipping, or when the surround-
ing population is considerable, or the enemy is unable to shelter his move-
ments by local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the works be competent 
to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hours only. . 
'I'he magnitnde and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the 
joint influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the 
position, and the succor to be drawn from the nei?"hborhood. We may in-
troduce, as instances, New York and Pensacola. The former is as attacka-
ble as the latter: that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, 
owing to its capacious harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it 
in a satisfactory condition as to the approaches by water. But while an 
enemy, in approaching any of the principal works by land, could not well 
cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated population of the vicinity, 
the rapid means of communication from the interior would daily bring 
great accessions to the defence. A land attack against the city must, con-
sequently, he restricted to a few days; and the works will fulfil their ob· 
ject, if impregnable to a coup de rnain. 
Pensacola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, and 
growing in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfect-
ly as the city just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy 
island, which closes in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this 
island (Santa Rosa) would be in uninterrupted communication with his 
fleet; could, owing to the sparseness of the population, have nothing to ap-
prehend, for some time, from any reinforcements arriving at the place; and 
would be well protected, by positio11, from the effects of this succor, when it 
should arrive. While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, 
not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a..::;iege of many days of the 
work which occupies the extremity of the island, and guards the entrance 
to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of this work, his 
gnn and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every thing 
110t bomb-proof and incombustible at the navy yard. An attack not less 
peri'evering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the 
~~~r.side of the harbor also. 
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It; therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred 
on the works at Pensacola, their object will Le obtained only through the 
forbearance of thP- enemy; it hemg obviously indispensable that the priu-
cil ~,1 of these worl\s be competent ro resist a short siege. It this linb!lity 
resulted from the thinness of the neighboring population, it wonld 
still be many years befi1re this str,te of things would be waterially al-
tered. Bnt it does not depend on this alone; the peculiar topographical 
features will continue this liability, in spite of increasin~ numbers, and ever, 
so easy and rapid commu11ication '>•·ith the interior; it having been proved 
that a fiePt may lie broad off this shore, and hold daily communication there-
with, during the most tempestuous season. The English fleet of men-of-
war and transports lay: during the last war: from the 7th of February to 
the 15th March, 18l4, anchored abreast of Danpbin island and Mobile 
point, where the exposure is the same RS that off Pensacola. 
Between the cases cited: which may he regarded as of the class of extreme 
cases, (a clnss comprising, however, many important positions,) almost eve-
ry concAivable nwdification of the defence will be called for, to suit the va-
rious conditions of the s;everal points. 
The fortifications of the coast must, therefore, be competent to the double 
task of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two dis-
tiud and independent qualities. 'l'he first demands merely an array, in 
suitnble m1mbers, and in proper proportions, of heavy gnns, covered by para-
pets proof against shot and shells ; the second demands inaccessibility. As 
there is nothing in the first quality necessarily involving the last, it has 
often happened, either from the little value of the position, or from the sup-
postd 1mprobability of a land attack, or from the want of time to construct 
proper works, that this property of inacce, sibility has been neglected. 
Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a bat-
tery, we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object 
as well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party 
of men for an expedition of an hour or two ; and, unless we tal{e the ne-
cessary preventive measures: his party will be sure to take the battery first; 
nfter which, nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it 
was the purpose of the battery to prevent. 
ln general, the same fortifications that guard the water approachPs, will 
protect the avenues by land also ; bnt, in certain cases, a force may be so 
Janded as to evade the channel defences, reaching the obj( ct by a route 
entirely inland. Of course, this danger must be guarded against by suit-
able works. 
After the preceding exposition of our views on the Q"eneral subject of the 
defences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indtcate the mode 
by which the system of fortifications on which we wonld rely can be 
manned and served, without an augmentation, for that particular purpose, 
of the regnlar army. 
The force that sbould be employed for this service, in time of war: is the 
militia, (using the term in a comprehensive sense;) the probability being, 
that, in most of the d0fended points on the seabGard, the uniformed nnd 
volunteer companies will supply the garrisous needed. And it may be 
shown that it is a service to which militia are better adapted than to any other. 
The prominent defect of a militia fvrce results from the impossibilitv of so 
trnillitJg the men to field movements in the brief period of their servic~,as to 
give them any confidence in themselves as ma.nceu vrers in the face of reg~ll' 
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troops; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is hut lit-
tle ; every attempt nf the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not 
how to avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an 
enemy and nuder fire. -
Without the knowledge to be obtained only by long and laborious prac-
tice, the militiaman knows that he is no match, in the field, for the regnlar 
soldier; and it is not surprising that be should desire to avoid an encounter. 
But there is 110 such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. 'The militia-
man bas to be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which 
nothing can be more simplP. He rnnst learn to nse the raiumPr and the 
sponge, the handspike and the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to 
trail aud to fire: these are all. Each of these operations is of the utmost sim-
plicity, depeuding on individual action: and not on concert; and they may 
all he taught in a very short time. There is no man am vring, no marching, 
no wheeling. The ~quad of one gun may be marched to another; but the 
service of both is the same. Even the art of pointing cannon is, to an 
American militiaman, an art of easy attainment, from the skill that all our 
countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms-" drawing sight, or "aiming," 
beitJg rlw same art, modified only by the difference in the gun. 
r:I'hc mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of 
our cities on the seaboard. The forts ;m<l batteriPs, being put in perfect 
condition, should be garrisoned (at least the more important ones) by n small 
body of regular artillery, such as our present military force could SUJ:ply, 
and sufficient for the preservation of the public property, and to afford in-
dispensable daily guards: to thPse should be added two or three men of the 
Ordnance Department, ·~specially charged with the condition of the. arma· 
meut and a.mmuuition, and two or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty 
it would be to attend to the condition of the fortifications; keeping every 
part in a state of perfect repair. In certain important works, however, that 
would be exposed to siAge, or to analogous operations, it would be prndent, 
especially in thf' beginning of a war, to keep up a more considerable body 
of regular troops. 
The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachments, 
without disturbing their company organizrttion; aud should be assigned to 
the several worl<s, according to the war garrisons required at each ; from 
four to six men: according to circumstances, being allowed to e:lch gun. 
The larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty companies; 
the smaller, one, two, threA, or more companies; and, m some cases. even 
a platoon might suffice. Being thus assigned, each .portion of the c1ty force 
wotdd have its df'finite alarm-post; and should be oftPn taken to it, and 
there exercised in all tile dnties of its garrison, and more especially in the 
servtce of its batteries, and in its defence against assault. The multipli1'ity 
of stPnmboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach even the 
most dtstant alarm-posts in a short time. 
In order thRt all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of the 
works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some 
partif'ular portion of the volunteers, should, during peace, he the ordinary 
school of drill for all: and in this the detachments should, in turn: assemble 
and ext>rcise. 
Besides the mere manual of the gnn and battery, there should he frrqnent 
targ-et practice, as hei11g nut only necessary to the proper use of the battery, 
but.~s !mparti11g interest and excitement to the service. 
,. -
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It might be necessary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a 
competent officer or non-commissioned officer of the regular artillery ; and, 
in particular, to conduct the practice with shot and shells under such in-
struction. 
The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed 
batteries would constitute, under an impending attack, a reserve, posted 
either in one or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover 
exposed points, to co-operate in offensive movPmentR, or to relieve exhausted 
garrisons: this portion having connected with it the _mounted force, the 
field artillery, and the heavy moveable guns. 
rrhis appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the 
city would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superadding 
to the impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with family, property, 
and social and civil relations, and, while making military service the first 
of duties, relieving it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar 
feature in this kind of service that the governing motive in the choice of 
officers would be favorable to the condition of tbe troops, every man feeling 
that the safety of his dearest concerns depended on the efficiency and 
courage of his officers. The same motive wonld prompt him, moreover, to 
desire, and contribute to, the highest state of efficiency in the corps. 
rrhe organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend 
the whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more .populous 
points upon the inland borders. 
This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least 
expe11sive, by far, of any that would be efficient. 
· The days of exerci~e, drill, and encampment should be fixed and inva-
riable, in order that they may the le,ss interfere with the private occupations of 
the volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should 
be cor1stantly at these posts; but still the service would comprise but a very 
small portion of the year. 
According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of 
the works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command ; which 
should be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might 
often be extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the 
right and left, constituting a maritime department. 
In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give the 
whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the 
works. 
We now proceed to examine the coast in detail; and, in order to conform 
to the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole seacoast of the United 
States into two great portions: the first portion extending from Passama-
quoddy bay to Cape Flor·ida ; the second from Cape Florida to the month 
of the Sabine. In our description, we shall, without any other than this 
general acknowledgment, qnote largely from a report presented to Congress 
in April, 1836, and to be found in the Senate documents of the lst session 
24th Congress, No. 293, vol. 4. rrhis report contains an argument on the 
general subject, embodying many important considerations, which we have 
thought best not to repeat in this lengthened report, but to refer to as wor· 
thy of perusal. 
We will conduct the examination geographically, beginnipg at the north-
eastern extremity ; and referring, in every case, to accompaq,ying tables, 
which exhibit the several works in the order of relative import~~~ee-;~ .. to 
time. ,. · .· 
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COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA. 
The extreme northeastP-rn section of this coast, extending from Qnoddy 
Head to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous 
harbors, and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. The extent of this 
section, measuring from point to point, wherever the breaks of the coast are 
abrupt, is abont 500 miles; while a straight line from one of the abovemention-
ed capes to the other is hardly half that distance. The eastern half is singu-
larly indented by deep bays; the coast being universa1ly rocky, and possess-
ing numerous islands surrounded by deep water; which islands not only 
increase the number of harbors, but cover: besides, an interior navigation 
well understood by the hardy coasters, and measurably secured by its intri-
tracies, and the other dangers of this boisterous and foggy region, from in-
terruption by an enemy. The western half is much less broken ; it is cov-
ered by few islands in compari~on, but contains several excellent harbors. 
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They 
are not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public 
establishments of the greatest maritime Power. They are, moreover, a:s yet, 
backed by only a thin population; and are, consequently, weak as well as 
exposed. The time may not, however, be very distant, when, becoming 
wealthy and populous, they will be objects of a fnll portion of the national 
solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must, therefore, be calculated 
for the future; must be founded on the principle that they must defend 
places much more important than any now existing there; that, being near 
the possessions of a foreign Power, they will be, in a particular manner, lia-
ble to sudden and repeated attacks; and that, lying at the extremity of the 
coast, they are liable to be tardily succored. The works must, conse-
quently, be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out for a few days. 
Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial: their weakness 
would, in the first place, invite attack; and, it being often a great advantage 
to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy could pre-
pare hitp-elf to remedy the deficiencies of the forts, after they should fall into 
his bauds, by adding temporary works, by providing strung garrisons, and 
by flidiug the defence with his vessels. 
No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for their 
defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence 
is not asked for the mere coujectnres presented below, as to the number 
and cost of the wo1 ks assigned for the protection of the harbors which have 
not yet been surveyed: in some cases, there may be mistakes as to the num-
ber of forts and batteries needed ; iu others, errors will exist in the estimated 
cost. 
Eastport and Machias may be mentioned as places that will unquestion-
ably be thought to neeu defensive works by the time, iu the order of relative 
1mportance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the Government. 
,.l'her~ are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island, that may, 
at that period, deserve equal attention : at present, however, the places men-
tioned will be the only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed 
as the cost at each. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Mount Desert islaud, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a 
capacious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class of 
ve~sels, and easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an 
. enemy ~Superior to any other on this part of the cottst. From this point, his 
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cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern 
coast, especially that of Maine; and his enterpnses could be conducted 
witb great rctpidity against any point~ he .might select. These considera-
tiorJs: added to the very great ad vantage, in certain political events, of our 
occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively, 
together with the expediency of providing places of succor on a part of the 
coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the 
prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion, that the fClftification, in a strong 
manner, of this roadstead, may, before long, be necessary. A survey of 
this island was begun many years ago; bnt the party being called off to 
other dnties, it was never completed. The project of defensive works has 
not heen made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the Engineer De-
P<Htment some years ag-o, $500,000. (Statem'3nt 1, table F.) 
Casti11e.-lt would seem to be impm-sible, on this coast, to deprive an 
enPmy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his nsing them as 
stations durirtg a war-insular situations, which his vessels would render 
unnpproachable, being so numerous; bnt it seems proper that such of these 
positions as are the sites of towns should be secnred. During the last war, 
the English held the position of Castine for some time, [Hld left it at their 
pleasure. It is probable a work costing about $50,000 wonld deter an 
enemy from again making choice of thi~ - position. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Pu,obscot bay.-Upou this bay, and upon the river of the same name 
flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and vtll11ges. Of the many 
bays which intersect the coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the 
greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a 
large portion of thPse harbors must, for the present, be left without de-
fences, bnt the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered; 
and to afford a secure rf'treat for such vessels as may be unable to place them-
selves under the protection of the works to the east or west of the bay, the 
passage of the river must be defended. The lowest poi11t at which this 
can be done, withont great expense, is opposite Bucksport, at the :c narrows." 
A project has been given in for a fort at that position, estimated at $150,000. 
(Statement 1, table D.) 
St. Gwrge's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscu.t.-West of 
the Penobscot occur the abovementi~med bays, all being deep indentations 
leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of ir!dnstry and en-
terprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and, of course, no plans have 
been formed for their defence. $4UO,OOO are assigned to the defence of 
these waters. 'l'he Sheepscut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels 
of every size. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Kennebeck r~vcr.-'l'his river (one of the largest in the eastern States) 
enters the sea r)early midway between Cape Cod and the month of the St. 
Croix. It rises near the snurce of the Chandiere, which is a tributary of 
the St. Lawrence, and has once served as a line of operations against Que-
bec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and 
the active commerce of several very flourishing towns upon lts banks, to-
gether with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit 
its defence to he neglected. rrhe surveys begnn many years ago were 
never fiuished. rrhe estimated co;;.t of defences. as formerlY. reported by 
the Engineer Department, was $3UO,OOO. Positions near th.~ 'moulh will 
permit a secure defence. (Statement 1, table D.) ·-· .~ · 
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Portland harbor.-'],he protection of the town, of the merchantmen be-
longing to it, and of the ships of war that may be stationed in this harbor 
to watch over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of 
them important objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map nf 
the harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble point, House island, Hog 
Islaud ledge, and Fish point. 
It the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed 
at small expense, (to decide which, some surveys are y~t necessary,) there 
will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and Fish point need be oc-
cupied on,ly by such works as may be thrown np in time of war. The ex-
pense, as now estimated, of the works .planned for this defence, will be 
$155,000 for Fort Preble, nnd $48,000 for House island; for Hog lsland 
channel, say $ L35,000. (Statement 1, tables A, D, E, and F.) In addi-
tion, there mnst be repairs immediately applied to the old works, at an ex-
pense of $6,600. 
Saco, Kennebunk, and York.-Srnall w0rks, comparatively, will cover 
these places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregate cost (Statement 1, 
table F.) 
Portsmouth harbor and navy-yard.-The only good roadstead, or har-
bor, between CApe Elizabeth and Gape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within 
the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as 
Fox point, seven miles above the town. This situation, sufficiently com-
modious for a secondary naval depot, designed to repair ·vessels of war, 
should be maintairied; but it is to be regretted that the bay to the south of 
Fox point was not chosen as the site of the navy yard, instead of Fernald's 
island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to make 
some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy yard from an 
attack from the north shore of the river. 
The position of Fort Coustitution \Vill certainly, and that of Fort Mc-
Cleary will probably~ be occupied by the defencE's; though the works them-
selves should give place to those that will better fulfil the object. The 
other positions for forts, or batteries, are, Gerrishe's point, Fishing island, 
and Clark's island: some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Surveys 
are required before the projects can be forrr.ed, or before estimates can be 
made; but there is reason for be]ieving that the entire cost of fortifying 
this harbM will not fal1 short of $300,000. (Statement 1, table D.) 
Newburyport hm bor.-'l'he points forming the mouth of the harbor are 
continually changing; and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the 
defence of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. ,.fhere is 
only a shoal draught of water. It is thought $10U,OUO will defend this 
harbor adequately. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Gloucester harbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity of 
Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachu-
setts bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet 
been made, but It is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for 
$200,000. (Statement 1, table E.) Should there be any occasion for de-
fensive works before the proposed new works can be commenced, an ex-
penditure of $10,000, in'repairs of 'the old fort, will be required. (Table A.) 
Beverly harbor.-This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of 
the work~ designed for Salem. $50:000, ill addition, will secure it. (State-
#?ent ~' ~~ble F.) 
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Salem. harbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, 
and separated therefrom by a peninsula.. 'rhe occnpation of the extremity 
of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickeriug) on one side, and 
Nangus Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projt'cts 
have been presented for this defence, estimated to cost $225,000. (State-
ment 1, tables U aud F.) On a sudden emergencyj old Fort Lee may be 
put in an effective state for $2,000. ('rable A.) 
Marblehead harbor.-Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of 
Boston, Salem and Marblehead harbors posse~s an important · commerce of 
their own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by cerrain winds, 
from entering Boston or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed 
mode of dAfendmg Marblehead harbor cGmsists in occupying, on the north 
side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be 
superse3ed by the new work,) and, on the south, the position of Jack's point. 
'rhe two works will cost $318,000. (Statement 1, tables D and F.) 
'ro repair old Fort Sewall, which may be necessary if the new works are 
not soon begun, will require $10,000. (Table A;) 
tt Boston harbor.-We come now to the most important harbor in the 
eastern section of the coast; and, considering the relation to general com-
merce, and the interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole 
Union. 
After a careful examination of all the necess;ary conditions of such a 
problem, the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 
1820, gave this harbor a preference over all other positions to the east, and 
inclusive, of New York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great 
northern naval depot; and the Government, by the great additions and im-
provements that have from year to year been since made to the navy-yard 
on the Charlestown side, have virtually sanctioned the recommendation of 
the board. But, independent of the navy-yard, Boston is a city of great 
wealth, and possesses n.n extensive and active commerce. 
The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water; 
but, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too 
scant to take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light 
winds or an adverse tide; as the former, especially, is a very convenient 
anchorage whence to proceed to sea; and, above all, as Nantasket roads 
affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed 
indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The 
project of defence regards the existing works, witk the necessary repairs and 
modifications, as constituting a second barrier. 
Besides a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it 
contemplates permanent works on Nantasket Head; filling up the Broad 
Sound channel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships of war. 
Until the best draught for steam-vessels of war shall be well ascertained, 
it will not be safe to say to what depth the Broad Sound channel should be 
restricted ; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserted that this description of 
vessel can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, 
however, be thus excluded ; an<~ steam-vessels passing this channel would 
still have to pass the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for 
this harbor is $2,040,000. • 
Resides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the 
beginning of a war, !o erect several temporary works on certain positions 
in the harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard . . (St.at~menp 
1, tables A, E, and F. 
-~ 
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Pl.lJmouth and Provincetown harbors.-These harbors have a commerce 
of some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in 
reference to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's 
squadron blockading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under 
his lee, whieh would enable him to maintain his blockade, even throughout 
the most stormy seasons-knowing that the winds which won 1d force him 
to seek shelter would be adverse to outward-bound, and fatal to such inward 
vessels as should venture near the Cape. Were the enemy deprived of these 
harbor$, he would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment, as he would 
be constrained to take an offing on every approach of foul weather. Our 
own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an enemy interposed between 
them and Boston, or bein~ turned from their course by adverse winds, 
would, in case of the defence of these• ports, find to the south of Boston 
shelters equivalent to those provided in the east, at Marblehead, Salem, 
Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully sur-
veyed. Provincetown harbor has been smveyed, but the projects of de-
fence hava not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably 
covered by a work of no great cost on Garnett point; while, to fortify 
Provincetown harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking- sijelter 
therein, and at the same time to deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, will 
involve considerable expense. Prol:fably no nearer estimate can be formed 
at present, than that offered by the Engineer Department some years ago, 
which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and $6UO,UOO for Provincetown. 
(Statement 1, tables D and E.) 
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the north-
eastern section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and 
a great portion of sandy shore: in its milder climate and clearer atmo-
sphere; and it differs from all the other portions in the depth and magnitude 
of it5 interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navi-
gation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not 
including the shores of the great bays, measures 650 miles; while a straight 
line from one of the abovenamed .capes to the other measures about 520 
miles. 
Martha:s Vineyard sound.-To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands 
of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands 
on the south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclo::-.e the 
abovenamed sound. The channels through this sound, being sufficient for 
merchant vessels, and one of the channels permitting the passage even of 
small frigates, are not only the constant track of coasting vessels, but also 
of large numbers of vessels arriving in the tempestuous months from for-
eign voyages. There are \Yithin the sound the harbors of Tarpa.uli n cove, 
Holtnes's Hole, Edgartown, Falmouth, Hyannis, and Nantucket, besides 
small anchorages. 
In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, (of 
which there are sometimes forty or fifty,) a portion, containing very valuable 
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is sup-
posed to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of 
this sound. 
If the harbors just named are to be defended at all, it must be by fortifi-
cations. . There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this 
is believed to be entirely without military organization. A privateer might 
fUn i.P.to either of these harbors, and capture, destroy, or levy contributions 
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at pleasure. The use of the sound itself, as an anchorage for vessels o( 
war, cannot be prevented by fortifications alone. $250,1100 may, perhaps, 
sutfice for the defence of all the laarbors aQ·ainst the kind of enterprise to 
which they are exposed. (Statement 1, table F.) 
New Bedford and Pairhavett harbor.-No survey has been made of this 
harbor, on which lie two of the most flourishing towns. It is easily defen-
sible, and the amount formerly assumed by the Engineer Department will 
probably suffice, namely, $300,000. (Statement 1, table D.) 
Buzzard's bay.-lnterposed between the main and the island of Mar-
tha's Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay 
on the south. ri'his bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and n1ight be 
used as an anchorage by an enemy's fleet; but it is too wide to be de-
fended by fortifications. • 
Narra[Janset bay.-The properties of this great roadstead will be here 
briefly adverted to. More minute information may be obtained by reference 
to reports of 1820 and 182l. 
As a harbor, this is acknowledged by all to he the best on the whole coast 
of the United States; and it is the only close man-of-war harbor that is ac-
cessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent witJd of the 
inclement season. Numerous hoards and commissions, sometimes corn-
posed of naval officers, sometimes of a·rmy officers, sometimes of officers of 
both services, have, at different times, had the subject of this roadstead un-
der cousideration ; and all have concurred in recommending, in strong terms, 
that it be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if uot a great naval 
depot; one or more of these commissions preferring it, for the lattrr purpose, 
to all other positions. These recommendations have not been nctt>d on ; 
but it is next to certain that a war would force their adoption upon the 
Government. 
With the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel 
of war would come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast, in 
the boisterous season, without aiming at this port, on account of the compa-
rative cert<unty of an immediate entrance. And this would be particnlarJy 
the case with vessels injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with au eue-
my; with vessels bringing- in prizes, or pursued by a superior force. 
'J'his use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand 
for the means of repairing and refitting; and the concentration of thPse 
upon some suitable spot would be the beginning of a permaneut dock yard. 
For the same reason that ships of war wonld collect here, it would be a 
favorite point of rendezvous for privatee.rs and their prizes, and a common 
place of refuge for merchantmen. 
From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound, and 
the communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound, or Buz· 
zard's bay, might be well protected ; New London harbor would be cov-
ered ; the navy-yard would command southwardly, as from Hampton roads 
northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and 
Cape Hatteras; the influence of which command over the blockading opera-
tions of an enemy will'be apparent, when it is considered that the only har-
bors of refuge left to him will be the Delaware, Gardiner's and Buzzard's 
bays, .and Martha's Vineyard sound. 
'l,he bays first mentioned belong to the class before alluded' to, which, 
being too wide for complete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary 
defences as the navy may supply; and, in reference to their defen,ce by; 
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these mean~, nothing can be more important than the fortification of Narra-
ganset roads, because all but the first of the bays just named (including an 
anchorage for ships of war under Block island) would be commanded by a 
single squadron of those floating defences lying in these roads. To a squad-
ron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it would 
be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorages an 
enemy should go-all being within reach in three or four hours, and some 
within sight. \Ve will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating 
defences is in accordance with the principle before insisted on: they are 
not expected to close the entrance into these several bays·-that would re. 
quire a squadron for each, at least equal to the 'enemy's; but as the enemy 
goes in merely for rest or shelter, aud there is no object that he can injure, 
he may be permitted to enter; and our squadron will assail him only when 
the circumstances of wind, weather, &c. give all the advantages to the 
attack. The fortification of Narraganset roads is therefore, in effect, a 
most important contribution toward the defence of all the neighboring 
anchorages. 
But the same properties that make Narraganset roads so precious to us, 
would recommend tllem to the enemy also; and their natural advantages 
will be enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advan-
tages may have accumulated therein. 
If this roadstead were without defence, an enemy could occupy it without 
opposition, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgment on the 
island of Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, 
and with his fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces 
of the eastern States ; and while, from this position, his troops would keep 
in alarm and motion the population of the east, feigned expeditions against 
New York, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country . 
in that direction: and thus, thongh he might do no more than menace, it 
is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he would 
drive the Government. 
It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occu-
pation of other positions; (such, for instance, as are afforded in the bays 
just mentioned;) and that, therefore, the defence, in a strong manner, of 
Narraganset roads is useless. 
Even allo\ring that there are other advantageous and inaccessible po-
sitions, whereon an enemy might place himself; is it a reason, because the 
foe can, in spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open 
harbors, that we should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him, 
the very best harbor on the coast? that we should submit to capture and' 
destruction the valuable objects that accumulate in consequence of the 
properties of the harbor? 
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer 
for such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose 
than an occasional anchorage of ships of war; and for these reasons,. 
amongst others: that, although ships of war might possibly ride in these 
broad waters at all seasons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity 
for transports to attempt it, except in the mildest seasons ; and there can be 
litt1e doubt that a hostile expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of 
rendezvous, unless it afforded sure protection to its transports ; these being 
the only: mea,ns by which ulterior purposes could be executed, or final re-
. treat frQm the country effected. 
. . 4 
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If, moreover, Narraganset roads be fortified and become a naval station, 
or at least the station of a floating force designed to act against these outer 
waters, such an establishment by any enemy would at once be put upon 
the defensive, and require the constant presence of a superior fleet; thus 
measurably losing the object of the establishment. 
Independent of the qualities of the harbor, however, none of these bays 
would answer our purposes: lst. Because they cannot be securely de-
fended; and, 2d. Because they are difficult of access from the main-the 
communication with them being liable to interruption by bad weather, and 
liable to be cut off by the enemy. 
'rhe defence adopted for Narraganset roads must be formidable on the 
important points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. 
Although the possession of this harbor, the destruction of the naval estab-
. ishment, the capture of the floating defences, and the possession of the island 
~ a place of debarcation and refreshment, should not be considered as con-
stituting, of themselves, objects worthy a great expedition, they might very 
well be the preliminary steps of such expedition ; and defences weak in 
their character might tempt, rather than deter it; for although unable to re• 
sist his enterprise, they might be fully competent, after being captured and 
.strengthened by such means as he would have at hand, to protect him from 
offensive demonstrations on our part. 
There are, besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the 
works should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the islam.l, 
being permanently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive v:orks; 
but this bridge being at the upper end of the island, the channel is open to 
an enemy all along the eastern shore of the island. 'Vorks erected for the 
defence of the channel on the west side of the island cannot, therefore: pre-
vent, nor even oppose, a landing on the eastern side. 'l'he enemy: conse-
quently, may take possession, and bend his whole force to the reduction of 
the forts on the island, which cannot be relieved until a force has been or-
ganized, brought from a distance, conveyed by wnter to the points attacked, 
and landed in the face of his batteries: all this obviously requiring several 
.days, during which the forts should be capable of holdiug out. To do 
this ~gainst an expedition of 10,000 or 20,000 men, demands something 
.more than the strength to resist a single assault. 
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few da.ys, 
they will not, therefore, fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless. 
It must here be noticed, that, although the works do not prevent the 
anding of nn enemy on Rhode Island, they will, if capable of resisting his 
efforts for a few days, make his residence on the island for any length of 
time impossible, since forces in any number may be brought from the main, 
and Jande& under the cover of the fire of the works. 
To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It 
must be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads: 
I st. The eastern channel, which passes up on the east side of the island 
f Rhode Island. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, needs 
no defence by fortifications, other than a field-work or two, which may be 
hrown up at the opening of a war. . 
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between 
Rhode Island and Canonicu! island. This is by far the best entrance, and 
eads to the best anchorage ; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort o 
e east side of the en trance, designed to be the principal work in the. ~PJ: 
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tern. This work, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the west 
side of the entrance it is proposed to place another work ; and on an island, 
called Rose island, facing the entrance, a third work. It is nlso proposed to 
repair the old fort on Goat island, just within the mouth; and also old Fort 
Green, which is a little higher up: and on the island of Rhode Island. 
3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: first, by 
redncing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as while the passage 
shall be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the 
vessels of war) including steam-vessels; second, by relying on fortifications 
alone to close the channel; or, third, by resorting in part to one and in 
part to the other mode just mentioned. Either is practicable; but, being 
the least expensive and most certain, the estimates am founded on the first. 
The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,817,482. 
(Statement 1, tables A, B, D, E, and F.) 
Gardiner's bay.-Jt is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a 
very valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible 
by fortifications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear 
that, from one or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled 
by heavy sea-mortars. In such a case, the defensive works would not be 
costly. If it be found expedient to fortify some particular portion of the 
bay, as an anchorage for steam batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) 
the expense would probably be as great as was anticipated some years since 
by the Engineer Department, viz: $400,000. (Statement 1, tal>le F.) 
Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these 
harbors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is pos-
-sessed of considerable tonnage; and the second, besides being engaged in 
commerce, is the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be 
assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other. (Statement 1, tables E 
and F.) 
New London harbor is Yery important to the commerce of Long Island 
sound; and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, rarely 
freezing, and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. 
It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous 
of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. 
In the plan of defence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give 
place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $441,000. 
(Statement 1, tables C and F.) 
]1.outh of Connecticut rivcr.-This river has been shown to be subject 
to the expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to 
its defences; $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost. (State-
ment 1, table F.) 
New Haven harbor.-lt is proposed to defend this harbor by improving 
and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight re-
doubt erected during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of 
both may be set down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate re-
pairs of old Fort Hale. (Statement 1, table F.) 
'l'here are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both 
sides of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, still, most, if not 
all, are prosperous and increasing. Although, in their present condition, it 
might mt be 'deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, 
~et, as·.pn.rt 'of the present object is to ascertain, as near us may be, the ulti-
"'tc.cost of cori1pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward.. 
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to the time when some of these towns may become objects of predatory en-
terprises of some magnitude. Bearing in mind the probable increase of" 
population in the mean time, and the situation of the places generally, it is 
thought that $200,000 will be enough to provide defences for all. (State-
ment 1, table F.) 
New York harbor.-The objects of the projected works for the security 
of New York are, to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to pro-
tect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of 
this great port; and to cover the interior communication uniting this har-
bor with the Delaware. In the present ~ondition of the defences, an ene-
my would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack were made by 
land or water. 
'1,here are two avenues to the city, namely: one by the main channel, di-
l'ect from sea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of 
ihe seund, he may, now, land his forces on the New York side, at Hell-
gate: within less than ten miles of New York, and the next day, at the 
latest, be in the city; or, he may land on the Long Island side, at the snme 
distance, and in the same time be master of the navy-yard aud of Brooklyn 
heights, whence the city of New York is perfectly commanded; or, he 
1nay divide his forces, and reach both ohjects at the same moment. 
The projected systeri1 of defence closes this avenue at the greatest dis-
tance possible from the city, namely, at Throg's point. The oecupation of 
this point will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the 
city on one side, and still farther from the navy-yard on the other. 
'A "'ark now in progress at Throg's point will probably prevent any at-
tempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to 
land at a considerable distance from the object; and as he will thP-n be un-
able to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the 
New York side will he sufficient. 
But should he land on the Long Island side: he might, by leaving parties 
on s\1itabie positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and 
falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy-yard, having )10 obstacle in bis 
front. 'l'o prevent this, effectually, and also to accomplish other objecls, a 
work should 'be erected on Wilkins's point, opposite Throg's point. 'fhis 
vork, besides completing the defence of the channel, would involve a march 
against the navy-yard from this quarter in great danger; since all the forces 
that could be collected on the New York shore might, under cover of this 
·work, be crossed over to Long Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, 
cutting off his communication with the flebt. The two works on Throg's 
.and Wilkins's points may, therefore, be regarded as perfectly protecting, on 
1hat side, the city and navy-yard. 
Against an attack by the main channel, there are-
1st. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an 
enemy's squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consist of 
Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island; 
}..,ort Wood, on Bedlow's island; and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island. 
J t is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of 
the lower b,urier being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a 
_disadvantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city 
might be going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and 
the fleet. 'rhey cannot, however, be dispensed with, until the outer barriers 
..are entirely completed, if even then. ! :. 
~ t . ~ . 
53 [ 451 T 
2d. At the narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage be-
comes so contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. 
On the Long Island side of the narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong 
water-battery standing on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and im-
mediately behind it, on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, 
called Fort Hamilton. Some repairs being applied to these works, this po-
sition may be regarded as well occupied. . 
On the west side, or Staten Island side of the narrows, are the following 
works belonging to the State of New York, viz: Fort Richmond, which is 
a water-battery; Batte·ry Hudson, which is at some height above the water; 
Battery JJ1orton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and F'ort 
Tomkins: which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work~ 
All these need great repairs; but, being once in proper order, would afford a 
very important contribution to the defence of the passage; nothing further,. 
indeed, being contemplated for this position, except the construction of a 
small redoubt on a commanding hill, a little to the southwest. 'rhe repairs 
of these works cannot too soon be tl'lken ir1. hand; and it is hoped some ar-
rang-ement may soon be made with the State authorities to that end. 
'\Vith the narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect 
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an 
attack by water through this passage. 
But there lies below the narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchor-
age for any number of vessels of war aud transports. An enemy's squad-
ron being in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, wonld set a seal 
upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any 
-seaso11 of the year. And it would also intercept the water communication,. 
by the way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia. 
T!1e same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, 
(the p1ace of the landing of th~ British, which brought on the battle of 
Long Island in the revolutionary wm":) within seven miles of the city of 
Brooklyn, of its commanding height, a11d of the navy yard; with no inter-
vening obstacle of any sort. 
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to. 
be as fully realized as it was during the Jnst wnr, when, on the rumor of 
nn expedition being in preparation in England, 27:000 militia were assembled 
to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences 
near the city, nnd those at the narrows, indispensable as they are for other 
purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise; which can be thoroughly 
guarded against only by-
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accom-
plish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade 
of the harbor impossible ; and obliging an enemy, who should design to 
move troops against the navy yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty 
miles from his object, upon a dangerous beach; leaving, dui·ing the absence 
of the troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without 
shelter. 'rhe hazards of such a land expedition would, moreover, be greatly 
enhanced by the fact that our own troops, by passing over to Long Island 
under cover of the fort at '\tVilkins's point, could cut off the return of the 
enemy to his fleet, which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway: time, 
distance, and the direction of the respective marches, would make, very-
natn rally, such a mancenvre a part of the plan of defence. Against an ene-
.my landing in Gravesend bay, no such manceuvre could be effectual, on ac-
, count of the shortness of his line of mareh, as well as of its direction. 
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In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected addi"-
tional works-one for the east bank, and another for the middle ground j 
these positions being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside of Sandy 
Hoole Before determining on the works last mentioned, the board went 
into much research in order to ascertain whether these shoals were un-
changeable ; and it was thought to have been fnlly proved that there had 
been no material alteration in more than sixty years. This apparent stability 
of the shoals encournged the board to devise the project referred to. 
Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new, or rather another 
channel. If it be indeed a new channel, it shows a want of stability in the 
shoals, that forbids any such strnctures as the contemplated batteries ; and· 
it mav be necessarv to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, un-
questionably, though it may not be best to decide on them nntil all doubt as 
to the fixed or changing nature of the channel shall be removed ; especially 
as it must necessarily be some time before the completion of more jndis-
pensable works will allow the commencement of these. 'l'his may, how-
ever, be s;~.id with certainty, namely : that, all other means failing, works 
may be erected ou Sandy Hook, which will have a good action upon the 
channel, and under cover of which bomb·ketcl1es or steam batteries, or both, 
may lie. 'Vith such an arrangement, there would be little probability of 
the lower bay being oc.cupied as a blockading station. 
To recapitnlate: The security of th€ city of New York and the navy-
yard requires, first,defences on the passnge from the sound; namely, the 
completion of Port Schuyler on Throg's point, and the erection of a fort 
on Wilkins's point-cost of both $976,000: second, the repair of works on 
Governor's islanq, on Bedlow's island, and on Ellis's island-estimated 
cost $170,897: third, the repair of the works at the narrows, inclnding 
the works belonging to the State-cost $475,000; and, fnurth, the erection of 
outer defences on or near Sandy Hook, estimated by the board of engineers 
to cost $3,362,824. 
'rhe total cost, exclusive of these last1 will therefore he $1,621,897; or; 
including these, $4,984,721. (Statement 1, tables A, C, and F.) 
Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fm·t JYJ~fllin, Delawa1·e breakwater.-
The coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as 
that on the south side of Long Island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated 
by several inlets; but not one, besides the Delaware, is navigable by sea-
going vessels. The Delaware bay itself being wide, and full of shoals, 
having an intricate channel: and being much obstructed by ice in the win-
ter, affords no very good natural harLor within a reasonable distance of the 
sea. 
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen 
will, it is hoped, fully supply this need; in which event, it must be securely 
fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object; and 
as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the 
conjectural estimate made some years since in the Engineer Department, 
namely, $600}000. (Statement 1, table F.) 
The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea·patch island, 
about forty five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, 
to replace the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea-patch, on the 
Delaware shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the 
same time protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake c::mal ; a 
temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the coromence-
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ment of a war, to assist in closing the channel on that side; together with . 
floatiBg obstructions, to be put down in moments of peril, will effectually 
cover all above this position-including Philadelphia, and its navy-yard 
Wilmington, New Castle, the canal before mentioned, and the Philadelphia 
and Baltimore railroad. 
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being delayed 
by difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on which 
it is to stand, Fort Mifflin, which is an old work, about seven miles below 
the city of Philadelphia, h:1s been put in good order. This work ·is ready 
to receive its armament and its garrison. 
The expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000, 
and of the fort opposite $521,000. (Statement 1, tables C and F.) 
Chesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted 
with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern nava 
depot, recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, 
on James river, for the one; and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the 
other. They also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay, at 
the north, and Hampton roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In 
those reports the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of 
all the matters relating to these important objects, and reference is now 
made to those reports for many interesting details. 
Hampton roads, James river, Norfolk, and the navy-yard.-The works 
projected for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort-this 
is called Fort Monroe; 2d, a casemated battery, called Fort Calhoun, on 
the Rip Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort; and 3d, a line of floating 
obstructions extending across the channel from one of these works to the 
other. It was the opinion of the commission above mentioned, that, in 
the event of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ulti-
mately be proper to provide additional strength by placing works on the 
positions of Newpo1 t new~, W assaw shoals, and Craney Island flats. Such 
an expansion has, however, since then, been given to the present navy-yard 
at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other 
position on these waters being occupied for such purposes. 
'rhe great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of 
covering the navy-yard, is conceded on all hands. The bearing of this 
harbor upon the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally 
well u!Jderstood; it being very evident that a small hostile force would re-
luctantly ventnre up the bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or 
any of the upper harbors, leaving behind them a great naval station, and 
the common rendezvous of the southern coast-a station seldom, in time of 
war, without the presence of a number of vessels just ready for, or just re-
turned from, sea. 
A very important bearing upon the security of Norfolk and the navy-yard, 
independent of the closing the channel to those places, is, however, not gen-
erally understood; and h-as been entirely overlooked in the official animad-
versions (before mentioned) on the system of defence of the board of engi- · 
neers. 
If we suppose no defencrs at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as 
can be disregarded, or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in 
Lynnhaven bay, and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would 
pass up the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covP-ring the flank of 
• his troops, but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by 
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. the army attempting to defend the place; or, instead of landing in the bay, 
he might, at his option, land the main body quite near to Norfolk; and hav-
. ing possession of James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor 
'in steamboats, or otherwise, by that channel. 
There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Nor-
folk, caused by the interlocking of streams, that, with the aid of field-works, 
would possess great strength ; and, being occupied in succession, would 
undoubtedly delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since 
.. the naval depot seems fixed at Gosport, these must, indeed, be chiefly relied 
()ll for its security from land attacks; and timely attention must be given, 
<>n the breaking out of a war, to the occupying of these defiles with appro .. 
priate defences. These positions possess no value whatever, if they can be 
turned; and, without adequate fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads, 
there would seem to be no security for Norfolk or the navy-yard, except in 
the presence of a large military force. 
On the completion of the projected defences, the circumstances will be 
very different. Then, those defiles must be attacked in front, because no 
part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But 
this is not all. The moment an enemy advances toward Norfolk from this 
point of debarcation, his communication with his fleet wilt be jeoparded ; be-
cause, as the defiles do not require a large body to defend them against an 
attack in front, the greater part of the reinforcements arriving from above, 
by way of the river, may be landed upon his flanks: or in his rear. An 
offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could 
be justified only in the case ot hi~ finding an entire want of preparation, 
caused by the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion 
with this disposition for defence, it may be expedient, on the opening of a 
war: to throw np a field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort 
Calhoun; which would, besides, contribute to the exclusion from the road-
stead of vessels of small draught. _ 
The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less 
neecssary to the security of the navy-yard and the city of Norfolk from a 
land attack, than from an attack by water; aud that both these important 
functions are superadded to the task of defending the only good roadstead 
of the southern coast, antl of contributing, in a ver.y important degree, 
towards the defence of the Chesapeake bay. 
As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system 
of defence, that, although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others 
in this region open. May we suppose, then: that if there were no other 
than this harbor, its defence would be justifiable? If so, it would seem 
that the objection rests on the principle, that, in proportion as nature has 
been bountiful to us, we must be niggard to ourselves; that, having little, 
we may cherish it; but, having much, we must throw all away. 
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of 
these works, (Fort Monroe ; ) and we concede that there is justice in the 
criticism. But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, 
however, be improper to avail of this opportnnity to remove from the 
country the professional reproach attached to this error. vVhen the sys· 
.. tern of coast defence was abont to be taken up, it was thought be~t, by the 
Government and Congress, to call from abroad a portion of that skill and 
science which a long course of active warfare was supposed to .. pave sup-. 
plied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of that determination.~~ .It was ... 
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not easy, probably: to come down from the exaggerated sca!e of warfare to 
which Europe was then accustomed; nor, for those who had been brought 
up where wars were often produced, and always magnifieu, by jnxtapo· 
sition or proximity, to realize to what deg-ree remoteness from belligerant 
nations would diminish military means and qualify military objects. Cer-
tain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe, 
would have been mnch more so but for the opposition of some whose 
more moderate opinions had been moulded by no other circumstances: than 
those peculiar to our own country. 
The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however; not to strength. 
Magnitnde, in fortification, is often a measure of strength; bnt not always, 
nor in this instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now, 
against a water attack, or an assault, or a sie~e, with one-third its present 
capacity, and perhaps at not more than half its cost. 'N e do not think this 
work too strong for its position, nor too heavily armed ; and as the force 
of the garrison will depend mainly on the extent of the armament, the 
error has caused an excess in the first outlay chiefly, but will not involve 
much useless expense after completion. 
Although there is much important work to be done to complete the fort~ 
it is even now in a state to contribute largely to the defence of the road-
stead ; and there is no doubt that in a very short time all the cascmated 
parts may be perfectly ready to receive the armament. 
This work will be found in statement 1, table C; $223,367 bci.•1g re-
quired to complete it. 
Fort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward, for want of stahility in the 
foundation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been mised 
out of the water, the walls of the battery were begnn some years since; bnt 
it was soon found that their \Veight caused considerable subsidence. On 
an inspection by engineer officers, it was then decided to keep the founda-
tions loaded with rriore than the whole weight of the finished work, until 
all subsidence bas ceased. The load had hardly been put on, however, 
before it wa:s injudiciously determined tl) take it off, and begin to build: al-
though the settling was still going on. Happily a better policy prevailed 
before the eoustruction wns resumed; but not before the very considerable 
expen e of removing the load had been incnrred, and the fnrther expense 
of replacing it rendered necessary. It is hoped the whole load will be re-
placed early the present year. (Statement I, table C.) Required to complete 
the ._,·orlc $416,000. 
It may be expedient, in time of war, by way of providing interior bar-
riers, to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river ; 
and to pnt in condition and arm old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the 
city. 
Harbor of St. Mary's.-'rhe central situation (as regards the Chesapeake) 
of this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the 
facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of 
refuge for the commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if 
not constant, station during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey 
has been made, but no project has been formed. The Engineer Department: 
some years ago, conjectured that the cost of defences in this harbor might 
amount to $300,000. (Statement 1, table F.) 
·.: · Annapo?is harbor.-No surveys or plans of defence have heen made. -~he existing: works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former esti-
. '· 
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mate, made by the Engineer Department, amounting to $250,000, is adopted 
here. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Harbor of Baltimore.-'I.'he proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay 
greatly endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things, 
an enemy in a few hours' march, after an easy landing, and without hav· 
ing his communication with his fleet seriously endangered, can make him-
self master of that great emporium of commerce. There are required for 
its security two forts on the Patapsco-one at Hawkins point, and the other 
opposite that point, at the extreme end of the flat that runs off from Sollers 
point; the8e being the lowest positions at which the passage of the Patapsco 
can be defended. Besides the advantages that will result, of obliging the 
enemy to land at a greater distance-thereby gaining time, by delaying his 
march, for the arrival of succor, and preventing his turning the defensive 
positions which our troops might occupy-it will be impossible for him to 
endanger the city by a direct attack by water. 
The present Fort McHenry, redoubt Wood, and Covington battery, should 
be retained as a second barrier. The first-mentioned is now in good con..-
dition, and the repairs required for the others may be applied at the begin-
ning of a war. 
'rhe fort on Sollers point fiats, which should be first commenced, is esti-
mated to cost $1,000,000. (Statement 1, table D.) 
The fort on Hawkins point (to be found in statement 1, table F) will 
co&t, it is supposed, $376,000. 
Mouth of Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communica-
tion from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to 
place a fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an 
enemy from destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this out-
let of the canal. 'I'here have been no surveys made with a view to estab-
lish such protection, which are estimated at $50,000. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Cities of fVas!tington, Georgetown, and Alexan~rin.-Fort \Vashing-
ton covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige au enemy 
to land at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his 
object, and about twice as far below Washiugton. It will also serve the 
very important purpose of covering troops crossing from Virginia with a 
view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from the 
Patuxent or the Chesapeake. To pn t the necessary repairs on Fort Wash-
ington will co~t about $20,000. (See statement I, table A.) 
Cedar poi·nt, Potomac river.-But all these objects would have been 
better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar point. As it is, 
however, the contemplated works being construct~d in the Patnxent: and 
• the militia of the surrounding country in a dne state of preparation, an 
enterprise against 'vVashington would be a hazardous one. 
As giving complete' secnrity to the towns in the District, covering more 
than sixty miles in length of the Potomac, and a large tract of country 
lying between the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on Cedar point 
should not be ornitted. rrhere have been no surveys made of the ~round, 
nor projects of the fort, which, in a conjectural estimate of the Engineer 
Department, was set down at $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.) 
Patu.1.:ent river.-The more effectually to protect the city of \Vashington 
from a sudden attack by trrop3 landed at the head of navigation in the 
Patuxent, and to pro\1-ide acditional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a 
fort has been planned to cccnpy Point Patience, and another to occupy 
.. .. ' 
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Thomas's point, both a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's 
point is (in statement 1, table D) estimated $250,000; and the work on Point 
Patience, (in statement 1: table F,) estimated to cost $246,000. 
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contem-. 
plates, first, · defending the Potomac on Cedar point, and maintaining a 
second barrier at Fort 'Vashington ; second, defending the mouth of the 
Patuxent. 'rhis system is criticised, in the .document before referred to, in 
a way to induce the suspicion that it was not understood. 
Dnring the last war, there was no fort in the Patuxent; and the ~onse­
quence was, that the British approached by that avenue, and occupied the 
whole river as high as Pig point-nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and 
Jess than twenty miles from the capital; while, in consequence of there 
being no forts in the Potomac, they occupied that river as high as Alexan-
dria, inclusive; by this latter occupation, perfectly protecting the left flank 
of the movement, during its whole advance and retreat. Both flanks being 
safe, the British had nothing to fear except from a force in front; and that 
this risk was not great, in the short march of less than twenty miles from 
his boats, was proved by the issue. 
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake, the 
English army was in possession of the capital, having penetrated near 
fifty miles beyond the point of debarcation. On the twelfth day from the 
time of landing, the troops were again on ship-board, near the month of 
the river. This attack, exceedingly well conceived, and very gallantly 
executed, owed its success entirely to the want of defencE's, such as are 
now proposed. 
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an <~nemy 
landed at the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise, 
his march will be prolonged by at least four days; that is to say, it will 
require more than sixteen days, during which time he will be out of com. 
munication with his fleet, as regards supplies and assistance. 
,.rhe opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our 
troops having now nothing to fear as t.J their flanks, either from the Potomac 
or Patuxent, will dispute every foot of territory; and although he should 
continue to advance, it must be at a slower rate. 
While he is thns pursuing his route towards 'vVashington, the forces of 
Virginia will be crossing the Potomac, and concentrating at Port Tobacco, 
or some position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to 
falling on his flank and rear. ,.fhis would seem to be conclusive; for it is 
difficult to conceive of troop~ persevering in an expedition, when every 
moment will not only place them farther from succor, but greatly increase 
their need of it. Railroads reach from near the crossing-places of the 
Potomac to the very heart of the country south ; and a very few days 
would bring forward a large force, all of which would arrive upon the 
rear of the enemy. 
It is said, in the criticism, that, if shut out of the Patuxent, the enemy 
might land between the mouth of that river and Annapolis, and thence 
proceed against Washi11gton. But the same difficulties belong to this pro-
ject, and a new difficulty is added. The Virginia forces arrive, as before, 
and as:;;ail his flank, either between the Potomac. and Patuxent, or between 
the Patuxent and the Chesapeake; and there is, besides, the Patuxent for 
the enemy to cross, both in going and returning-itself n formidable mili-
tary obstacle. · 
J.. 
[ 451 J 60 
It is said, also, that the landing may be made in the Potomac; bnt this: 
only proves that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being 
a fundamental principle of the system that such landing must be prevented 
by fortifying the rivers as low down as possible. · 
The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern point 
of Florida, is invariably low, and, for the greater part, sand)r; much resem-
bling the coast from the abovementioned cape to Montauk point, on the 
east end of Long Island. 
A ridge of sand, here and there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, 
.extends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies on 
the main land; while, in others, it is divided therefrom by basins or" sounds" 
of various width and depth; and is c.ut up into islands by numerous chan-
nels which connect these interior waters with the sea. "\Vherever this sand 
ridge is interrupted, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bor-
dering the principal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers. 
Ocracoclc inlet, N. C.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at this 
inlet effectually excludes ali vessels of war-at least, all moved by sails. But 
.as this is an outlet of an extensive commerce: and as, through this opening, 
attempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam· 
vessels, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water 
communication, timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal 
to defence against all such minor enterprises. 
Beaufort harbor, N. C.- A work called Fort .Macon has been erected 
for the defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some 
operatio::Js are also called for to protect the site from the wearing action of 
the sea. (Statement 1, table A.) Estimate $10,000. 
1J.fouths of Cape .Pea1' river, N. C.-The defence of the main channel 
of Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now nearly completed,) 
on Oak island, another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller 
channel will require a redoubt on f 1ederal point. The battery-magazine, 
block-house, &c., at Smithville, should remain as accessories. Port Cas-
'Well, Oak island, (statement I, table C,) requires $6,0110 to complete it; the 
fort on Bald Head (statement I, table F) will require $ 180,00(); the re-
doubt on Federal point (!5tatement l, table F) will require $ 18:000; and the 
battery,&c., called Fort Johnston, at Smithville, (statement 1, table A,) $5,000. 
Georgetown harbo1·: S. C.-The first inlet of any consequence south of 
Cape Fear river is at the united months of the Wflccamaw, Pedee, and Black 
rivers, forming Georgetown harbor ; which is a commodious and capacious 
bay, having sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, 
for merchant vessels and small vessels of war. A survey of this harbor 
was begun many years ago, but never completed; and no pwjects for de-
fence have been made. It is probable that a work placed near Moschcto 
creek, or on Winyaw Point, would give adequate strength at the cost of 
abont $250,000, (statement l, table E.) 
Santee river· and BuZZ's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown 
are the months of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not 
known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water 
for sea-going vessels. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into 
Bull's hay. It may be sufficient to consider these, and the other inlets be-
tween Georgetown and Charleston, as calling for small works, capable of 
resisting boat enterprises, and to assign as the cost 5100,000. Should they 
prove to be navigable for privateers, they will require a larger expenditure. 
(Statement I, table F.) ;. 
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Clwrleston, S. C.--This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and 
Cooper rivers, is auout five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Between 
it and the ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. 
Upon the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, how-
ever, only water enough for smaller frigates and sloops of war. On the 
southwest side of the harbor is James's island, in which are several serpen-
tine passages, more or less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam-ves-
sels: some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river. 
Whappoo cut, the most northerly passage from the Stono to Charleston har .. 
bor, enters Ashley river opposite the middle of the city. 
Interior Batura! water .communications exist, also, to the southwest of 
Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South 
Edisto and St. Helena's sound; this, again, with Broad river; and, finally, 
this last with Savannah river. 
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, sep-
arated frem the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the 
northwest side of this island is an interior water communication, which ex-
tends to Buil's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown. 
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences 
to the principal entrance of the harbor. 'l'he lateral avenues must also be 
shut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will 
show that the best mode of defending them will be by works at or near the 
mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance 
from the city; the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected; 
and the line of interior water comnmnication will be inaccessible from the 
sea. 
No position for ·the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor 
can be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's 
island. 'rhis is, at present, occupied by l<.,ort Moultrie-a work of some 
strength, but by no means adequate to its object ; its battery being weak,. 
and the scarp so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How 
far this work, by a modification of its plan and relief, may be made to con· 
tribute to a full defence of the harbor, has not yet bP-en determined. But 
so long as it is the only work at this, the principal point of defence, it must 
be kept in good condition for service; and no alterations that will disturb 
this efficiency ·shonld be undertaken. The repairs now indispensable will 
cost $10,000. (Statement 1, table A.) 
On a shoal nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie, the foundation of a fort has 
been begun, which \vill have a powerful cross ·fire with Fort Moultrie. 
This is called Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work 
will require, it is estimated, $286,000. 
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter':s Folly , 
island. Tl:lis requires some repairs, estimated at $7,000. (Statement 1, 
table A.) 
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto.-All these must be fortified, at 
least in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or 
small vessels. To that end, $50,000 may be assigned to each. (Statement 
I, table F.) 
St. Helena sound.-The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the 
sound shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no 
.great depth ~of water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller 
~class ofmerchantmen, and for steamboats: and to have a P..a\iigable commu-
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nication with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal: intersecting the in-
terior navigation between Charleston and Savannah. rrhe estimate is 
~150,000. (Statement 1, table F.) 
Broad river, or Port Royal 1·oads.-The value of this capacious road-
stead, as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth that can be carried over 
the bar ; on the distance of this bar beyond the line of coast ; and on the 
n1eans that may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. 'rhis 
is supposed to be the deepest bar on the southern c0ast. Should there 
prove to be water enough for frigates, and should it be practicable to make 
the passage over the bar safe and easy, by the erection of light houses on 
ihe shore, and lights, or other distinct guides, on the bar, this harbor, situ-
ated within 60 miles of the city of Charleston, and 20 of Ravannah river, 
intersecting the interior water-communication between these cities, thereby 
securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a high degree 
of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but also as a naval station. 
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made 
with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shaH 
have been done, can the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast be 
known ; and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required 
defences will depend. For the present, the estimate made some years ago 
by the Engineer Department is adopted, namely, $300,000. (Statement I, 
table E.) 
Savannah, and mouth of ~..':;avannah river, Georgia.-Mention has been 
made of the natural interior water-commn11ication along the coast of South 
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south from the Savannah 
river, as far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city 
of Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by othtlr avenues 
than the harbor or river; and, accordingly, ifs defences must have relation 
to these Jesser, as well as great, channels. 
The distance from the mouth of vVassaw sound, or even Os~abaw sound, 
(both to the southward of Savnnnah river,) to the city, is not much greater 
than from the month of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole 
distance by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either 
jnlet, or from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of 
Charleston: it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most 
advantageously. It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the 
defences to be placed near the inlets; because, thus placed, they will serve 
the double purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these 
harbors, which) in time of war, cannot but be very useful. 
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur 
islaed, lying- jnst within the mouth, and, perhaps, for additional security, 
another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of 
the river, would prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover 
the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur. 
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be 
maintained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the 
passages which come into the river from the south; which last would not 
be at all controlled by works on Cockspur or Tybee. Fort Pulaski, on 
Cockspur island, is well advanced; and, to a certain extent, is 'evcn now 
efficient, measnres being now in hand for mounting the lower ti.er of guns. 
$215,000 an~ required to complete the works, and th~. out-works and a ,, 
pendages. (Statement 1, table C.) 'l'o fortify 'l'ybee island may:requifj 
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$120,000. (Statement 1, table E.) And to repair Fort Jackson, $50,000. 
(Statement 1, table A.) 
Wassaw sound: Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, at tlte mouth 
of Medway river; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamalta sound, at the 
mouth of Altamaha river; St. Simon's sollnd, at the mouth of Buffalo 
creek; St. Andrew's sou11d, at the united mouths of the Scilla and San-
tilla 1·ivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of 8t. Mary's river.--
All these communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards 
the line of interior navigation, and sever&ll of them as affording access to 
excellent harbors. The last, and one or two others, are known to be navi-
gable to the largest sloops of war and merchantmen ; and some of the others 
are bnt little inferior, as regards depth of entrance or safety of anchorage. 
A l1 these openings have yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably 
easily defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of 
floating defences. 
It is an important principle, bearing- peculiarly on the defence of the 
whole southern coast, that, on a shore possessing few harbors, it is at the 
same time more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and more 
easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter, without which a close blockade 
cannot be maintained. 'rhis principle is enforced, in the instance of onr 
southern coast, by the two following -weighty considerations, namely : first, 
its remoteness from the. nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which 
is: on a mean, 600 miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and cur-
rent; and, second: its being close upon the larboard hand, as they enter the 
Atlantic, of the great concourse of vessels passing, at all seasons, through the 
Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concen-
tration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid 
can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off 
from all retreat by a superior enemy. 
Accnrate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether 
pursned by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers 
which beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged-de-
fences to cover them when arrived, seem to be indispensable. 
When these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast, 
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage, 
will be a diffieult and hazardous one to an enemy, to who.n no perseverance 
or skill can avail to maintain 11 continuous blockade; while, on the part of 
·our small vessels of war, steam-frigates, and privateers, the same sort of su-
pervision will be at all times easy and safe. 
Nothing better can now be done, than to assume $200,000 as the aver-
age cost of defending each of the nine entrances; giving a total of 
$1,800,000. (Statement 1, tables E and F.) 
St. Augustine, Plorida.-This, the most southern of the harbors on the 
Atlantic, anrl the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the 
smaller class of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam-vessels; and re-
quires a certain amount of protection from attacks by water. It is, there-
fore, proposed to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Marion) that 
commands the harbor in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000. 
(Statement 1, .table A.) 
Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy 
to Cape FJor'da, pointed out every harbor of any conseqnencc, and speci-
'P,eg~ev€ry wo~·k·that _a thorough system qf defence will require, we will, in 
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order to give a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and 
garrisons of the works, refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In 
that statement the works are divided into tables, showing-, separately, 1st, 
(tabfe A,) the old works alrear!.v repaired, and those propo:sed to he repaired 
and retained in the system of defence; 2d, (table B,) new works completed ; 
3d, (table C,) works under construction; 4th, (table D,) works to be first 
commenced ; 5th, (table E,) works to be commenced next after those in ta· 
ble D; 6th: (table F,) works to be last commenced. 
'l.,he most essential works on the Atlantic coast are included in the first 
five tables; and it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will 
be required, for g·arrisons in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 
5,748 pieces of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be in-
curred, $9,476,767. 
We consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of works also, 
(table F,) although it mnst be a long time before permanent works for 
these positions can be commenced. For these there will be required, in 
additi(,n, for war garrisons, 25,545 men; for armament, 4,79(:) pieces of ord-
nance; ami for the expense of erection, $14,241,~24. 
It must be here stated, that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller in-
formation may require them to be elevated into some of the earlier classes. 
SEACO.-\ ST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE 1\IOUTH OF THE SABINE. 
The first positions that present themselves, on doubling around Cape 
Florida into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key JiJ'est and the Dry Tortugas. 
This board concur in the opinions heretofore expressed in favor of these 
fine harbors; and they beg leave to refer for very interesting :;tatemcnts, in 
relation to the latter harbor especially, to a letter from Commodore Rodgers 
to the Secretary of the Navy, Jnly 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st seE:.sion 
21st Congress, vol. 1, .[\;o. 1, page 236;) and letter fi·om the Secretary of the 
Navy, March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, 
vol. 2, No. 111, page 1.) 
A naval force, designed to control the navigation of the Gulf could -de-
sire no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very 
wayside of the only path through the Gulf, it is, at the same time, well sit-
uated as to all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, 
Mobile, the mouths -of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of 
the Gulf: 
The Tortugas harbors, in particular, are said to afford perfect shelter for ves-
sels of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there 
can be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means 
would, with great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort, and 
his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this 
sea. vVith an enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf, by us, would 
be imminently hazardous, if not irppossible; and nothing but absolute na-
val superiority would avail any thing against him. Mere military means 
could approach no nearer than the nearest shore of the continent. 
It is believed that there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable 
with these, that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To de-
prive him of these, would, therefore, be interfering materially with any or-
ganized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these har· 
bors would, however, do much more than this. It would transfer to Qt.Ir 
' . ,..,•vft 
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own squadron, even should it be inferior, these most valuable positions: and 
it would afford a point of refuge to our navy and our commerce, at the very 
spot where it would be most necessary and useful. 
In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this 
topic, merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be dif-
ficult. By occupying two, or at most three, small islands, the harbors of the 
Dry Tortugas (there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly 
protected. The works must be adequate to resist escalade; bombardment, 
and cannonade from vessels, and to sustain a protracted investment; but 
as they will not be exposed to any operation resembling a siege, there can 
be no difficulty in fulfilling the conditions. They must have capacious 
store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof, and be heavily armed. 
The fortification of Key 'VVest should be of a similar character. 
No details can be given until all these positions have been minutely sur-
veyed with reference to defence. 
The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the Engineer 
Department as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key 
West: and this estimate may now be taken as ample. (Statement 2, table F.) 
'fuming now to the shore of the Gulf, we find n. portion, namely, from 
Cape Florida to Pensacola, thut has never been examined with particular 
reference to the defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Char-
lotte harbor, J;]spiritn Santo bay, Appalachicala bay, Appalachie bay, St. 
Joseph's bay, and Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than 
to assume for these the estimate formerly presented by the Engineer De-
partment, viz: $1,000,000 for all. (Statement 2, table F.) 
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the 
relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country in-
terested in its safety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the ad-
jacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, i~ will be some time 
before that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endan-
gered by an enemy, will be competent,ofitself: to sustain a serious attack from 
without. Upon the Atlantic seaboard, the Alleganies crowd the people 
down upon the shore; every important point on the coast being surrounded 
by a population dense now, and every day rapidly increasing in numbers; 
while the ocean and the interior parallel communications transmit rapid 
aid to the r(~ht and left. The coast of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled 
in itself, is remote from succor from behind, and is almost inaccessible to 
lateral assistance. 'rhose reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the ne-
cessity of an orgai'lized, permanent, and timely system of defence for the 
whole seaboard of the United States, apply to this part of it with peculiar 
force. 
'Ve now pass on to the remaining point~ of defence on the Gulf. 
Pensacola bay.-The upper arms of tl)is considerable bay receive the 
Yellow-water or Pea river, Middle river: and Escambia river. The tribu-
taries of the last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, 
seem to mark the routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a 
part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola; while the qualities and po-
ttition of the harbor, and the favorable nature of the country, have already 
marked out lines of railroad communication with a vast interior region. 
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from the lower part of the bay, into 
Santa Rosa bay. On the west, the lagoons of Pensacola:, Perdido, and Mo. 
bile bays, respectively, interlodr in such a manner ns to require but ft few 
5 
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miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last 
named bay, and thence, through an existing interior water communication, 
to the city of New Orleans . 
. Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to 
frigates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deep-
ened. 
The bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and easily 
hit. 'rhe harbor is perfectly land-locked, and the roadstead very capacious. 
There are excellent positions within, for repairing, building, and launching 
vessels, and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply 
of good water is abundant. The harbor is perfectly defensible. 'l'hese 
properties, in connexion with the position of the harbor, as regards the coast, 
have induced the Government to select it as a naval station and place of 
rendezvous and repair. 
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to 
form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, 
as an important naval station, and place of rendezvous and repair, which it 
now is, further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, 
delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the several av-
enues by land and water, are found to be necessary. 
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, 
$22,000 bein~ asked to finish them. A work is just begun at the position 
of the Barrancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other 
small works designed to cover the navy-yard from a lateral attack through 
the western bays. The Barrancas work may require $100,000, and the 
others $200,000 ; making a total for Pensacola of $322,000~ (Statement 2, 
tables A, C, and F.) 
Perdido bay.-'This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile 
ba.ys, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be care-
fully surveyed with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the 
cost may be $200,000. (Statement 2: table F.) 
Mobile bay.-The plan of defence for this bay comprises a fort, 11ow 
needing some repairs, for Mobile point. Another fort is projected for Dau-
phin island, and a tower for the defence of Pass-au-Heron. The estimates 
for all ,require $915,000. (Statement 2, tables A, E, and F.) 
New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.-The most northern 
water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage 
called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The 
next is the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. 'l'hrough 
these passages, an enemy, entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same 
time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensa-
cola, be able to reach New Orleans from the s·outhern shore of the lake ; or 
he might continue onward, through Lake Maurepas, Amite river! and lber· 
ville river, thereby reaching the Mississippi at the very head of the delta~ 
or, landing within the mouths of the Chef Menteur, he might move against 
the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road. 
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is 
Bayou Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English 
army in the last war,) not running quite to the l\iississippi, but bounded by 
shores. of such a nature as to euable troops to march frqm the point of de-
barcation to the city. 
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These avenues are defended by Fort Pike, at the Rigolets; by Fort 
Wood, at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue; and by a 
tower at Bayou Dupre. 
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, 
about seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be 
occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little 
lower down, on the left. 
All these forts have been abandoned for several years; and, having re-
ceived no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs some-
what extensive-especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. 
The following sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works 
in perfect order, viz : Fort Pike, $5,000 ; Fort Wood, $3,580 ; fort on 
Bayou Bienvenue, $2,500; Tower Dupre, $400 ; Fort Jackson, $20,000; 
and Fort St. Philip, $3,300. (Statement~, table A.) 
The most western avenne by which New Orleans is approachable from 
the sea, passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barra-
taria bay, which is an excellent harbor for a floating force, guarding the 
-coasting trade on that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are seve-
ral passages leading to New Orleans. "rhe estimate for a work which is 
now about to be begun on Grande Terre island is $325,000. (Statement 2,. 
table C.) 
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which 
would demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to fixed de-
fences upon the shore. We have here an instance in whidithat kind of 
defence would be very useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New 
Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ; 
but, owing to the great width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, 
by fortification alone, deprive an enemy of anchorages, (especia1ly that of 
Chandeleur island,) nor cover entirely the exterior water communication 
between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly sub-
mit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in possession of these pas-
sages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation of a floatir1g force 
adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the shelter of the 
forts, of being always on the alert: and of assuming an offensive or defen-
sive attitude, according to the designs, condnct, or situation of the enemy. 
Onr examination of the coast, from Cape Florida to the Sabine, having 
now been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for-
a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the 
works, to statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to 
those ·of statement 1. 
'rhe more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first five 
tables, will require for garrison, in time of war, 4,4.20 men; for the arma-
ment, 794 pieces of ordnance of every kind ; and for the expense yet to be 
incurred, $516,780. 
The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be 
postponed to a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for 
exampl~~ .tho-se for 'rortugas and Key 'Vest) as to which the examination 
ha~ not been sufficiently minute to decide to what class they really apper-
tain. 
In this ao-e of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it would 
be unwi~c to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floating 
iforce required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts-
, 
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perhaps even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability-
undoubtedly is, that the power will be steam, genius may, in the interim, 
devise something still better than st~am. 
And we may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam-vessels 
for warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to c!.irect a very 
cautions and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to 
surpass, in important particulart:l, all that had preceded; and, to surpass the 
more, as each succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and. 
trial of the preceding. 
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give· 
way to some agent still more potent: and at the same time not less safe and 
manageable. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam-vessels 
now under construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten 
years. · 
A' deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommend-
ed the more, by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers when 
needed, the timber being collected in the mean time. 
Referring nG>w to the tables which accompany this report: 
Statement 1 includes all works from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida; 
statement 2, all works from Cnpe Florida to the mouth of the Sabine; 
each statement comprising six tables, as before mentioned. 
In relation to every work executed, in progress, or merely projected, the 
tables show the garrison, the ordnance of every description: the sums already 
expended, and the final cost. 
As to works not yet planned, n portion of the same particulars are exhibit--
ed, founded pn conjecture merely; of course, without layitlg claim to accu-
yacy, but still as approximations, affording some indication of the final 
result. 
It may be well to give here n. summary of all these tables. 
The works which are likely to be erected on the Atlantic, within a rea-
sonable time, and which are regarded as necessary to a good system of de-
fence, will reguire war garrisons, amonnting to 28,720 men ; and they will 
Iequire a furtherexpenditure of $9,176,767. Works called for in like man-
l1er upon the Gulf of Mexico coast, will need 4,420 men to garrison them. 
and u further expenditure of $516,780. Of the 'Whole coast, therefore, the 
garrisons will amount to 33,140 men, and the expenditures to $9,993,547. 
,.fhe remaining works comprised in table F, of both statements, will re-
quire 30,695 men, and co~t $19,521,824. 
Making the grand total for the whole seacoast of the United States, in 
garrisons for the works 6:3,835 men, and 'in cost $29,5l5,37J. 
In addition to these statements as to the fortifications, there are two cor-
Tesponding statemeuts of the cost of the ordnance, of the carriaaes, nnd of a 
certain supply of powder and shot, or shells, for each piece-o~e statement 
relating to the Atlantic coast, and the other to the Gulf of Mexico coast. 
From these it appears, that for the works likely to be erected on the Atlantic 
coast, within a reasonable time, (that is to say, for the wor}{s comprised in the 
:first five tables, A, B, C, D, and E,) there will be needed 2,483 piec~s of 
-()rdnanc_e, ~nd 4,511 carriages, whi-::h \~i~l cost $2,252,290. 
For :mmlar works on the Gulf of Mexico coast, there will be needed 296 
pieces of ordnance, and 495 carriages, at a cost of 8240,720. 
The remaining works named in tables F, of both statements, will require, 
in additiou, 5,447 guns and 5,551 carriages, which will cost $3,735,330. 
Making the grand total required for the whole seacoast 8,226 guns and 
10,560 carriage;:\, at a cost of $6,228,340. 
The time required to construct and put in order the whole system must 
depend on the amount of the annual appropriation. All that need now be 
' said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much 
time, and of such vital importance, there shou]d be no relaxation of diligence. 
With all diligence~ many years must necessarily be consumed. But the work 
may be too much hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of 
progress at which it wi1I be executed in the best manner, and at the mini-
mum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality, and more costly 
if delayed. 
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior de- . 
fences. · 
In the report presented by the Engineer Department, in March, 1836, 
(Senate document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, No. 293,) there is a de-
monstration of the actual economy that will result from an efficient system 
{)[ seacoast defence; which is to the following effect, referring to the docu-
ment itself for details. 
There is first supposed to be an expedition of 20,000 men at Bermuda, or-
Halifax, ready to fall upon the coast. 'rhis will make it necessary, if there . 
be no fortifications, to have ready a force at least eqna1, at eacP! of the fol-
lowing points, namely: 1st. Portsmouth and navy-yard. 2d. Boston and . 
navy-yard. 3d. Narrag<mset roads. 4th. New York and navy-yard. 5th. 
Philadelphia and navy-yard. 6th. Baltimore. 7th. Norfolk and navy-yard. 
8th. Charleston, S. C. 9th. Savannah; and lOth. New Orleans; to say 
nothing of other import:mt places. 
At each of these places, except the last, 10,000 men drawn from the inte-
rior, and kept under pay, will suffice; the vicinity being relied on to supply-
the remainder. At New Orleans, 17,000 men must be drawn from a dis-
tance. In a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least 
Z26,75o,ooo. 
rrhe garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in ther:e 
places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500) · 
will then be only $3,448,156 less than the whole expense of building these 
defences, viz: $21,767,656. Whence it follows, that the expense of these . 
erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in.... 
a single campaign. 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel Engineers. 
S. THAYER, 
Lieut. Colonel Engineers, Brev. Colanel. 
T. CROSS, 
Colonel, Assistant Quartermaster General .. 
G. 'rALCOTT, 
Lieutenant Col9nel Ordnance .. 
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STATEMENT 1. 
Of the fortifications constructed, const1'ucting, or repairing, and of those· 
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A.-Old works repaired, and those proposed 
to be repaired, wit!£ tke amounts expended, 
and the amounts 1·equi1·ed to put them in a 
serviceable condition. 
Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine 
- -
180 
-
5 21 
- -
3 
Fort Edgecomb, Wiscasset, Maine 
-
60 
- -
12 
-
Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Maine - 100 
-
8 
-
3 3 
Fort Scammel, House island, Portland, Me. 80 
-
-
8 
- -
3 
Fort McCleary, Portsmouth, N. H. 
-
80 
-
5 
- -
6 
Fort Constitution, N. H. - -
-
250 
-
21 12 
- -
6 
Fort at ,Gloucester, Mass. 
- -
80 
-
8 
- - -
3 
Fort Pickering, Salem, Mass. 
- -
60 
-
6 
- -
3 
Fort Lee, Mass. 
- - - -
40 
-
8 
- -
Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass. -
-
125 
-
18 
- -
3 
Fort Independence: Boston, Mass. - 500 6 49 25 
- - -
Fort Winthrop, Governor's island, Boston, I 
Mass. - - - - - I 
- - -
16 
- - -West-head battery, Governor's island, Bos- ~ ton, Mass. 
- - - - I 150 - 7 - - - -Southeast battery, Governor's island, Bos- I 
ton, Mass. - -
- - J - 7 - - - - -Fort at New Bedford, Mass. 
- -
60 
- -
9 
-
. -
-
Fort Wolcott, Newport, R.I. 
- -
200 
- -
34 
- - -
Fort Green, Newpert, R.I. 
- -
40 
- -
8 
-
- - I 
Fort Hale, New Haven, Conn. 
- -
30 
-
6 
- - -
Fort Columbus, Governor's island, N. Y. l -800 53 26 - - -Castle Williams, Governor's island, N.Y. 26 26 18 - - -South Battery, Governor's island, N. Y. 
-
5 5 
- - -
Fort Gibson, Ellib's island, N.Y. -
-
80 10 
- -
Fort Wood, Bedlow's island, N.Y. 
-
300 16 26 
-
2 
-
6 
Fort Richmond, Staten island, N. Y. 
- 1 - 27 - - -Forr Tompkins, Staten island, N. Y. - - 32 - 2 -Battery Hudson, Staten island, N. Y. 
-
1,000 40 
- - - - -
Battery Morton, Staten island, N.Y. 
- J 9 - - - -
Fort Mifflin, Delaware river, Peun. 
-
200 
-
28 
- -
-
Fort McHenry, Baltimore, Md. -
-
350 19 11 20 
- -
6 
Fort Madison, Annapolis, Md. -
-
80 
-
6 
- - -
3 
Fort Severn, Annapolis, Md. -
-
60 
- -
7 
- -
3 
Fort Johnston, Cape Fear river, N.C. 
-
60 
-
10 
- - -
Castle Pinckney, Charleston,.S. C. 
-
50 8 
-
Fort Moultrie, Charleston: S: C. -
-
300 
-
30 
-
3 9 6 
Beaufort ·battery, S. C. - -
-
30 
- -
6 
- -
Fort Jackson, Savannah river, Georgia - 70 
- -
10 
·- -
3 
Fort Marion, St. .Augu6tine, Florida 
-
30 
- -
6 
- - -
F ort Hamilton, New York harbor, N.Y. 
- - - - - - -
Fort Lafayette, New York harbor, N.Y. 
- -
- -
- - -
Fort Washington, Potomac river, Md. 
- - - - -
- - -
Fort Macon, Beaufort, N.C. . 
- - - - - - -
-
n,4451Ws 2o8 34315 
-- -
14 57 
* Garrison and armament will contribllle to those of new fort. t ,Belonpin~; " 
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STATEMENT 1. 
proposed to be constructed or repaired for the defence of the seacoast, 
bay to Cape .F'lorida. 
-
Armament. 
~r en~ :~r en~ rn~ ~ .... en .... ... ~ 0 Cl) (I) .... t"j ~ s Expended. Total cost of re-~ ~ ~ t: .... Required to u) ·~ >-. ·~...: 0 . s;5 0 (I) complete. pairs or con-<I) 0 s~ ~...: ~ . 
"'0 o:> o..c: s .... ..c ocn struction. ._a:t';$ ..c:.~ cd b.O bJJ ~ ... en 1<:1 <ned ~ Cl) 
..<:: ....... ..c: ,.cCU ~:..:::::: ..c:-- ~ 0 .,c:..C ~ u..C t) ..c ...... ;.,) .... Cd ..... t) t) .s ~ .s t) ~ 0 ..... 
.s .s ~ ·7 ..c 0 cd ~ 6 ;e 0 0 00 00 ~ 00 0 ~ 
- - - ---- - - --
-
4 
-
1 2 
-
- - -
36 
-
~10,000 $10,000 
- - -
- - - -
12 5,000 5,000 
-
5 
-
2 2 
- - - -
23 $5,086 3,200 8,28Ge 
-
3 
-
1 2 
-
- - -
17 440 3,400 3,840 .. 
-
4 
- -
-
- - -
15 1,990 750 2,740* 
-
7 
-
2 4 
-
- - -
52 2,590 3,671 6,261* 
-
2 
- -
2 
- - - -
I5 
-
10,000 10,000* 
-
1 
-
I 
- - - - -
11 
-
5,000 5,000• 
- - - -
- -
- -
8 
-
2,000 2,000* 2 
-
2 
- - - -
25 10,000 IO,OOO* 20 15 
-
2 4 
- - - -
I21 229,594 230,000 459,594 
- - - -
2 
- - -
-
I8 
-
IOO,OOO IOO,OOO 
- - - - - - -
- -
7 
-
5,000 5,000 
- - - - - - - -
7 
-
5,000 5,000 
- -
1 2 
-
- - -
12 
-
5,000 5,000* 
-
7 
- -
2 
- - - -
43 
-
IO,OOO 10,000 
- - - - - - -
- -
8 
-
2,000 2,000 
-
- -
-
-
6 
-
5,000 5,000• 
4 8 
-
2 12 
- - - -
105 
f 
l ,662 
f - 8 - - - - - - - 78 205,722 5,735 216,619 - 4 - - - - - - 14 
-
3,500 
-
2 
-
I 2 
- -
- -
15 
-
IO,OOO 10,000 
-
8 
-
2 
- - -
- -
60 
-
150,000 150,000 
- - - - - -
27 I 10 7 
-
4 8 
- - -
I 64 I 450,000 450,000t 
-
40 ~ -- - - - - - - - I 
-
- - - - - -
9 J 
-
8 
-
4 4 
- - -
44 76,783 
-
76,783t 
-
7 
-
2 7 
- - -
2 74 140,000 140,0001: 
-
4 
-
1 4 
- - - -
I8 
-
5,000 5,000 
-
2 
- -
2 
- - - -
14 
-
5,000 5,000 
-
- - - - -
- - -
10 5,000 5,000 
- - - -
l 
- - - -
!) 37,114 7,000 44,114. 
-
5 
-
1 
- - - - -
54 
-
10,000 IO,OOO 
- - - - - - -
-
-
6 
-
5,000 5,000 
" -
1 
- - - - - - -
I4 
-
50,000 50,000 
- - - -
- - - - -
6 
-
50,000 50,000 
-
-
- -
- - - - '7, - - 20,000 20,00011 
- - - - - - - - - - -
5,000 5,00011 
- - - - - - - - - - -
20,000 20,00011 
- - - - - - - - - -
-
10,000 10,000U 
-- - -- - - - -- - --------34 114 27 64 3 I ,O!l7 699,319 1,227,918 1,927,237 
. ~; 
::: Repams completed. II Induded m table B. 
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STATEMENT 1 
....: 
~ 
~ :::: ~ ~ ~ en v; .s Designation of the works. 
.s ~ 1-< Q) Ci (I) (I) (I) Q) (I) (.) 
(.) s= "0 "0 "0 "'0 "0 Q9 
tQ 0 ~ s ~ ~ Q ·s. -~ <n ::s ::s ::s ::s E 0 5 0 0 0 ~ as 0.. 0.. 0.. P. P. v 6 ~ c:~ C'l ~ 00 ~ iZ ~ ~ ~ ~ ..... 
-------H.-New 7Dorks completed. --------
1 Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, N.Y. 800 14 18 5 5 6 
2 Fort Lafayette, New York harbor, N.Y. 370 24 24 18 
-
2 2 
3 Fort Washin~on, Potomac river, Md. - 400 
-
66 3 
4 Fort Macon, eaufort, N. C. -
-
300 
-
12 15 4 4 3 
-----------------
1,870 38 54 99 9 11 14 
C.- Works 1mder constntction. ---------- -
1 Fort Warren, George's isl'd, Boston, Mass. 1,500 61 137 58 
-
2 Fort Adams, Newport, R. I 
- -
2,440 59 90 98 21 13 12 
3 Fort Trnml:Jull, New London, Conn. 
-
350 ] <! 14 14. 3 3 3 
4 Fort Schuyler, Throg's neck, N. Y. . 1,250 48 48 70 8 12 6 
5 Fort Delaware, Delaware river -
-
750 32 32 54 
- - -6 Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Va. 
-
2,450 42 189 10 H 25 12 
7 Fort Calhoun, Hampton roads, Va. - 1' 120 54 54 88 
-8 Fort Caswell, Oak i~Jand, N. C. -
-
400 
-
20 32 2 2 
-9 Fort Sumter, Charleston, S. C. 
- -
GSO 41 41 33 
-
9 
-10 Fort Pulaski, Cockspur island, Georgia 
- 800 
-
65 53 4 
- -
----------
--
----
11 ,74(1 354 690 5LO 52 64 33 
-----
--
---- ··-D.- JVorks to be first commenced. 
1 Fort at Bucksport, Penobscot river, Me. - 500 
-
45 50 4 6 5 
2 Fort at mouth of Kennebeck river, Me. - 500 
-
45 52 4 6 5 
3 Fort Scamme!,House island, Portland, Me. 250 
-
17 18 
- -
4 Works in Portsmouth harbor, N.H. - 750 
-
45 52 4 () 5 
5 Fort Pickering, Salem, Mas~. - - 300 
-
16 21 2 3 6 
6 Fort on Jack's point, Marblehead, Mass 
-
350 32 20 2 2 3 
7 Works at Provincetown, Cape Cod, Mass. 1 ,ooo 40 56 56 
- - -8 Works at New Bedford, Mass. - - 750 45 52 4 6 5 
9 Fort on RoRe isl'd, Narraganset roads, R. I. 470 30 27 21 
- - -
10 Fort on Sollers' point fiats, Md. - - ROO 38 76 33 
- -11 Fort on Thomas's point, Patuxent river, Mel. 350 
-
20 25 2 
-
3 
6,o20 /loB ----------424 400 22 29 32 Deduct garrison and guns of Nos. 4, 7, 8, 
and 15, of A - - - - 280 - 8 23 9 
-----
5,740 108 416 377 22 29 23 
-------
-
-- -E.-Wtwks to be commenced next after those 
in D. 
1 Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Me. 
-
300 8 15 18 4 4 6 
2 Works at Gloucester, Mass. -
-
500 16 30 33 
- - -3 Closing Broad Sound pass, Boston harbor, 
Mass. - - - - -
- -4 Works at Gutnet point, Plymouth, Mass. - 500 
-
33 4 4 3 
5 Works at Stonington point, Conn. - 375 
-
20 36 (j 
6 Fort on Cedar point, Potomac river, Md. 550 
-
24 50 2 4 6 
7 Works at Georgetown harbor, S.C. 
-
500 
-
20 44 2 4 6 ' 
8 WQrks in Port Royal roads, S.C. - 5!)() 
-
24 50 2 4 6 
9 Works on Tybee isl'd, Savannah river, Ga. 100 
-
16 
- - -
3 
10 Works at Cumberland sound, St. Mary's 
river, Ga. - - - - 550 
-
20 56 2 4 3 
--------- --
---- -
3,925 24 169 320 16 24 39 
*Not projected; guns, cost, &<;., con.jeetur&L.. 
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-Con tin ned. 
Armament. 
Expended. 
[ 4'51 ] 
Required to Total cost of re· 
complete. pairs or con-
struction. 
--------------------1·-----1----- ------
48 
14 
8 
6 
7 
6 
62 27 
2 4 
2 
2 
2 8 
2 5 
2 
4 1 7 
118 
76 
80 
62 
336 
$479,236 
318,305 
454,103 
349,500 
$479,236 
318,305 
454,103 
349,500 
1,601,144 1,601,144 
------ ---- ---- -- -- ---1 __ .:.____:_ __ 1------1--~----
23 30 
83 27 
10 8 
70 19 
20 10 
16 20 
8 20 
8 
12 
4 12 
-
7 
-
6 
-
5 
-
2 
8 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
-
1 
16 
7 
3 
7 
2 
7 
,.. 
I 
-
r, 
1 
3 
3 
-7 
1 
5 
1 
2 
5 
-
25 
4 
12 
15 
-2 
336 
458 
79 
318 
151 
371 
224 
61 
1:36 
150 
4'70,000 
1,330,060 
30,000 
450,(100 
363,800 
1,806,917 
1 567 726 
' 491:179 
22fi,921 
685,308 
$470,000 
148,482 
243,000 
290,000 
4!H,OOO 
223,367 
41G,OOO 
6,000 
286,000 
215,000 
940,000 
1,478,542 
273,000 
740,000 
854,800 
2,030,284 
1 ,983,726 
497' 179 
512,921 
900,308 
234 166 ~~ ._!2_ ~ ~ ~ _ 8_ 58 2, 287 7,421 ,911 2,788,849 10,210,760 
9 16 2 _ 4 2 2 1 2 148 _ 1, 150,000 150,000 
9 16 2 _ 4 2 2 1 2 150 _ I ::;oo,ooo 3oo,ooo* 
9 ;:J - - - - - - 46 - 48,000 48,000 
9 16 2 - 4 2 2 1 2 150 - 300,0!0 300,000* 
11 7 _ 1 4. ___ 2 
2
g7
0
3
0 
• _ I 174,000 174,000 
10 7 2 1 4 _ _ 1 4 n _ 144,000 144,000 
20 16 2 6 2 2 _ _ GOO,OOO 600,000"' 
9 16 2 - 4 2 2 1 2 150 - 300,000 300,000* 
_ 12 _ 1 3 ____ 94 _ •
1 
150,000 150,(100 
- 12 - - - - - 159 - 1,000,000 1,000,000 
6 6 2 1 2 - - - 2 69 - 259,000 259 '000 
--- --- - -------------
92 126 12 6135 10 10 5 16 1,327 .. I 3,425,000 3,425,000 
- 6 - 3 6 - - - - ~ 
---- --------------
92 120 12 3 29 10 10 5 16 1,272 - 3,425,000 '3,425,000 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
6 
8 
-
4 
8 
8 
8 
2 
8 
2 
-
2 
2 
1 
1 
-
I 
-2 
-
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 4 78 
100 
-
50 
75 
110 
100 
110 
23 
110 
155,000 
200,000 
210,000 
100,000 
200,000 
300,000 . 
250,000 
300,000 
120,000 
200,000 
155,000t 
200,000:1: 
210,000t 
100,000:t 
200,000:1: 
300,000:1: 
250,000:1: 
300,000:t: 
120,000:1: 
200,000t 
------------- --------------------·~ _7.:...0_.:__52_.:__6.;,.._:__4....:___:.1..:....9__:____;~8:._:__~1____:__4~__:_75::...:6__l__ ___ .!__2.....:,_o3_5..:..,_ooo_)__2~, o_3_5,;_, ooo_ 
~Work pn:ije:eted. ~Gun~, cost, &c.~ conjectural. 
·~. 
·"' ~ :, .. ! 
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STATEMENT 1 
~ 
Designation of the works. t'd s:i ;::: 
:li v.i .n v.i rt; . ~ 
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... 
'"' '"' 
w Iii c.) (I) (I) (I) (I) C) 
C) s:: "'0 "0 "0 "0 "0 (I) 
<a .~ ~ ~ ~ s:l s:l ·o. ·~ :;::1 :;::1 ::: :;::1 ::::1 ~ ... 0 0 0 0 0 
t'd 
'"' 
p.. p.. ~ p.. p.. Q) 6 t'd rn ~ ~ 00 ~ ~· ~ ~ C"') 01 ....-4 
--- --- ----
-- ----
F-Works to be last commenced. 
1 Works in Easthort harbor, Me. 
- -
250 
- - - - - -2 Works in Mac ias harbor, Me. 
- -
250 
- - - -
- -3 Works on Mount Desert island, Me. 
-
1,000 
- - - - - -4 Works at Castine, Me. 
- - -
125 
- - - - - -5 Works at St. George's bay, Me. 
- -
11,000 6 Works at Damariscotta bay, Me. -7 Works at Broad bay, Me. -
- -
- - - - - -I 8 Works at Sheepscot bay, Me. - - J 9 Works in Hog island channel, Portland, Me. 150 
-
- - - - -10 Works at the mouth of Sa co river, Me. - ~ 11 Works at the mouth of Kennebunk river, Me. 150 - - - - - -12 Works at York, Me. - - -13 Works at Newburyport, Mas:s 
- - 250 
- - - - - -14 Works at Beverly, Mass. -
-
-
125 
- - - - - -15 Works at Nangus head, Salem, Mass. 
-
180 
- - - - - -16 Wor]{s at Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass. 280 
- -
-
-
- -17 Fort and outworks atNantasket bead, Bos- ~ 1, 700 ton, Mass. - - - - - - - - - -18 Redoubt on Hog island, Boston harbor, Mass. 
19 Works at Nantucket harbor, Mass. - l 625 20 Works at Edgartown, Mass. - -21 \Vorks at Falmouth, Mass. - -
- - - - - -22 Works at Holmes's Hole, Mass. - - I 23 w· orks at Tarpaulin cove, Mass. - - J 24 Works at Canonicut island, R.I. 
- -
1,800 
- - - - - -25 Closing west passage of Narraganset roads, 
R.I. 
- -
. 
- -
.. 
- - - - -
-26 Fort Griswold, New London, Conn. 
-
500 
- - - - - -27 Works at the mouth of Connectic-ut river, 
Conn. 
-
- - - -
250 
- - - - -
_ , 
28 Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Conn. 
-
125 
- - - - - -29 Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Conn. 120 
- - - - -
-30 Works for harbors and towns between New 
Haven and New York 
- -
500 
- -
-
-
- -31 Works in Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound, 
N.Y. - - - - - 'i50 
- - - - - -32 Works in ·Sag harbor, N. Y. 
- -
250 
- - - - -
-33 Fert on Wilkins's point, Long island, N.Y. 1,33G 
- -
- - - -34 Redoubt in advauce of Fort Tompkins, 
Staten island, N.Y. 
- - -
800 
- - - - - -35 Fort on Middleground shoal, Sandy Hook, 
N.Y. 
- - - -
1,760 
- - - - - -36 Fort on East Banlt shoal, Sandy Hook, N.Y. 1,760 
- - - - - -37 Fort at Delaware breakwater - - 1' 125 
- - - - - -38 Fort opposite Fort Delaware, Del. 
-
760 
- - - -
- -39 Fort on Elk river, Mel. - -
-
169 
- - - -
-
-40 Fort on Hawkins point, Md. 
- -
800 
- - - - - -41 Works at Annapolis harbor, Mel. 
-
500 
- - - -
- -42 Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Mel. 400 
- - - -
- -43 W or lis at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Md. 550 
- - - - - -44 Works at Bald Head,Cape Fear river, N.C. 450 
-
-
- - - -
*Guns of Fort Sullivan, No. 11 /1.. · tGun.s,·: 
75 [ 451] 
-Continued. 
Armament. 
00- rr, ~- "'- (/J- r!. .... .... 
"' 
.... .... 0 v II) .... ~ ~ E s N ~ ~ t:. Expended. Required to Total cost of re-·~ :>, t:: .... .... v} ·~...; 0 • 0 0 u complete. pairs or con-u 0 s~ s....; s...; s:: • 
"0 o:> o..c s ..c ..c g~ struction. 
cd ..c~ ..c:.~ «! b.o b.O oo«S 00 Q CIJ 
..c:- ..c: ..c" ..c::.:: ..c::.:: ..d .... E 0 ..c:..C c:.> c:.>..c: <:.,) c:.> ~ .... c:.> () 
.s .~ .s c:.> .s 0 .... 
.s .s .s ..s:: 0 ~ M 6 6 ~ 0 0 00 r;i; ~ ~ ~ 00 0 E-1 
-- - -- - - - - ----
- -
.... 
- - - - - - -
$100,000 $100,000* 
- - - - - - - - -
50 
-
100,000 100,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
200 .. 500,000 500,000t 
-
-
-
- - - - - -
25 
-
50,000 50,000t 
-
1 200 400,000 400,000t 
- - -
- - - - - -
-
- - - - - - - -
21 
-
135,000 135,000t 
- -
- - - - - - -
30 
-
75,000 75,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
50 
-
100,000 100,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
25 
-
50,000 50,000t 
-
- - - - - - - -
40 
-
51,000 51 ,000+ 
- - - - - - - - -
55 
-
174,000 174,000:1: 
- - - - - - - - -
334 
-
1,020,000 1,020,000+ 
- -
- - - - - - -
125 
-
250,000 250,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
403 
-
1,200,000 1,200,000+ 
- - - - - - - - - -
307,000 307,000 
- - - - - - - - -
82 
-
198,000 198,000+ 
- - - - - - - - -
50 
-
100,000 100,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
25 
-
48,000 48,000+ 
- - - - - - - - -
12 
-
42,000 42,000:t: 
. 
- - - - - - - - -
100 
-
200,000 200,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
150 
-
400,000 400,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
50 
-
100,000 IOO,OOOt 
- - - - - - - - -
195 
-
686,000 686,000+ 
- - - - - - - - -
26 
-
52,000 52,000:1: 
- -
-
- - - - - -
332 
-
1,681,412 1 ,681,412+ 
- - - - - - - - -
332 
-
1,681,412 1,681,412:1: 
- - - - - - - - -
225. 
-
600,000 600,000t 
- -
- - - - - - -
112 
-
521,000 521,000+ 
- - - - - - - - -
25 
-
50,000 50,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
131 
-
376,000 376,000:1: 
- - - - -
- - - -
100 
-
250,000 250,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
87 
-
246,000 246,000:1: 
- - - - - - - - -
110 
-
300,000 300,000t 
- - - - - - - - -
S7 
-
180,000 180,000:1: 
t.,. cost, &c., conjectural. +Works projected . 
. ,
.,..~ 
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STATEMENT 1 
~ 
~ Designation of the works. ~ ~ 
-~ 
.s ~ .n .n ~ .n .n ..... ..... ..... <11 a; <11 <11 <11 <11 ClJ t) 
t) s::: -o "0 "0 "0 "0 <11 
~ 0 s::: s::: s::: s::: s::: ·p_ .~ ::::; ::::; ::::; ::::; ::s 00 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Vl t: 0.. 0.. 0.. p.. 0.. cd 
cd dl ci ..,j, ~ ~ .~ 0 C!) ~ ~ ~ ~ 
-------r-------
F-Continued. 
45 Works at Federal point, Cape Fear river, 
N.C. - - - - - 200 
- - - - - -46 Works at the mouth of Santee river, S.C. l 250 47 Works at Bnll's bay, and other inlets, S. C. - - - - - -48 Works ·at Stono sound, S. C. - - ~ 49 Works at North Edisto sound, S.C. - 3"/5 - - - - - -50 w· orks at South Edisto sound, S. C. -51 Works at St. Helena sound, S. C. 
-
375 
- - - - - -52 Works at Was~aw sound, Georgia - I ,, 53 Works at Ossabaw sound, Georgia - I 51 W .orks at St. Catharine's sound, Georgia 55 Works at Sap6lo sound, Georgia -
56 Works at Doby inlet, Georgia 
-
-
~4,000 
- - - - - -I 57 Works at Altamaha sound, Georgia - I .58 VVorks at St. Simon's sound, Georgia -
59 \Vorks at St. Andrew's sound, Georgia - ) 
----------------
25,740 574 1,390 1,366 86 109 142 
Deduct garrison and guns of Nos. 9, 10, 
and 18, of A 
- - - -
195 
-
8 24 
- -
3 
------
----------
25,545 574 1,382 1,342 86 109 139 
·--------
--
--
RECAPITULATION. 
A Old forts and batterirs 
- -
5,445 168 268 343 5 14 57 
B New fortifications completed - - 1,870 38 54 99 9 11 14 
C Fortifications under construction 
-
II ,740 354 690 510 52 64 33 
D Fortifications to be first commence€l 
- 5,740 108 416 377 22 29 23 
E Fortifications to be next constructed 
-
3,925 24 169 320 16 24 39 
-----------
----
28,720 692 1,597 1,649 l04 142 166 
F Fortifications to be last commenced .. 25,545 5i4 1,382 1,342 86 l09 139 
----------- ----
54,265 1,266 2,979 2,991 190 251 305 
* Work projected. 
'\V ASHINGTON, April 23, 1840. 
-Continued. 
' 
Armament. 
77 
40 
50 
75 
75 
800 
402 101 33 46 145 17 33 12 73 4,829 
2 2 39 
402 399 33 46 143 17 33 12 73 4,790 
Expended. 
[ 451 J 
Required to Total cost of re-
complete. pairs _or con-
structiOn. 
$18,000 
100,000 
150,000 
150,000 
1,600,000 
14,241,824 
14,241,824 
$18,000* 
lOO,OOOt 
150,000t 
150,00 t 
1,600,000t 
14,241,824 
14,241,824 
------------------------1-----1-----
34 114 
-
27 64 
- -
3 1,097 699,319 1,227,918 1,927,237 
62 27 2 H 4 I 7 336 1,601,144 1,601,144 
234 166 20 19 49 12 18 8 58 2,287 7,421,911 2,788,849 10,210,760 
9-2 120 12 3 29 10 10 5 l(j 1,272 
-
3,425,000 3,425,000 
70 52 (j 4 19 
-
8 1 4 756 
-
2,035,000 2,035,000 
- --- --
-- ---- - -
49~ 4:79 38 55 16!) 22 4) 15 88 5,748 9,722,374 9,476,767 19,199,141 
402 399 33 46 143 17 33 12 73 4,790 
-
14,241,824 14,241,824 
--
- - - -
-;F - --~94 ~78 71 101 312 27 161 10,538 9,72'2,374 23,718,591 33,440,965 
t Guns, cost, &c., conjectural. 
For the board. JOS. G. TOT'rEN, Col. Enff• 
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Estimated cost of ordnance of all kinds required for the armament of 
100 rounds of ammu 
v; v; 00 112 
s:: s::J s::J s::J 
s::J s::J s::J s::J 
b.o bll b.o bQ 
rei "'C:i ..0 ..0 
s::J s::J ~ s::J 
s::J 0 0 s::J 
0 0 0 0 p.. p.. p.. p.. 
dl ci ..i< 00 
-::1' M o-l ...... 
--------
Old forts and batteries. Ta- Required 
- - -
168 268 343 5 
ble A . On hand 
-
. 
-
168 268 343 5 
I 
--- --------
To be provided-
-
- - - -
--- --- -----
New fortifications comple- Required 
- - -
38 54 99 9 
ted. Table B. On hand 
- - -
13 54 99 9 
--- --------
To be provided -
-
25 
- - -
--- --- -----
Fortifications under con- Required 
- - -
354 690 510 52 
struction. Table C. On hand 
- - -
-
690 510 52 
---
---------
To be provided -
-
354 
- - -
--- --------
Fortifications to be first Required 
- - -
108 416 377 22 
commenced. Table .D. On hand 
- - -
-
416 293 22 
------ ---
--
To be provided -
-
108 
-
84 
-
--~ 
--- ---
--
Fortifications to be next con- Required 
- -
- 24 169 320 16 ~tructed. Table E. On hand 
- -
. 
-
8 
-
16 
------ ---
--
To be provided -
-
24 161 320 
-
--- --- --.--
--
Required from A to E • 692 1,597 1,649 104 
------ -----
Fortiftcations to be last con- Required 
- - -
574 1,382 1,342 86 
structed. Table F. On hand 
- - - - - -
86 
--- --------
To be provided -
- 574 1,382 1,342 
-
--- --- --- --
Grand total reouired 
-
1,266 2,979 2,9!)1 190 
Grand total on.hand 
-
H:ll ·1,436 1,245 190 
--- ---
--
Grand total to be provided 1,085 1,543 1,7461 
-
;·-f 
·, 
79 
fortifications, agreeably to statement I, 
nit ion for each piece. 
~ 
::. 
bl) 
..0 
1=: 
::. 
0 
~ 
S:! 
14 
14 
.n § 
bD 
-6 
~ 
~ 
57 
57 
00 Q.) 
'0 
til 
1=: 
0 
.... 
~ 
0 
34 
CANNON. 
<FJ 
c:'i! ooo 
t.>>-o 
tllCl.l QJN 
en.~ 
...c:p: 
oo 
.S...c< 
00 
114 
21 
Q.) 
.~~ 
rnw 
.~ 
~;:: 
uo 
.S...c< 
00 
~ 
~ 
.... 
0 
s 
...c: 
t) 
.s 
c:h 
..... 
27 
>. 
> 
til 
Cl) 00 
...c< ..... ~ 
,.c;~ 
.~ s 
8 
64 
19 
embracing 
:c ~ 0 
bD a ~ .. Ji ~00 .... til 
...c:;:: ·~ ... 
...... d oo 
...c:-.~ s t) 
.s ~ 00 
[ 451] 
cannon mounted and 
Q.) 
(:: 
0 
V)~ 
til 
...c<~ vi !=) 
.s s .... 0 ,...:::: 
C.? 0 
..... u 
3 
~ 
Q) 
..a 
13 2 ;:.0 
~=:!=: 1=: Q)d 
~ t) 
o._ 
...c<o 
::: 
1,097 
895 
--------------·--- --- . ----
11 
11 
64 
42 
14 
14 
33 
33 
34 
62 
62 
234 
93 27 
27 2 
27 2 
166 20 19 
45 
8 
8 
49 12 
12 
4 
4 
18 
3 
1 
8 
3 
7 
7 
58 
202 
336 
2Q4 
132 
2,287 
1,342 
22 1_-_~ -~ __:_ __:_ ~ _-___ 1s ____ 8_ ---5~  
t --~~ ~~ ~2 I~--=:_~ ~ ~--==-~--==- I,~~ 
2'):1- 92 100 12 3 29 3 10 5 16 1 511 
24 I 39 
- 1 39 
70 52 6 4 19 8 
------
4 756 
63 
i4 \ - --;-5---6 --4 ~ -_- ----8 --1- ---4- 693 
1421~ 492 479 38 55 169 22 40 15 88 5, 748 
1091139 402 399 33 46 143 17 33 12 73 4,790 
- 139 - - - - - - • - - - 225 
----
109 402 399 33 46 143 17 33 12 73 4,565 
251 30) 894 SiS 71 101 312 39 . 73 27 161 10,538 Gi :305 21 I• 19 19 7 :, - - 3,490 
-+--'-''-' - ---------
. 18~ 1 _ 894 857 71 101 293 20 661 271 161 7,048 
;~~ 
-~) 
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STATEMENT:-
..... ..... ..... 
..... 
, Q) Q) Q) Q) 
"0 '"0 "'0 "0 
s:: s:: s::: s::: 
::l ::l ::l ::l 0 • ~~ 0 . &<11 ~;g o.,rn ,s:; s:: 
~~ ~::l ~::::! 00~ 
~ QJj ~"" b!J ~ b.Q ,..... b.O 
..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 0 0 0 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Old r:;: and batteries~=-- -;:~~re~ - -~--~ --1-6-; ---;; ---;;,--5-
ble A. On hand - - • 50 268 ~~----
To be provided -
New fortifications comple- Required -
ted. Table B. On hand -
118 _ 1 5 
___-_ 
38 54 
54 
99 
99 
9 
To be provided -
_ --3-8 __,___ _ 1 9 
Fortifications under con- Required -
struction. Table C. On hand -
To be provided -
Fortifications to be first Requirerl -
commenced.. Table D. · On hand -
To be pro.vided -
Fortification5 to be next con- Reqnired -
strucled. Table E. On hand -
To be provided -
Required from A to E -
Fortifications to be last con- Required -
structed. Table F. On hand -
To be provided-
354 
354 466 
108 416 
108 416 
24 1G9 
2:1 169 
510 
J3 
477 
3i7 
3i7 
320 
320 
6~2 I ,597 1,649 
574 I ,382 1,342 
574 1,382 1,342 
52 
22 
22 
16 
16 
104 
86 I 
S6 
Grand total required - 1,266 2,979 2,991 1190 
Grand total on hand - 50 546 475 _ ' 
Grand total to be provided 1,216 2,433 2,516 190 
Continued. 
14 
14 
11 
11 
64 
64 
29 
29 
24 
24 
--
142 
--
109 
-
--
109 
251 
CARRIAGES. 
5i 
57 
14 
14 
34 114 
34 114 
62 27 
62 27 
33 234 166 
33 
23 
23 
39 
39 
-
·--
166 
--
139 
13!.1 
--
-
234 166 
92 120 
92 120 
70 52 
70 52 
--- --
492 479 
--
--
402 399 
----
402 399 
305 894 878 
305 
20 
20 
12 
12 
6 
6 
---
38 
---
33 
---
33 
71 
81 
27 64 
27 64 
2 8 
2 8 
19 49 
19. 49 
3 
3 29 
4 19 
4 19 
--- ----
55 169 
--~ ---
46 143 
--- ---
46 143 
101 312 
:= 
.~o 
d~ .... _ 
. .... Oo 
::a 
0 
~ 
12 
12 
10 
JO 
-
---
22 
---
17 
---
17 
39 
4 
4 
18 
18 
JO 
10 
8 
8 
---
40 
---
33 
---
33 
73 
[ 451] 
.:. 
0 
s 
3 
1 
' 
., 
8 5I 
8 
5 1& 
5 lG 
1 
1 4 
--- ---
15 88 
--- ---
12 ?3 
--- ---
12 '73 
27 161 
-- -- -- -- --- --- ------t---·1---
2:>1 894 878 71 101 312 39 73 27 161 
451] 
' 
82 
STATEMENT--
0 0 0 0 
,Q ~ ,Q ,Q en 
"' 
en 
,... 
.... 
,... $.; 
cu Q) cu cu 
"0 "'0 "0 "0 ~ ~ ~ ~ :::1 :;:::1 :;:::1 
0 0 0 0 p.. 1=1. P.. p.. 
dl Cl ..;. ~ '<!I M ~ 
------ --
t)Jd forts and batteries. Ta· Required 
- - - 16,800 26,800 34,300 500 bleA. On hand 
- - - 13,835 26,800 34,300 500 
---· --------
To be provided -
- 2,965 
- - -' 
---
--------
.New fortifications comple- Required 
- - - 3,800 5,400 9,900 900 
ted. •rable B. On hand 
- - -
-
5,400 9,900 900 
--
To be provided -
- 3,800 
- - -
-----------
ortifications under con- Required 
- - - 35,400 69,000 51,000 5,200 
struction. Table C. On hand 
- - -
-
69,000 32,000 5,200 
--------- --
To be provided -
- 35,400 
-
19,000 
-
--- --- ---- --
rtifications to 'te first Required 
-
-
- 10,800 41,600 37,700 2,200 
commenced. Tab\~ D. On hand 
- - -
-
11,020 2,200 
------ --- --
To be provided • . 10,800 30,580 37,700 
-
------ -----
Fortifications to be next con- Required 
- - - 2,400 16,900 32,000 1,600 
structed. Table£. On hand 
-
. 
-
- - -
1,600 
--- --------
To be provided .. . 2,400 16,900 32,000 
-
---
--- -----
Required frO!Il A to E - 69,200 159,700 164,900 10,400 
------
---
--
ortific~ions to be last con- Rt>quired • 
- 57,400 138,200 134,200 8,600 litruct~d. Tabe F. Onhmd - . . 
- - -
8,600 
--- --------
'. I ~ To be provided • 
-
57,400 138,200 134,200 
-
------
--- --
Grand tot~l required 
- 126,600 297,900 299,100 19,000 
Grand total on hand 
- 13,835 11~,2~0 76,200 19,000 
---
--- ·--- --
Grand total to 'be provided 112,765- 185,680 222,900 
-
I 
~ 
- -
.~. 
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PROJECTILES. CANNON POW-
DER. 
0 ~ ~ '"',j 
..;; Q) Q) 
.!!3 ~ ~ .£; .;:: ..q Q) 
'"' 
VJ Q) Q) i:: Q) J-<00 
..0 ,..d ,..d 0 "tl ,..d VJ rn rnS s:l 
.S§ s:l rn ,..d ,..d <A :::;, :::;, 
,..d ~Q) "tl 0 ....,bll 0 t.l t.l s:l t.l 
·* 
.s >-s:: p. 0 p. 
.s t~:~o p ~ ,..d ..,;. 6 ..c:~ 0 
.... r:tJ. ~ 00 ~ .... 0<1.1 P-4 
1,400 5,700 3,700 11,400 2,700 6,400 
-
878,800 
1,400 5,700 3,i00 6,1:20 
-
6,400 
-
878,800 
- - -
5,280 2,700 I 
I 
1,100 1,400 6,900 3,100 200 800 100 205,800 
1,100 1,400 5,348 
- -
800 
-
60,170 
- -
1,552 3,100 200 
-
100 145,630 
6,400 3,300 29,200 20,400 1,900 6,100 800 1,616,300 
6,400 3,300 
- - -
6,100 
- - I 
29,200 20,400 1,900 
-
800 1,616,300 
~.900 2,300 10,800 14,200 300 3,900 500 874,300 
2,900 2,300 
- - -
3,900 
- -
10,800 14,200 300 
-
500 874,300 
2,400 3,900 7,400 6,600 400 1,900 100 471,300 
2,400 3,900 
- - -
54 
- -
7,400 6,600 400 1,846 100 471,300 
14,200 16,600 58,000 55,700 5,500 19,100 1,500 4,046, 
10,900 13,900 47,500 46,500 4,600 16,000 1,200 3,388, 750 
10,900 13,900 
r 
- - "' I 
. 
-.I 46,500 - 47,500 4,600 16,000 1,200 3,388,750 
~-;100 30,500 105,-500 102,200 10.,100 35,100 2,700 7,43~250 
25,100 30t500 9,048 6,120 
-
17,~54 
-
93 ,970 
- -
' 96,452 96,080 10,100 17,846 2,700 6~496,280 y 
--
.( 451] 84 
,Old forts and bat&eries. Table A - Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
New fortifications completed. Table B 
- Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Fortifications under construction. Table C • Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Fortifications to be first commenced. Table D Required 
On hand 
Fortifications ~o be next constructed. Table E 
To be provided 
Required 
On haud 
To be provided 
STATEMENT-
Required from A to E 
Fortifications to be last constructed. Tabl~ F Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Grancltotal required -
Grand total on hand • 
Grand tntaJ to be provided -
Note.-The cost of saltpetre and brimstone may 
OnDNANCf! OFFICE, Washington, January 16, 1840. 
85 [ 451] 
Continued. 
COST OF ARMAMENT. 
Of cannon. Of carriages. Of projectiles. Of powder. Total amount. 
------ ------ ------
$403,935 00 $361,935 00 $203,340 00 $175,760 00 $1,144,970 0() 
338,115 00 24~,375 00 151,782 40 175,760_00 908,032 40 
------
65,820 00 119,560 00 51,557 60 
-
236,937 GO 
------ ------ ------ ------
105,065 00 105,455 00 47,283 00 41,160 00 298,963 00 
69,105 00 55,275 00 28,454 00 12,034 00 164,868 00 
------
35,960 00 50,180 00 18,829 00 29,126 00 134,095 0() 
816,770 00 739,590 00 351,484 00 323,260 00 2,231,104 00 
50~,860 OJ 99,025 00 164,284 00 
-
765,t.i69 00 
------ ------- ------ ------
314,410 00 640,565 00 187,200 00 323,260 00 1,465,435 00 
------ ------
451,405 00 411,685 00 188,547 00 174,860 00 1,2-26,497 0() 
290,9~ 00 6,900 00 39,560 40 
-
337,385 40 
---
------ ------------
60,480 00 404,785 00 148,986 60 174,860 00 889 ,111 6() 
--- ------ ------ ------
243,410 00 240,320 00 102,333 00 94,260 00 (j80,323 00 
11,500 00 11,700 00 4,203 60 
-
27,403 00 
------------ -------
231,910 00 228,620 00 98,129 40 94,260 00 652 ,919 40 
------
2,()-20,585 00 1,858,985 00 892,987 00 809,300 00 5,581,857 00 
------
1 ,69~, 110 00 1,551,500 00 746,770 00 677,750 00 4,668,130 00 
35,400 00 41,700 00 17,20~ 00 
-
9!,30~ 00 
------ ------
1 ,656, 710 00 1,509,800 00 729,568 00 677,750 00 4,573,828 0() 
------------ ------ ---·-----------
3,712,fi95 00 3,410,485 00 1,639,757 00 1,487,050 00 10,249,987 0() 
1,247,405 00 456,975 00 405,486 40 187,794 00 2,297,660 40 
------ ------ -------------
2,465,290 00 2,953,510 00 1,234,270 60 1,299,256 00 7,952,326 6() 
be estimated at· one-~alf of the cost of gunpowder. 
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STATEMENT 2. 
OJ the fortifications constructed, construct·ing, or repairing, and of those 
from Cape Florida 
J 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
l 
2 
'3 
4 
5 
7 
J. 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
.8 
9 
10 
i 
s:-: 
Designation of the works. ~ ~ 
.s 
~ 
0 
·~ 
""' ~~ 
A-Old wo1·ks 1·epaired, and those proposed 
to be repai1·ed, with the amounts expended, 
and the amounts required to put them in a 
serviceable condition. 
Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, Fla. 
- -
250 
Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river, La. 
-
100 
Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor, Fla. 
- -Fort Morgan, Mobile point, Ala. -
- -Fort Pike, Rigolets, La. -
- - -
Fort Wood, Chef Menteur, La. 
- - -Battery Bienvenu, La. 
-
- - -
Tower at Bayou Dupre, La. 
-
- -
Fort Jackson, Mississippi river, La. 
- -
----
350 
---
B-New works completed. 
Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla. 
- -
1,260 
Fort Morgan, Mobile point, Ala. -
-
700 
Fort Pike, Rigolets, La. 
- - -
300 
Fort Wood, Chef Menteur, La. 
- -
300 
Battery Bienvenu, La. 
- - -
100 
Tower at Bayou Dupre: La . 
- -
50 
Fort Jackson, Mississippi river, La. 
-
350 
----
3,060 
C-Works under construction. 
Fort on Foster's bank, Pensacola, Fla. 
-
650 
Fort Livingston, Barrataria island, La. 
-
300 
---
950 
E-Works to be r.onsf1·ucted after those in D ---
of statement I are completed. 
Tower at Pass-au-Heron, Mobile bay, Ala. 60 
---
F-Works to be la.st commenced. 
Works at Key West, or Tortugas, Fla. - 2,500 
Works at Charlotte harbor, Fla. - _· 1 
Works at Espiritu Santo bay, Fla. 1 
Works at Appalachicola bay, Fla. -- L 1,25o Works at Appalachie, Fla. - r 
Works at St. Joseph's bay, Fla. - - I 
Works at Santa Rosa bay, Fla. - - J 
Work!' to cover navy yarrl at Pensacola, Fla. 
Works at Perdido bay, Ala. - -
Fort at Dauphin island, Mobile bay, Ala. 
100 
400 
900 
5,150 
en ~ 
'"" Q) Q) 
"0 '0 
~ d 
::s ::= 
0 0 
0.. 0.. 
d> dl 
~ <:":) 
-- --
-
11 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
----
11 
--
--
63 17 
14 
-
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
----
77 17 
24 24 
-
-
----
24 94 
----
- -
- --
118 61 
en ~ en en 
""' '"" 
Q) 
:!, Q) cu u 
'0 '0 'V Q) 
~ ~ ~ ·s.. ;:s ::s ::s 
0 0 0 "0 
0.. 0.. 0.. v t ~ ~ ~ 
--- -- - --
10 5 3 3 
16 
- -
-
- -
- -
- - -
-
- -
-
-
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
--------
26 5 3 3 
--
-- -
-
49 5 13 6 
52 3 4 6 
28 6 
-28 3 6 
-8 
-
3 
-4 
-
-42 
-
7 
-
---- - --
211 11 39 12 
:-
- --
66 
-
3 
28 
-
6 3 
------ --
94 6 6 
-- - -- --
6 2 2 
-
-- ---- -
394 21 5R 2.) 
• Included in B. t Wotk projected. 
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STATEMENT 2. 
proposed to be constructed or repaired for the defence cif the Gulf frontier, 
to tlte Sabine bay. 
Armament. 
Expended. Required to Totalcostofre. 
complete. pairs .or con-
structiOn. 
- ·-------- ---------1·-----1-----·1-------
8 4 
4 
2 2 49 
20 
$75,000 $100,000 $175,000 
3,300 3,300 
8,000 8,000• 
10,000 10,000• 
5,000 5,~ 
3,580 3,580* 
2,500 2,500* 
4()() 400* 
20 1000 201 O()()t: 
---------------------------1------
8 8 2 2 69 75 'ooo 1!12' 780 227.780 
- - - ------_..::..::...._, __ ....:.::....:....:__:_, _ _::...~.......:..-1--:-• .,.---_..:..;..-
26 13 
26 10 
9 5 
9 5 
2 
10 
2 
5 
1 
2 
-1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
-
1 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
212 
132 
49 
52 
13 
7 
61 
677,000 
1 ,026,177 
314,597 
378,642 
96,447 
16,677 
638,766 
677,000 
1,026,777 
314,591 
378,649 
96,44'7 
16,677 
638,766 
_8_o _4_2 __ 4 __ 1_3 _6 _6 _4 _1_0 _53_2 
1
_3_:.,_14_8...:.,9_o_s_
1 
_____ 
1 
__ 3-',_14_8_~,_906_ 
- 10 
9 5 
9 15 
2 
1 
3 
129 
52 
181 
302,648 
75,000 
14,000 
325,000 
316,648 
400,000 
377,648 339,000 716,()48 
-------------1---l---....:...._--l---"---ll---·-'--'---
_- _2 ___ - _- _- _- -------1----1 __ 1_2-t ___ -__ ,. __ 2_5:_,00_0_, ____ ~ 
500 
250 
50 
128 
113 7ft 5 21 7 8 5 14 9~8 
. :t Guns, cost, &c., conjectural. 
3,000,000 
1,000,000 
200,000 
200,000 
880,000 
5,280,000 
3,000,000t 
l,OOO,OOOC 
200,0~ 
200,000f 
880,000t 
5,280,000 
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STATEMENT 2 
RECAPIT 
~ 
Designation of the works. ~ ~ 
vi 00 vi 
.s 00 00 00 ~ ~ ..... ~ .... C) Q.l Q.l Q.l ~ Q., 
s= 
"" 
og "C "=' "C Q.l 0 r::: c Q Q ·s. 
·t: :s a :s :s :s 0 0 ~ 0 0 "0 ..... ~ 1=4 ~ $:l.. ~ CIS ~ ~ 
'""' ~ Z! r;: ~ ...,. M Cit
--- -------- - -
A Old forts and batteries 350 II 26 5 3 3 
B-~ew fortifications completed 3,060 77 17 211 11 39 1~ 
CFortificatwns under construction 950 24 24 94 6 6 
&Works to be constructed after those in D of 
statement 1 are completed 60 6 2 2 
---
-- -- -- --
52 337 18 50 21 
9 Works to be last commenced 61 394 21 58 25 
--- --· ----- ----1-
9,570 219 113 731 39 108 46 
WASHINGTON, April 23, 1840. 
-Continued. 
ULATION. 
Armament. 
.,~ .,~ r:.- £ 
..... ..... ~ ..... Q,) C1.l ~ s IN ~ d .... ·~ >, '[;....; i:: 0 0 u5 0 s~ s....; <II 
"C o> O..Q 8 ~ tiS ,.Q~ ..c.~ d 
~ Q,) ..c:~ ,.Q .dQ,) ..c;.:; e .c..C t) :J,.Q t) t) t) 
.s .s s::: .... s .s 1!15 M s ~ 0 00 -:i:J .... 
- - -- - - -
8 8 
-
2 
80 4~ 
-
4 13 6 
9 15 
- -
3 
-
-
2 
- - - -
- -- - - - -
97 67 
-
4 18 6 
113 78 
-
5 21 7 
-- - - - - --
210 145 
-
9 39 18 
For the board: 
:fl ... ,!. 
~ 0 s 
0 Q,) s....; s::: • om 
,.Q 
- .... .s:::~l rfltl$ u5 ..c- e ;.) 
t) c:::: 0 
.s ~ ,.Q 0 
:D .... u 
- - --
1 2 
6 4 10 
- - -
- - -
- - -
7 4 1~ 
8 5 14 
- - --
15 9 26 
89 
Expended. 
~ 
0 
E-4 
69 $75,000 
532 3, 14A,906 
181 377,648 
12 
-
794 3,601,554 
!128 
-
1,72-2 3,601,554 
Required to 
complete. 
$152,780 
339,000 
25,000 
516,780 
5,280,000 
5,796,780 
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. 
Total costofre 
pairs or con 
struction. 
$'2~7,78 0 
6 
8 
3,148,90 
716,64 
25, 000 
4,118,33 4 
00 5,2tlO,O 
----
9,398,3 34 
JOS. G. 'rOTTEN, Col. Engs. 
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Estimated cost of ordnance of all kinds, required for the armament of 
100 rounds of amrnu, 
.n .n .n .n 
1=: 1=: d ~ 
::s ::s ::s ::s 
tu> b.O tu> b.O 
'"' 
.... .... I-. 
C1) C1) C1) w 
"d "1:1 "'d '"d 
d d ~ d 
::l ::s ::s ::s 
0 0 0 0 
Ill. c. p. '?-
~ ~ ..,j. ~ 
"<!' M ~ 
--------
Old forts and batteries. Ta- Required 
- - -
-
11 26 5 
ble A. On hand 
- -
-
-
11 26 5 
--- ------
---
To be provided -
-
- - -
-
------
--
---
New fortifications complet- Required 
- - -
77 17 211 11 
ed. Table B. On band 
- - -
28 17 211 11 
------ --- --
To be provided -
-
49 
-
- -
--- --- ---
--
F ortifieations under con- Required - - - 24 24 94 -
struction. Table C. On hand 
- - - -
24 94 
-
--- --- ---
--
To be provided-
-
24 
- -
-
--- --- ---
--
Work:o to be constructed after Required 
-
~ 
-
- -
6 2 
those in table D statement 9n hand 
- - -
- - -
2 
1 are completed. Table E. 
--- ----- ----
To be provided- -
- -
6 
-
--- --------
Required from A to E 
-
101 52 337 18 
--- --- --- --
Works to be last commenced. Required 
- - -
118 61 394 21 
Table F. On hand 
- - - - - -
21 
--- --- --- --
To be provided -
-
118 61 394 
-
--- --- --- --
Grand total required 
-
219 113 731 39 
Grand total on hand 
-
28 52 331 39 
--- --- ---
--
Grand total to be provided 191 61 400 
-
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fort~{icntions, agreeably to statement 2d, embracing cannon mounted, and 
nition jlJr each piece. 
CANNON. 
~ ..!. I ~ ..... ui .... 0 ...., ui 0 0 0 ~ en 0 r- >. s s s .... 
= 8~ ,..0::: ~ QJ bO ttoo > ;:: QJ ,D. 
... ui ui ~:n ;::. ,::::: . s QJ CXS N bDr- 0 b{)ui c"' QJ ,::::: 
"0 a..- QJ QJ s ,..0:::~ ·~ r- bD~ ........ ::1 "0 ::1 (<$ (/J"~ ·- N -r.d ~s 
"'"' 
ui s:: ~ (J) ~~ ,..o:::t:: 
= 
bD ,::::: ,..0::: ,..0::: .... ,..0:::...., Q QJ 
-d 0 ,..0:::0 ,..0::: c..> <:.JO <:.J ,..0::: c..> .... 0 0 t: c..>.<:: c..> .s .:= s .s c..> 
·* 
0 !:'.. ~ .s .s .s ...c: ,..0::: ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 00 00 00 tO 0 .-4 
------
----
---- --
--
-- --- ---
3 3 8 8 
- -
2 
-
1 
-
2 69 
3 3 
-
- - - - - - - -
48 
-- ------ ---- --
---- --- ---
- -
8 8 
- -
2 
-
1 
-
2 21 
-----
------
----
--
-----
39 12 80 42 
-
4 13 6 6 4 10 532 
39 12 
-
- - - - - - - -
318 
-~-
----------
------ ---
- -
80 42 
-
4 13 6 6 4 10 214 
---- -- ------ --- --
--
---
6 6 9 15 
- -
3 
- -
181 
- -6 6 
- - - - - - - - -
130 
--
-------- -- ------ --- ---
- -
9 15 
- -
3 
-
-
51 
- -
------· ------------ --- ---
2 
- -
2 
- - - - -
12 
- -
- - - - - - - - -
2 
- -
----
~-
------------ ---
2 
- -
2 
- -
- - -
10 
- -
--
------ -- ----
~ 
-- ---
50 21 97 67 - 4 18 6 7 4 12 794 
---- -----------------
58 25 113 78 
-
5 21 7 8 5 14 928 
-
25 
- - - - - - - - -
46 
------------------ ---
58 
-
113 78 
-
5 21 7 8 5 14 882 
-- -- ------ -- ---- --
---
lOA 46 210 145 
-
9 39 13 15 9 26 1,722 
48 46 
- -
- - - - - - -
544 
-- --------.. ---------
---
60 
-
210 145 
-
9 39 13 15 9 26 1,178 
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STATEMENT-
... ... 
,_. 
"" Q) Q) Q) Q) 
"1:l "1:l "1:l "1:l 
s:: 
= = = ::s • ::s • ::s • ::s • 
o m om om orn 
p.t::l p.,t::l p.t::l c..t::l 
•:::I fJ61 •:::I ~51 ~bJ) ~ b.O 
... ... ..... ..... 
0 0 0 0 
~ tr.. tr.. tr.. 
---
--------
Old fort~ and batteries. Ta· Required . . . 
-
11 26 5 
ble A. On hand . . . 
-
11 26 
-
---
--------
To be provided - . 
- -
-
5 
------ -----
New fortifications complet- Required . - . 77 17 211 11 
ed. Table B. On hand . . . 
-
1i 211 
-
---------
--
To be provided - . 77 
- -
11 
--- ------
--
ortifications under con- Required . . . 24 24 94 -
struction. Table C. On hand . - . 
-
7 6 
-
F 
--- --------
To be provided - . 2! 17 88 
-
, ------ -----
w orks to be constructed after Requirerl . . . 
- -
6 2 
th~ se in table D statement On hand . . . 
1 a1 e completed. Tabl~ E. 
-----------
To be provided • . 
- -
6 2 
------
-----
Required from A to E . 101 52 337 18 
-----------
orks to be last commenced. Required - - . 118 61 39i 21 
Table F. On hand 
-
. . 
- - - -
w 
------
---
--
To be provided • . 118 61 394 21 
---
--------
Grand total required 
-
219 113 73l 39 
Grand total on hand . 
-
35 243 
-
---- ---------
Grand total to be provided 219 78 488 39 
.... 
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Continued. 
CARRIAGES. 
'"' 
td • ~ c!, ~ :.:= A ,; b.O .... OJ ,; ~rn 0 1.0 ~ cd '0 rn~ Q.l a cd .n IV 'lh .n IV t.:: s:; 1:: ~ N .... ...c: .n 0 ui p 
'" 
~ ·~ ...c:= ...c: om S'n p ..c:~ (J • ...= CJ ..c: ... s ,:;:; P.lil 0 CJ~ CJN 
.s ~ CJ .s CJ! "" ~S'o rd ::: ·~] s:; ·::; .s cs-. IV 0 ~ ' 'i ~ M- 6 . .... 0 ,:;:; -'= cd oo .... 000 
"""' :: .... oos ~ 0 ~ CJ 'n ...c: Col 
'"' 
.... 
'"' 
,_.«! 
.... 
"' 
... 
'"" "' 
.... 
'"' 0 0 ~ 0;) c 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ l:r,.c.l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
--
-- ------~ 
------ --- ---------
3 3 8 8 
- -
2 
-
1 
-
.... 3 
--
-- -------------------------
3 
-
8 8 
- -
2 
-
] 
.. 2 
--------
--~ 
------
------ ---
39 12 80 42 
-
4 13 6 6 4 1 0 
-
hl 
--
-- -- -- --- ---------
39 
-
80 42 
-
4 13 6 6 4 10 
----
------- ------------
-------
6 6 9 15 
- -
3 
-
6 
--
-- -- --------------------
6 
-
9 15 
- -
3 
--
-- ---------------
---------
2 
- -
2 
---- -- --
---
--- ---
=I= ------2 2 50 21 97 67 
-
4 6 7 4 19 
--
-- ----
--------- ------
--- ---
58 25 113 78 
-
6 21 7 8 6 14 
-
25 
--
-- ----· - - - ------
------ -------
58 
-
113 78 
-
5 21 7 8 5 14 
-- -- --
------------
108 46 210 145 
-
9 39 13 15 9 26 
-
46 
------ -- ------
------------ ·---
108 
-
210 145 
-
9 39 13 15 9 26 
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STATEMENT-
c c 0 ... 0 
-'= 
-'= ...c -'= rn 
"' 
00 rJ) 
1-< ,... 1-< .... Q.) <IJ Q.) Q.) 
"0 
-.:::1 '"d "0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
'i'- c.. 9-t c.. 
rn ~ 
""" 
~ 
""" 
M rn 
------ - - - --
Old forts and batteries. Ta- Required 
- - -
-
I, 100 2,600 500 
bleA. On hand - - -
-
I, 100 2,ti00 500 
-----------
To be provided -
-
- - - -
-----------
New fortifications complet- Required - - - 7,700 . I,700 2I,IOO 1,IOO 
ed. Table B. On hand - - -
- I I,700 2I ,000 1,100 
---.--- -----
To be provided -
-
7,700 
- - -
------
---
--
Fortifications under con- Required 
- - -
2,400 II 2,400 9,400 
-struction. Table C. On hand 
- - -
t 2,400 5,915 
-
--
To be provided • - 2,400 
-
3,485 
-
--1-----
--
Works to be con~tructed after Required . 
- - - -
600 200 
those in tableD statement On hand 
- - -
- - -
200 
1 are completed. Table E. 
--------- --
To be provided -
- - -
600 
-
------ --- --
Require om A toE 
-
10,100 5,200 33,700 1,800 
-----------
Works to be last commenced. Required - - - 11,800 6,100 39,400 2,100 
Table F. On hand - - . - - - 2,100 
--- --------
To be provided -
-
11,800 6,100 39,400 
-
. 
---
--- ---
--
Grand total required 
-
21 ,900 11,300 73,100 3,900 
Grand total on hand 
- -
5,200 2U,615 3,9CO 
-----------
Grand total to be provided 21,900 6,100 43,485 
-
.. s-
Continued. 
PROJECTILES. 
00 ~ 0 I: So (3 ...Q 
...Q 
Cl.l 
.0 Cl.l 
'"' 
Q) 
'"' CI.J Q) 
"0 ,.:::: "0 
I: .. s::: 
::I .8 I • ~ 0 0 
0. 0 p. 
dJ @ ..,j. 
...... ~ 
300 300 1,000 
300 300 1,000 
- - -
3,900 1,200 9,000 
3,900 1,200 6,800 
- -
2,200 
600 600 900 
600 600 
-
' 
-
-
900 
200 
- -200 
- - -
5,000 2,100 10,900 
5,AOO 2,500 12,700 
5,800 2,500 
-
- -
12,700 
10,80') 4,600 23,600 
10,800 4,600 7,800 
- -
15,800 
95 
,;d 
,;d 
Q) Q:i 
...Q 
...Q Cl.l 
Cl.l 
...::: 
...Q <:,) 
<:,) 
.s 
.s ~ 00 
900 
-
- -
900 
4,800 400 
- -
4,800 400 
1,500 
-
- -
1,500 
" 
200 
-
200 
-
-
7,400 ~: 
8,600 500 
8,600 500\ 
16,000 900 
- -
16,000 900 
CI.J 
I: 
,;d 0 en 
"i) 
'"' 
...Q <£ 
00 
rJl 
...Q Q) 
<:,) bJ) 
.s .. td 
~ ..c:: 0 
200 
200 
1,900 
1,900 
-
300 
300 
-
-
-
2,400 
2,800 
2,800 
5,200 
2,400 
2,800 
-
-
400 
-
400 
-
-
-
-
400 
500 
500 
900 
-
900 
[ 451] 
CANNON 
POWDER. 
00 
"0 
s:: 
::s 
0 
~ 
38,950 
38,950 
327,450 
95,735 
231,715 
122,400 
------
122,400 
6,700 
6,700 
495,500 
579,850 
579,850 
1,075,350 
134,685 
940.665 
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Old forts and batteries. "Table A 
New fortifications completed. Table B 
96 
Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Requirf'd 
On hand 
To be provided 
Foni1ications under construction. Table C. Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Works to be constructed after those in tablf D Required 
of statement 1 are completed. Table E. On ha.1.1d 
Works to be last commenced. Table F 
To be provid~d 
Required from A toE 
Required 
On hand 
To be provided 
Grand total required • 
Grand total on hand -
STATEMENT-
Grand total to be provided • 
NoTs.-The cost of saltpetre and brimstone may be 
0RDNANCI!! OF~ICE, 
WasltiugtoJt, Januaryl6, 1840. 
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Continued. 
COST OF ARMAMENT. 
Cannon. Carriages. Projectile~. Powder. Total amount. 
------ -------
$20,320 00 $20,660 00 $9,138 00 $7,790 00 $57,908 00 
15,550 00 13,200 00 6,762 eo 7,790 00 43,309 00 
------
4,770 00 7,460 00 2,376 00 
-
14,606 0() 
------------
------------
164,075 00 164,745 00 76,870 00 65,4.<}0 00 471,180 00 
101,975 00 78,125 00 43,62o oo 19,147 00 242,873 00 
------ ------
62,100 00 86,620 00 33,244 00 46,343 00 228,307 00 
------ ------ ------
62,530 00 59,950 00 23,812 00 24,480 00 170,772 00 
43,150 00 6,200 00 11,243 uo 
-
60,593 0() 
------
-----~ ------------
19,380 00 53,750 00 12,569 00 24,480 00 110,179 00 
------ ---·---------
3,550 00 3,590 00 1,372 00 1,340 00 9,852 00 
500 00 
-
244 00 
-
744 00 
------
------------
3,050 00 3,590 00 1,128 00 1,340 00 9,108 0() 
------ ------
250,475 00 248,945 00 111,192 00 99,100 00 709,712 00 
~293,080 00 290,990 00 130,181 00 115,970 00 830,221 00 
7,750 00 7,500 00 5,412 00 
-
20,662 00 
------ ------- ------
285,330 00 283,490 00 124,769 00 115,970 00 809,559 0() 
------·------------
543,555 00 539,935 00 241,373 00 215,070 00 1,539,933 0() 
168,925 00 105,025 00 67 ,2tl7 00 26,937 00 368,174 0() 
374,630 00 434,910 00 174,086 00 188,133 00 1,171,759 0(11 
' 
estimated at one-half of the cost of gunpowder. 
7 
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REPORT 
ON 
THE NORTHERN FRONTIER. 
This frontier extends, as described by the terms of the resolution, from 
Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than 
two thousand miles, binding all the way on the British American Prov-
inces. 
Whether we regard the strongly marked geographical features of this fron-
tier, presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes or in-
land seas, stretching along the border, the common property of both na-
tions, and affording fa.cilities for an extensive commerce, almost rivalling 
that of the ocean itself; or whether we look to the growing strength of our 
colonial neighbors, fostered by the immense power and resources of the 
mother country ; its vast importance cannot fail to impress us with the ne-
cessity of being prepared, not only for defence aloug that line, but also to 
act offensively, with decisive effect, in the event of our being involved in a 
conflict. 
From the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily 
partake somewhat of the system applicable to the seacoast; for, although 
it is denominated inland, in contradistinction to the latter, it is, neverthe-
less, maritime in many of its features, and must be treated accordingly for 
purposes of defence. 
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in 
that quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of war, there 
will be some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the as-
cendancy on those waters. Whichever Power shall acquire that, even tem-
porarily, will have the means of assailing his adversary with great effect 
along the shores of the lakes, in the absence of fortifications, by occupying 
the harbors, destroying the towns, (some of which are fast advancing to 
the rank of cities,) and controlling the commercial operations of which those 
lakes coflstitute the principal channeL These considerations render it high-
ly expedient-indeed, necessary-to fortify the larger harbors on the Jakes, as 
well as the more important passes on the straits and rivers by which they 
are connected. 
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, which 
might be deemed somewhat out of place here, regarding the object of the 
resolution, which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the board 
will proceed to enumerate the works of defence deemed necessary on the 
northern frontier, beginning at Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects 
.and advantages which are likely to result from the establishment of those 
works. 
' 1. Fort at Ff!llls of St. Mary.-A fort here will control the commu-
nication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an 
enemy from availing itself of it for purposes of communication and for the 
transpor~ation of supplies, if it does not secure those important advantages 
to us; which it would do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side 
of the line. In that event, almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, 
but would still serve to cover and protect our settlements along the St • 
.Mary, and form a rallying point for local defence in times of alarm. 
99 
Estimated expense of fort, barracks, &c. - . 
2. J?ort at Michilimackinac.-Although this position is 
somewh~t interior, it is regarded of high importance from its 
geographical relations. A fort here, in conjunction with float-
ing batteries, may be made to command, effectually, the ap-
proach to Lake Michigan, and shut out an enemy who might 
possess a naval ascendancy on Lake Huron; thus protecting 
the entire circumference of Lake Michigan from attacks t0 
which it would otherwise be exposed, even from a small 
force, and securing it to ourselves, as a safe channel of com-
munication with the rich and productive States in the rear, 
whose shores it washes. 
Estimated expense 
3. Fort at the foot of Lake Fiuron.-A work here will 
control the outlet of Lake Huron, and interrupt the navigation 
between that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It 
will serve, also, to cover the settlements on that part of the 
frontier, and form a rallying point for the neighboring militia 
for local defence. 
Estimated expense 
4. Fort and barrack establishment at Detroit.-In the 
event of war, Detroit would undoubtedly be a point of con-
siderable concentration of troops, not merely for the defence 
of that portion of the frontier, but for such offensive operations 
as might be deemed expedient in that quarter. lt may be 
regarded as the centre of the upper section of the northern 
frontier, and has important relations, both geographical and 
military. Although true policy would, in such a case, dictate 
that our chief efforts should be directed against the vital 
points of the enemy's possessions as low down the line as 
practicable, still it might become expedient, with a view to 
distract his attention and divide his forces, to menace him 
above; and this is one of the points from which he might 
be assailed by minor expeditions, especially if he should relax 
his measures of defence, in looking to his safety elsewhere. 
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment, including 
site $150,000 
Estimated expense of fort at Spring Wells, in-
cluding site - - - - - 100,000 
5. Field-worlc and barrack-establishment at or nea7' Buf-
falo.-1'he wealth and commercial importance of Buffalo, and 
its close proximity to the British line, will make it an object 
of attack in time of war, unless it be protected by the presence 
of a respectable force there. It may also become a point of 
concentration of troops for minor offensive movements, by 
way of diversion; and i~ thus, in every view, entitled to sea-
sonable attention. An extensive barrack-establishment, de-
fended by field-works, would be suffi.ci~nt for all necessary 
objects. 
Estimated expense 
6. Fort Niagara to be rel:;ailt.-A fort at this position is 
,. i~portant, Oit the assumption (admitting, it is believed, of but 
litt_le dou~t ). ~hat in time of war there would be some naval 
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preparations on Lake Ontario. It commands the entrance 
into the Niagara river; and a work here will shut the enemy's 
vessels out from that harbor, while it will afford protection 
under which ours may take sheller in case of need. 
Estimated expense of completing the work n.ow in pro· 
gress - - - - - - $27,500 
For repairs of buildings and new barracks there 37,500 
7. Fort at Oswr-Fro.-The growing importance of Os-
wego, the relation it bears to the great line of internal com-
munication to the west, and its exposed situation, directly on 
the shore of the lake, from whence it might be assailed by 
armed vessels without the co·operation of a laud attack, call 
for works of defence to protect the harbor, and thus secure a 
safe retreat for our vessels in case of need, while we shut out 
those of the enemy. Besides, this place possesses many ad-
vantages for naval preparations for vessels of light draught 
of water, and would probably be made a subordinate depot in 
time of war. 
Estimated expense of completing the works now in pro-
. gress - $20,000 
For barracks, quarters, storehouses, and maga-
zine 25,000 
8. Fort' at Sackett's Harbor.-In the event of naval 
armaments, to any considerable extent, being resorted to on 
Lake Ontario, Sackett's Harbl)r, from its bold water, and its 
excellence as a harbor, would at once become a depot of great 
importance; the safety of which shonld be insured against the 
enterprises of the enemy, by the timely construction of appro-
priate works of defence. Situated directly opposite to the 
strong post of Kingston, on the Canadian side, and adjace~t 
to the head of the St. Lawrence, it is one of the points at 
which a concentration of troops may become expedient for 
the defence of that portion of the frontier and the protection 
of the naval depot. The barrack accommodations already 
established there are deemed sufficient, and it remains to 
fortify the approach to the harbor. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks within 
9. Fort at · the narrows of the St. Lawrence, below Og-
densburg.-The chief object of a work here would be to cut 
off the enemy's communication, by the river, between Montreal 
and Kingston, and thus prevent him from availing himself 
of that channel for the transportation of troops and supplies, 
if we cannot entirely secure it to ourselves. By this ob-
struction on the St. Lawrence, he would be thrown alto-
gether upon his back line of communication by the Ottawa, 
which, althongh it has the merit of bemg more secure 
from interruption, is longer and more difficult, especially in 
~easons of drought. This would also be another point from 
which the enemy might be menaced, and from which auxil-
iary movements might be made in aid of the chief attack. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks - - • 
$65,000 
45,000 
75,060 
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10 • . Ji'ort near thP. line on Lake Champlain.-A work here 
may be made to command the pass of the Jake, and is con-
sidered by far the most important of any proposed on the 
whole line of frontier. 
The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar. 
While Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, stretch their whole 
length directly along the border, (forming, in fact, the boun-
dary,) Champlain extends deeply into our territory, at right 
angles with the line of the frontier; and, while its southern 
extremity reaches almost to the Hudson, it finds its outlet, 
to the north, in the St. Lawrence, nearly midway between 
Montreal and Quebec, the two great objects of attack. 
This is undoubtedly the avenue by which the British pos-
sessions may be most effectually assailed; while, at the same 
time, it would afford to the enemy possessing a naval ascend-
ancy equal facilities for bringing the war within our own bor-
ders, if it be left unfortified. Jt therefore becomes important to 
fortify a point as near the line as practicable, so as to shut 
out the enemy's vessels, and thus effect the double object of 
protecting the interior shores of the lake from the predatory 
attacks to which they would otherwise be exposed, and of secu-
ring it to ourselves, as the great channel by which our troops 
and supplies may be rapidly thrown forward to the points of 
attack or def{mce. 
For a permanent work on Stony point, (N. Y.,) including 
purchase of site - - - - $300,000 
For a permanent work on 'Vindmill point, 
(Vt.,) including purchase of site - 300,000 
11. Barrack establishment and depot at Plattsburt;.-
ln the event of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot 
for the operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of con-
centration of troops preparatory to any offensive movements, 
and the station of the reserve to sustain those movements, and 
the posts that may be established in advance. Even in time of 
peace, a respectable force should be posted here, especially 
during the continuance of the boundary question and liJonler 
disturbances. Barracks for a regiment, at least, with suitable 
storehouses, are recommended to be erected, on a plan admit-
ting of extension, if required, and also of suitable defensive 
arrangements. 
Estimated expense of completing the works in progress, 
on the scale here suggested - - - -
12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical fea-
tures of the frontier materially change character, and re-
quire a corresponding modification of the means of defence. 
The line no longer intersects great lakes, admitting. of naval 
preparations, nor binds on straits and rivers, the navigation 
of which may be controlled or interrupted by fortifications. 
It is altogether inland, until it reaches the St. Croix, where 
the principles that have been applied to other portions of 
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the frontier similarly situated will again become applicable. 
Running on a parallel of latitude to the Connecticut river, 
and thence along a chain of highlands, not yet clearly defined, 
to the Province of New Brunswick, the board are not aware 
that there are any points immediately on the frontier suffi-
ciently commanding, of themselves, to call for the establish-
ment and maintenance of fortifications, or works of defence. 
Should it ever become necessary to sustain, by force, our 
title to the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by 
isolated forts along the frontier, commanding, probably, 
nothing beyond the range of their own guns, but by an 
active army, competent not only to occupy the country and 
hold it, but also to assume the offensive, if necessary, and 
carry the war beyond our borders. 
But while it is not deemed expedient to construct a chain 
of forts along this portion of the frontier, the board consider 
it a proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our 
relations with the British Provinces, that positions should be 
selected, and preparatory arrangements made, for the estab-
lishment of depots of supplies at the head of navigation on 
the Kennebunk and Penobscot. In the event of movements 
in that quarter: the~e wonld be proper points for the concen-
tration of troops, and would serve as a base of operations, 
whether these :should be offeusive or defensive in their cha-
racter. 
Estimated expense of storehouses and other accommoda-
tions 
13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here, 
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine 
from the attacks to which it would otherwise be exposed, 
may, from its advanced pnsition, be made to act an important 
though indirect part in the defence of the more northern 
portion of the frontier. Calais appears to be a very eligible 
point for the concentration of troops, with reference to exist-
ing circumstances. A strong force stationed here, threatening 
the enemy's posts on the lower St. John's, and held ready to 
strike in that direction, in case of movements from New 
Brunswick towards the disputed territory, could not fail to 
have a decisive influence on such movements ; since it is 
obvious that they could not be made with safety, while ex-
posed to attack in flank and rear, and to have their line of 
communication intercepted, and their depots seized, by a 
prompt movement on our part from the St. Croix. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks -
14. In reference to the northern frontier, general] y, it is 
the decided opinion of the board, that, besides the defences 
which have been suggested along the border, chiefly for pur· 
poses of local protection, there should be a great central 
station at some position in the interior, at which troops might 
be assembled for instruction, and where they would still be 
$150,000 
1.03 
within supporting distance of the more exposed parts of the 
frontier. 
Turning our views inland in search of some single posi-
tion at which preparations might be made for extended opera-
tions on this frontier, and from which aid and succor could 
always be speedily derived, some position which, while it 
shall be equally near to many important points of the en.-
emy's possessions, shall afford, at no time, any indication 
of the direction in which our efforts are to be made ; which 
will, if it be possible, unite the opposite qualities of being at 
the same time remote and proximate, far as to distance, but 
near as to time ; which, while it brings a portion of the 
military resources of the country to the support of the inland 
frontier, and places them in the best attitude for operations 
in that quarter, whether defensive or offensive, at the same 
time takes them not a way from the seacoast. Looking for 
these various properties, we find them all united, in a re-
markable degree, in the position of Albany. 
From this place, by steamboat, canal-boat, or railroad-car, 
troops and munitions conld be transported, in a short time, 
to Buffalo, or onward to Detroit, to Oswego, to Sackett's Har-
bor, to Plattsburg, to Boston, and along the coast of New 
England; to New York by steamboat now, and soon by rail-
road also; and thence onward to Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Washington, and the heart of the southern country, if ne-
cessary. In a word, Albany is a great central position, from 
which radiate the principal lines of communication to the 
north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; and com-
bines so many advantages for a military depot, that the expe-
diency of occupying it, and thus availing ourselves of those 
advantages, would seem to be manifest. 
Estimated expense of the purchase of land, and the con-
struction of barracks and other buildings 
Total for northern frontier 
[ 4{11] 
$300,000 
$2,160,000 
------
------
The board beg leave to observe, in conclusion, that, in the preparation of 
the estimates submitted, they hnve not attempted to aim at precision .. 
Hence the amounts stated for the various objects are to be regarded only as 
approximations. 'rhey could not be any thing more, on the data used, 
which, for want of minute surveys and reconnaissances, were necessarily 
vague. It is believed, however, that the results presented will be found 
sufficiently accurate for the general purposes contemplated by the resolu-
tion under which this report has been prepared. 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Col. Engineers. 
S. THAYER, 
Lieut. Col. of Engineers and Bvt. Col. ' 
T. CROSS, 
Col. and Ass' t Quartermaster General. 
G. TALCOTT, 
Lieutenant Colonel of Ordnance .. .. 
Estimated cost f[/ ordnance of all kinds, 'requiredjm· the annarnent f[/ the northern frontier, embracing cannon mounted, 
and one hundred 'rounds of ammunition for each piece. 
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Works at Falls of St. Mary 
- -
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-
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- -
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Fort at Michilimackinac 
- - 400 
-
400 200 
- -
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Fort of Lake Huron 
- - - -
400 400 200 
-
200 
Fort for Spring Wells, below Detroit 
- -
1,000 400 400 400 200 200 
Buffalo and Black Rock -
-
-
1,000 400 400 200 200 200 200 
Fort Niagara - -
- - -
1,600 400 400 200 200 600 200 
Fort Ontario at Oswego 
- -
-
800 1,300 40.0 200 200 600 200 
Sackett's Harbor - . 
-
-
1,000 400 400 200 200 200 200 
Fort at the narrows of the St. Lawrence 1 ,@00 400 400 400 200 200 
Fort on N('W York side at Champlain 
- 6,400 1,000 400 400 1,200 400 2,600 200 
Fort on opposite side - -
- 6,400 1,000 400 400 1,200 400 2,600 200 
Plattsburg - -
- -
400 400 400 200 
-
200 200 
Head-waters of the Kennebec 
- - -
400 400 800 200 
-
200 400 
Head-waters of the Penobscot 
- - -
400 400 800 20(1 
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- -
-
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-
200 400 
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For the Board : 
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$1,540 $3,160 $1,016 $540 $6,256 
2,040 1,9GO 1,128 780 5,908 
1,540 3,160 1,0lfi 540 6,256 
3,630 6,920 2,376 1,380 14,306 
4,010 7,Hi0 2,928 1, 740 15,838 
6,170 8,460 3,760 2,860 21,250 
6,170 9,650 3,058 2,440 21 '318 
4,010 7,160 2,928 1,740 15,838 
3,(;30 6,920 2,35(i 1,680 14,586 
:H,350 32,620 12,280 10,600 86,85(1 
31,350 32,620 12,280 10,600 86,850 
2,290 4,960 1,416 1,020 9,686 
2,89C 6,760 1,610 1,200 12,460 
2,890 6,760 1,610 1,200 12,460 
2,890 6,760 1,610 1,200 12,460 
------
--- --- ---
106,400 145,030 51,372 39,520 342,322 
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel of Engineers. 
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ON THE 
WESTERN FRONTIER, FROM '.fHE SABINE BAY TO LAKE SUPERIOR. 
The principles which should govern in fortifying the seaboard are not 
-considered applicable to · our inland frontiers, which will very rarely be 
found to call for regular fortifications. Hence, in relation to that portion 
{)f the frontier now under consideration, the duty of the board will be per~ 
formed by indicating the military positions or stations which should, in 
their opinion, be occupied by troops, in order to accomplish the objects in 
view, and' in presenting estimates of the probable cost of constructing the 
necessary barracks, quarters, and storehouses, combined with such works 
of defence as circumstances may appear to require, to insure their protection 
against the attacks to which they may be exposed. 
The want of personal knowledge, on the part of the board, of our exten-
sive we:stern frontier, and the very limited surveys which have been made 
in that quarter, have somewhat embarrassed them in the selection of posi-
tions; but they desire to be understood as merely designating places in a 
geographical sense, leaving the particular sites on which the works should 
be erected to be determined hereafter, by minute examinations of the coun-
try at and around those positions; which become the more important, inas-
much as the original locations of some of the places that will be recom:-
mended to be retained have been considered faulty. 
The southern section of this frontier, extending from the Sabine bay to 
the Red river, borders all the way on 'Texas, arid has, it is believed, little or 
nothing to apprehend from Indian aggressions. 'rhe Cumanches, the 
only tribe of any power in that quarter, are represented as gradually reced-
ing to the westward, and the progress of the Texian settlements will tend 
to push them farther from our border. But our reladons with the Texian 
republic, however amicable they may be at present, would seem to require 
that some military force should be stationed on or near the boundary-line; 
and the board therefore recommend the establishment of two small posts on 
the Sabine river, suppressing Fort Jesup, which is considered too far within 
the~fi·ontier, or retaining it merely as a healthy cantonment. 
As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national 
police more than to military defence; they ought to be established on the 
river where the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to 
supervise the chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at the 
same time, control the navigation of the Sabine. 'rhe points where the 
Opelousas and Natchitoches roads, leading to Texas, strike the river, are 
therefore recommended as the positions which should be occupied, and at 
whic.h barracks for two or three companies, defended by light works, should 
be constructed. 
The middle section, which extends from the Red river to the Missouri, is 
by far the most important portion of the whole of our western frontiir. It 
is along this line that the numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated 
from the east have been located; thus adding to the indigenous force al-
ready in that region, an immense mass of emigrants, some of whom have 
been sent thither by coercion, with smothered feelings of hostility rankling 
in their bosoms, which, probably, waits but for an occasion to burst forth 
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in all its savage fury. These considerations alone would seem to call for 
strong precautionary measures; but an additional motive will be found in 
our pecnliar relations with those Indians. 
We are bound, by solemn treaty stipulations! to interpose force, if neces-
sary, to prevent domestic strife among them, preserve peace between the 
several tribes, and to protect them against any disturbances at their ne\\r 
homes, by tile wild Indians who inhabit the country beyond. The Govern-
ment has thus contracted the two-fold obligation of intervention among, and 
protection of, the emigrant tribes, in addition to the duty which it or.ves to 
its own citizens of providing for their safety. · 
It appears to the board that this obligation can only be properly fulfilled 
by maintaining advanced positions in the Indian country with an adequate 
restraining military force; and that the duty of protecting our own citizens 
will be best discharged by establishing an interior line of posts along the 
western border of the States of Arkansas and Missouri, as auxiliaries to the 
advanced positions, and to restrain the int{'rcourse between the whites and 
the Indians, and serve as rallying-points for the neighboring militia in times 
of alarm. 
With these views they would recommend the maintenance of Fort Tow-
sou, on Red river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas; and the establishment 
of a post at the head of navigation on the Kansas, and one at Table creek, 
on the Missouri, below the mouth ofthe Big Platte, as constituting the ad· 
vanC€d positions on this portion of the froutier. 
Por the secondary line intended for the protection of the border ·settle-
ments, the board would adopt the positions which have been selected by a 
commission of experienced officers, along the western boundary of Arkansas 
and Missouri; at some of which, it is understood, works are already in pro-
gress, namely, Port Smith, on the Arkansas river; Fort "\Yayne, on the Illi-
nois; Spring river, and Marais de Cygne; terminating to the north at Fort 
Leavenworth, on the Missouri. They wonld also recommend the estab-
lishment of one or two intermediate posts between the Arkansas and Red 
rivers, if, on further examination of the country, suitable positions can be 
selected near the State JiiJe. It is not deemed advisable to establish those 
posts on the route of the road lately surveyed, which (especially the southern 
portion) is considered too far in advance of the border settlements to accom· 
plish the object in view; but if eligible positions cannot be found along the 
line, then a post on the road, where it crosses the Poteau river, which is 
not very remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence. 
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri 
river to Lake Superior, the board would recommend the establishment of a 
post near the upper forks of the Des Moines river; the maintenance of Fort 
Snelling, on the Mississippi; and the ultimate establishment of a post at the 
western extremity of Lake Superior. The last is suggested with some quali-
fication, for want of the necessary information by which to determine the 
channel of communication to that remote position. Whether it shall be 
through Lake Superior, or by the Mississippi and its tributaries, it would, 
in either case, be difficult in peace, and next to impracticable in time of 
war. As the position has, however, important geographical relations, and 
would enable ns to extend our influence and control over the Indians with-
in our territory, and afford protection to our traders in that remote region~ 
it would seem to be worthy of early occupation, if its maintenance can be 
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rendered secure-a point which can only be determined by a careful exami· 
nation of the country. . 
It is, nevertheless, recommended to retain Fort Crawford, at Prairie du 
Chien; Fort Winnebago, at the portage of the Fox and Wiskonsin rivers; 
and Fort Howard, at Green hay. These posts are deemed necessary to 
protect that portion of our frontier, while, at the same .time, they serve to 
cover an important line of intercommunication between the northern lakes 
and the western waters. 
It has not been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence, 
suggested for the middle section of this frontier, across from the Missouri to 
the Mississippi river. Our Indian relations in that quarter assume a dif· 
ferent aspect. There is no special guaranty of perpetual occupation of that 
country by the tribes who now inhabit it; uor can it be doubted that they 
will ultimately be pushed, by the advance of our population, to the west of 
the Missouri river. Under those circumstances, it is believed that the in-
termediate post recommended to be established on the Des Moines river, 
co-operating with the posts on the Missouri, and those on the Upper .M.issis. 
sippi, will afford adequate protection to the border settlements against any 
attacks to which they are likely to be exposed. 
The board have not felt called upon, by the terms of the resolution under 
which they act, to project a plan of operations for the western frontier; nor 
to go into an estimate of the military force that will be required there, far-
ther than was necessarv to determine the extent of accommodations to be 
erected, and the expense which these will ipvotve. rrhey would, however,. 
observe, that the positions which have been designated will not, of them-
selves, have the~ desired influence in restraining the Indian tribes and pro· 
tecting our border settlements, without the aid of -a respectable force, of 
which a full proportion should be mounted and held disposable, at all times, 
for active service in the field. · To effect this, the works should be so con-
structed that, while they will afford adequate accommodations for all the 
troops when they are not actively employed, their defence may be safely 
intrusted to a small force. With these precautionary measnres, and the 
co·operation of small but effective reserves posted within sustaining dis-
tances of the several sections of the frontier, it is believed that peace may be 
preserved, and the first onset of war met, until the militia of the neighbor-
ing country could be imbodied and brought into the field. 
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recom-
mended to be occupied, apportion the requisite force, and present a conjec-
tural estimate of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences 
deemed necessary at each. 
1. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where 
the Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences -
2. Por quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where 
the Natchitoches road crosses, including defences 
3. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 
500 men at Fort 'rowson, including defences 
4. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 
1,000 men, at Fort Gibson, including defences 
5. For quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas river, 
including defences 
$20,000 
20;000 
100,000' 
180,000 
60,000 
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6. For quarters and other accommodations for 500 men at 
the post at 'rable creek, near the mouth of the Platte, on 
the Missonri, including defences -
7. For qunrters and other accommodations for 400 men at 
the post on the Des Moines river, including defences 
8. For the enlargement and repair of Fort Snelling, to fit it 
for the accommodation of 300 men: including defences -
9. For quart.ers for 400 men at the post at the western ex-
tremity of Lake Superior, including defences 
INTERIOR LINE. 
10. For quarters for 200 men at the post between the Red 
and Arkansas rivers, including- defences • 
11. For completing quarters and other accommodations for 
200 men at Fort Smith, including defences 
12. For completing quarters and other accommodations for 
200 men, at Fort Wayne, including defences . 
13. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at 
the post at Spring river, including defences 
14. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at 
the post at ~arais de Cygne: including defences -
15. For completi~g quarters and other accommodations in 
progress for 400 men at Fort Leavenworth, includmg de-
fences , - - - . - - - -
Total for western frontier 
All which is respectfully submitted : 
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$75,000 
60,000 
30,000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,000 
$895,000 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel Engineers. 
,!. 
S. THAYER, 
Lieut. Col. Engineers, Brevet Colonel. 
T. CROSS, 
Col. and Assistant Quartermaster General. 
G. rrALCOTT, 
Lieutenant Colonel Ordnance. 
Estimated cost of ordnance of all kinds, required for the atmament of the western frontier, embracing cannon mounted, 
and one hundred 1·ounds of ammunition for each piece. 
- I 
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Poston the Sabine, at the crossing of the Opelousas road 
Post on the Sabine, where the Natchitetches road crosses 
Proposed establishment for 500 men, at Fort Towson-
Proposed eslablishment for 1,000 men, at Fort Gibson -
Propo!:>ed establishmentfor300 men, at the Kansas river 
Proposed establishment for 500 men, at a post on Table 
creek - - - - - - -
Proposed establishment for 400 men, at a post on the 
Des Moines - - - - - -
Repairs, &c., of Fort Snelling, for 300 men - -
Proposed establishment for 400 men, at a post on west .. 
ern extremity of Lake Superior - - -
Jnte1·ior line. 
For proposed establishment for 200 men, at a post te-
tween Red and Arkansas rivers - - -
For establishment at Fort Smith for 200 men - -
For establishment at Fort Wayne for 200 men- -
For establishment at Spring r:lver for 200 men- -
For ·es.tablishmt>nt at Marais de Cygne for 200 men • 
For e£tablishment at Fort LeaveBworth for 400 men -
-
-
-
2 
2 
4 
-
-
-
2 
2 
10 
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10 
10 
10 
10 
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10 
10 
10 
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10 
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1,500 1,000 1,000 250 
-
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-
-
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-
-
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1,500 1,000 1 ,0('0 250 
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1,0011 
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1,500 1,000 1,000 25<· 
$31( $3,043 
310 ~ 043 
30U 2:550 
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830 7,411 
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300 2,550 
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300 2,550 
-srn-3 -4151 147-4 soo 13,6oo 3ool 4oo 25,':25ojt6,432 --------17,433 5,182 5,050 -14,097 
For the Board : 
W .ASHINGTON, April 23, 1840. 
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, Colonel Engineers. 
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REPORT 
ON THE 
ARMORIES, ARSENALS, MAGAZINES, AND FOUNDRIES, WHICH ARE MENTION-
ED lN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE IN THE 
FOLLOWING WORDS, VIZ: 
"The armories, an,enals, magazines, and foundries, either constructeil. or deemed necessary, 
with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing such of said establishments as may 
not yet be completed or commenced, but which may be deemed necessary." 
The necessary arsenals and magazines will be first considered, as ar-
mories and foundries, being manufactories of arms destined for general 
distribution, do not pertain exclusively to any particular frontier. Arse-
nals and ordnance depots will be understood to include magazines in the 
general sense of the term; and these establishments will be rated: accord-
ing to their relative importance or magnitude, in three classes : 
I. Arsenals of construction, which embrace also repairs, and for deposite. 
II. Arser1als for repairs and for deposite. 
III. Depots, or places for deposite and safekeeping of arms, and other 
ordnance stores. 
I. On the northernfrontier,from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay.-
An arsenal, or ordnance depot, will be required at some suitable point 
on the Upper Mississippi; and Fort Crawford, at Prairie du Chien, offers a 
good position, particularly with reference to supplying the line or tract of 
country extending southwesterly from Fort Snelling, through the Terri-
tory of Iowa, towards the Des Moines river, as well as northwardly toward 
Lake Superior, and eastwardly through the Territory of "\Viskonsin to 
Lake Michigan. The expense of constructing this depot, on a scale com-
mensurate with the probable importance that must be given to it, will not 
be less than $70,000 
forming an arsenal of the third class. 
The Detroit arsenal, on the river Rouge, twelve miles 
from Detroit, now nearly finished, is an arsenal of the 2d 
class, destined to supply the lake frontier from the Sault 
de St. Marie, the outlet of Lake Superior, to Lake Michigan 
and Lake Erie 20,000 
will effect the completion of this arsenal. 
Allegany arsenal, at Pittsburg, an establishment of the 
1st class, is also available fo.:r the supply of the lake fron-
tier, as well as the western frontier, through the western 
arsenals. 
Rome arsenai, of the 3d class, is the place of deposite for 
stores required at the posts on Lake Ontario. 
Champlain arsenal, at Vergennes, Vermont, also of the 
3d class, will supply the posts on Lake Champlain and 
the northern part of Vermont. But the whole lake frontier, 
and the arsenals in that region, may be supplied from the 
W J.tervliet arse:1al, near Albany, which is an establishment 
of the 1st class, and admirably located for the preparation 
and sending forth of ordnance stores, not only to the north-
ern, put Jikewi~e to the maritime frontier. The periods of 
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free navigation of the New York canals, and the Hudson 
river, are used for the distribution from Watervliet of such 
supplies as may be required in the winter season. 
The Kennebec arsenal, at Augusta, Maine, of the 2d 
class, is designed to supply the northern and eastern fron-
tiers of that State, and part of New Hampshire; but arms 
would be furnished to the frontier of the latter State from 
Springfield armory, and ordnance stores would be passed 
up the valley of the Connecticut from arsenals either east 
or west of that river. 
It may become necessary to establish a depot on the Pe-
nobscot, at Bangor. But this point is only· 60 miles from 
Augusta; and no estimate of the cost is furnished, as the de-
posite would, probably, be temporary. 
II. The ·maritime frontier from Passamaquoddy bay to 
Cape Florida.-The Kennebec arsenal is the place of depos-
ite for the greater part of the seacoast of Maine ; the sum of $30,000 00 
will finish the additions required. 
'rhe w·atertown arsenal, five miles in the Tear of Boston, 
also of the 2d class, will supply the westerly part of Maine, 
the seacoast of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island ; and 25,000 
will be required for additional buildings and enclosures. 
Both the Kennebec and "iV atertown arsenals are of con-
siderable extent, with every facility for being converted into 
arsenals of the 1st class; and the construction of gun-car-
riages, necessary for arming the forts and batteries within 
the limits above stated, may be effected at both or either. 
The Watervliet arsenaL before mentioned, is, however, the 
principal one relied on for supplies required, not only from 
Cape Cod to the capes of Delaware bay, but for much of 
the maritime as well as tho lake frontier. Additional quar-
ters and storehouses at this post will cost - 50,000 
A depot in the harbor of New York receives articles from 
Watervliet, during the season of navigation, which are tran-
shipped, in time of peace, to all parts of the coast and to 
the Mississippi. During a war, supplies would be furnished 
from arsenals in the more immediate vicirtity of the sea-
coast defences, viz : Frankford arsenal, six miles above 
Philadelphia, is of the 2d class, and will supply works on 
Delaware bay and river; Pikesville arsenal, of the 3d class, 
four miles from Baltimore ; ·washington arsenal and Fort 
Monroe arsenal, both of the 1st class, will furnish what 
may be required for the seacoast defences of Chesapeake bay 
and Potomac river. The last mentioned was established 
with special reference to the construction of the gun-car-
riages required at that post and at Fort Calhoun. It has 
been found advantageous, however, to construct there car-
riages for other southern forts; but it cannot be considered 
as a permanent establishment ofth.e 1st class, to ·be kept up 
after the occasion which called for it shall have passed by~ 
The North Carolina arsenal, at Fayetteville, on Cape. 
Fear river, is under construction, an<l was originally ill-
113 
tended to be made one of the 1st class. Doubts have been 
~mtertained whether it ought to exceed those of the 2d class ; 
but the plan is such that it can at any time be extended 
according to the original design. The sum of eighty thou-
sand dollars will be required to finish it as one of the 2d 
'Class 
Charleston depot is at present of diminitive capacity. It 
is proper to enlarge it, and thirty thousand dollars will make 
it useful as a place of deposite 
Augusta arsenal, at Augusta, Georgia, is of the 2d class, 
and, with the two last mentioned, will furnish supplies re-
quired from Chesapeake bay to Cape Florida. 
The Augusta arsenal has its powder magazine detached 
and located at an inconvenient distance, beyond the control 
of the force at the post. For the construction of a new 
magazine, and other necessary additions to this establish-
ment, sixty thousand dollars will be required 
Several of the arsenals have been built upwards of 20 
years, and require extensive repairs and additions, which it 
is supposed may be effected, from time to time, by the aid 
of annual appropriations, amounting in all to about 
III. " The Gulf frontier, from Cape Fwrida to Sabine 
hay."-Appalachicola arsenal, at Chattahoochie, just below 
the junction of the Chattahoochie and Flint rivers ; Mount 
Vernon arsenal, on the Mobile river; and Baton Rouge arse-
nal, on the Mississippi, are all establishments of the 2d 
class, and destined to supply the whole of the Gulf frontier, 
and the forts below New Orleans, on the Mississippi. About 
sixty thousand dollars will be required to complete them, 
and erect some additional buildings at Baton Rouge -
IV. " The westernfrontier,from Sabine bay to Lake Su-
perior."-Baton. Rouge arsenal, already mentioned, will 
furnish supplies for posts on. the Sabine and Red rivers. 
Little Rock arsenal, just commenced, will be the source 
of supplies for posts on the Arkansas, and along the western 
border of that State. It will necessarily become, at first, 
an arsenal of the 2d class, with the depot at Memphis as 
subsidiary, and will require one hundred thousand dollars 
to complete it - - - - . -
St. Louis arsenal is a large establishment of the 2d class, 
but, with very little expense, can be raised to the 1st class; 
with the subsidiary depot at Liberty, on the Missouri, it will 
supply the posts on that river, the western border of the 
State, the posts on the Des Moines, and the Upper Mississippi. 
A depot at Prairie du Chien, mentioned in relation to 
supplies required in the direction of Lake Superior, and 
southwesterly, through the Territory of Iowa, would be 
sustained by the St. Louis arsenal, and completes the chain 
upon the several frontiers embraced in the resolution. 
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and 
repairs to ar~~n?ls and depots - - - -
8 
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$80,000 
30,000 
60,000 
180,000 
60,000 
100,000 
$105,000 
-----
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Armories. 
The two national armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harper's 
Ferry, Virginia, are the only public establishments for the manufacture 
of small arms. They furnish about twenty-five thousand stand of arms 
yearly. This number might be extended ; but it has been an object of 
solicitude with the Government, for nearly twenty years past, to establish 
an armory west of the Alleganies. 
Commissioners were employed in 1823 to examine the western waters , 
with a view to the location of an armory. Many sites were surveyed, 
and careful estimates made of the cost of an armory at each, with an ex-
hibit of their several advantages and disadvantages. The result of their 
investigations may be found at large in Gales & Seaton's reprint of 
American State Papers, folios 729 to 790 inclusive, vol. 2, Military Affairs. 
It is perhaps fortunate that the place ~hen selected was not adopted by 
Congress; for, since that period, the immense increase, not only of popu-
lation and the general resources of the western region, but of the partic-
ular articles required for the manufacture of arms, by the discovery of 
masses of coal, and the extensive working of iron-mines, where nothing 
of the kind was then found, has shown that an armory should be located 
much farther west . 
. The data collected by the commissioners in 1823 may be usefully 
applied in estimating the probable cost of an armory at the present day, 
making suitable allowances for the increased price of every thing con-
nected with such an establishment. This cost will be found to vary, 
according to localities of positions, from $280,000 to $500,000 for an 
armory capable of furnishing twelve thousand muskets per year. It will 
therefore be stated at the mean of $390,000, to which twenty per cent. 
should be added ; making the sum of - - - $468,000 
Another mode of proceeding proposed, consists in forming 
an establishment ~omplete in itself, of limited extent, and 
having the great mass of component parts of arms manufac-
tured by the piece in private workshops, and only the in-
specting, assembling, and finishing be done at the public 
works. This course would materially reduce the first cost, 
or necessary expenditure for buildings and tools. It also 
admits of extension to a great amount of fabrication, with · 
but little additional cost of permanent fixtures. But, which-
ever me~de is followed, or whatever site may be selected for 
its location, there can be no question of the necessity for an 
armory on the western waters; and as regards a proper 
location, it may be observed, that, to consider the relations 
of an armory in the same light as that of an arsenal or mag-
azine, would be an error; the means of production being 
the principal requisite for the one, and those of transporta-
tion or distribution for the others. 
Total required for an armory on the western waters $468,000 
JJ'oundries. 
The United States own no cannon-foundry. Altho~gh possessing 
some ore-beds, from which iron pf approved quality for ~asting cannon 
.• 
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has long been made, yet artillery of every description is procured from 
private foundries. This subject has been so recently before Congress, 
and so ably treated, that nothing will be said further than to state the 
probable cost of such an establishment; and here, again, so much depends 
upon the location, that only an approximation will be attempted. A 
report from the ·war Department made to the 24th Congress, 1st session, 
Doc. No. 106, states the cost of a foundry, to be located at Georgetown, 
in the District of Columbia, at $312,000. If this estimate is correct, 
(and it is known that great care was bestowed on its preparation,) it may 
be assumed that about - - - , - $300,000 
will be required for a foundry when favorably located for 
the use of water-power. Should steam-power be adopted, 
the :first cost of the establishment would be less, while the 
annual expenditure would be greater than for water-power. 
As regards a suitable location for a foundry, the great 
weight and bulk of the raw materials used in the manufac-
ture of cannon, and the weight of heavy guns, which are 
required for use only on the seaboard, would seem to de-
mand that particular attention should be given to the means 
of transportation both to and from the foundry. 
Total amount required for a foundry $300,000 
Recapitulation. 
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and 
repairs to arsenals and depots 
Total amount required to establish an armory on the western 
waters 
Total amount required to establish a national foundry 
Total 
All which is respectfully submitted: 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
$705,000 
468,000 
300,000 
1,473,000 
Colonel EngineersA 
S. THAYER, 
Lieut. Col. Engineers, Brev. Col. 
T. CROSS, 
Colonel, Asst. Quarterm'r Gen' l. 
G. TALCOTT, 
Lieutenant Colonel Ordnance. 
